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ABSTRACT 
Charles Parsons has argued, roughly as follows, that 
we cannot succeed in quantifying over all collections. 
We seem bound to adopt a metatheory for ZP in which truth 
for ZB is definable. But if we try to define truth for 
ZF without recourse to semantical notions, we must admit 
quantifiers over proper classes. But then the domain of 
these class quantifiers may not seem to contain all collec- 
tions, since we must in turn obtain a tauth theory for this 
class theory. So we seem never to arrive at a theory in 
which we can talk about - all collections, 
I contend that we can do quite will with a theory in 
which satisfaction for the formulas of ZF is inductively 
defined; this theory will not embroil us i n  proper classes. 
We can determine in a sense directly, I argue, that the SAT 
predicate is well defined. 
Parsons has constructed a translation from NB (Von 
Neumann-Bernays set theory) into ZF plus i t s  truth theory. 
Can this translation be taken to provide an ontological 
reduction, or can it be so modified that it does? If 
it can, then in adopting ZF plus its truth theory we are 
perhaps already admitting, however unwittingly, the proper 
classes of NB. For if we reduce one ontology to another, 
we in effect show that in adopting the second ontology 
we are thereby committed tc? the first. 
I propose some constraints on the way in which the 
relevant structure of a theory must be preserved in that 
of another for there to be a genuine reduction. On this 
score, the would-be reduction of NB to ZF plus its truth 
theory is seen to fall short. 
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Chapter X 
Paradox and Second Order Quantir"icacFon 
In  s number of p a p e r s ,  publ i shed  s e v e r a l  years ago ,  bur: 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y  l i t t l e  d i scussed  i n  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  journals, 
Char les  Parsons p r e s e n t s  a case  f o r  t h e  view t h a t  we cannot 
succeed i n  making our  q ~ ~ a n t i f i e r s  ange over  a l l  c o l l e c t i o n s ,  
Much of  t h e  evidence f o r  t h i s  c a s e  c a n s i s t : ~  o f  corrs idera t ions  
a r i s i n g  from the  l i a r  paradox.  C u r r e n t l y ,  most of t h e  indus-  
t r y  genera ted  by t h e  l i a r  paradox seems co be d i r e c t e d  towards 
K r i p k e ' s  theory  of t r u t h ;  2 t h i s  might c r e a t e  t h e  i n p r e s s i o n  t h a t  
Kr ipke ' s  theory  somehow superceded Parsons ' r e f l e c t i o n s  , Suzh  
an impress ion ,  I am convinced,  would be mis taken.  For w h i l e  
most r e c e n t  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  L i a r  paradox a r e  l i k e  K r i p k e ' s ,  
ccncerned w i t h  i t s  consequences f o r  t h e  theory  of natural. 1sngl;- 
age ,  t h e r e  i s  a wider q u e s t i o n  of i t s  impact on languages  i n  
g e n e r a l .  Even if w e  can c o n s t r u e  the t r u t h  p r e d i z a t e  i n  n a t u r -  
a l  languages s o  t h a t ,  given ~ h s  express ive  power of n n t u r a 1  
l ang~ iages ,  no l i a r  paradox czn a r i s e ,  i n  a forms1 language ~ ? i ' ; i ~  
grcater e x p r e s s i v e  power t h e  same technique  may not  s u f f i c e ,  
i n s o f a r  as we wish t o  ma in ta in  t h a t  such s t r o n g e r  formal langu- 
ages a r e  meaningful ,  we a r z  s t i l l  f aced  w i t h  t h e  problem of 
avoid ing  paradox. A t  this juncture, Parsons '  o b s e r v a t i o n s  b e -  
cone once more r e l e v a c t .  
One way t o  s e e  p r e c i s e l y  how t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  desc r ibed  i n  
t h e  parsgraph above can a r i s e  i s  t o  cons ide r  c l ~ e  inadequate  
exprassLve power of t h e  languages Kripke c o n s t r u c t s  i n  h i s  theory 
of t r u t h . ,  Hence I w i l l  begin t h i s  paper  by focuss ing  on K r i p k e ' s  
theory .  Once t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  problem I have i n d i c a t e d  i s  more 
c l e a r ,  I w i l l  d i s c u s s  i n  t h e  body of  t h e  paper some a s p e c t s  of 
t h e  impact of t h e  l i a r  paradox on onto logy,  epis temology,  and t h e  
phi losophy of mathematics.  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  I w i l l  address  a t  
l e n g t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n :  must our  q u a n t i f i e r s  t a k e  a s  va lues  only 
c o l l e c t i o n s  from a  l i m i t e d  p o r t i o n  of t h e  mathematical  un ive r se?  
This  w i l l  involve  me i n  a c a r e f u l  examination of Parsons '  a rgu-  
ments on t h i s  s c o r e .  I s h a l l  a rgue  t h a t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o r i g i n a t -  
i n g  from t h e  l i a r  paradox a l o n e  should n o t  compel a  p l a t o n i s t  t o  
t h e  view t h a t  q u a n t i f i e r s  may n o t  range  over  a l l  c o l l e c t i o n s .  
Kr ipke ' s  theory  of  t r u t h  i s  b a s i c a l l y  an a t tempt  t o  con- 
s t r u e  t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  of n a t u r a l  language i n  such a  way a s  
t o  account f o r  u s e s  of c e r t a i n  Engl ish  sen tences  i n  which ' t r u e '  
occurs ,  namely those  sen tences  which t a l k  about. o t h e r  sen tences  
i n  which ' t r u e '  a l s o  o c c u r s .  T a r s k i  had de f ined  ' t r u e '  i n  h i s  
systems i n  such a  way t h a t  t h i s  s o r t  of t h i n g  could n o t  happen. 3 
On T a r s k i ' s  t h e o r y ,  i f  a  sen tence  A t a l k s  about: t h e  t r u t h  of 
sen tence  B ,  then  t h e  n o t i o n  of t r u t h  used i n  sen tence  A has a  
h igher  index than  any t h a t  i s  used i n  B .  But then  sentence  B 
could n o t  i n  t u r n  t a l k  about  t h e  t r u t h  of sen tence  A ,  s i n c e  any 
n o t i o n  of t r u t h  i n  B must,  i n  consequence, have both  a  lower and 
a h i g h e r  index than  any i n  A .  These r e s t r i c t i o n s  hold f o r  T a r s k i ' s  
systems e s s e n t i a l l y  because i n  t h e s e  systems t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  
i s  ' b i v a l e n t '  ; t h a t  i s ,  i t  i s  always d e f i n e d ,  s o  t h a t  f o r  any 
o b j e c t  i n  t h e  domain, t h a t  o b j e c t  s a t i s f i e s  e i t h e r  the  t r u t h  
p r e d i c a t e ,  o r  i t s  n e g a t i o n .  Given t h a t  chese systems can 
express  t h e i r  otm s y n t a x ,  t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e s  must be indexed 
i n  a  h i e r a r c h y  i n  o r d e r  t o  escape  the  l i a r  paradox.  1( r ipke1s  
theory  develops sugges t ions  advanced b y  a number of ph i loso-  
phers  ( e . g . ,  Mar t in ,  Putnam, Harman) t h a t  a  n a t u r a l  language 
be cons idered  t o  c o n t a i n  i t s  own t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e ,  and t h a t  
paradox be scotched by a l lowing t r u t h  v a l u e  gaps i n  t he  i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n  of the  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e .  There a r e  v a r i o u s  c o n s i d e r -  
a t i o n s  t h a t  make i t  d e s i r a b l e  t o  c o n s t r u e  n a t u r a l  language i r ~  
t h i s  way. F i r s t ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  unders tand the  c la im 
t h a t  n a t u r a l  languages a r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  which i s  what T a r s k i  
b e l i e v e s ,  I n  f a c t ,  only  t h e o r i e s  can be i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  and 
n a t u r a l  languages a r e  n o t  t h e o r i e s .  It seems t h a t  n a t u r a l  
language i s  b e s t  taken  a s  a s y n t a c t i c a l  system wi th  different 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  on d i f f e r e n t  o c c a s i o n s .  S2cond1 i t  i s  e v i d e n t  
t h a t  n a t u r a l  languages do n o t  possess  d i v e r s e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e s  
a r ranged i n  a h i e r a r c h y  a s  T a r s k i ' s  systems would have i t ,  
s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  j u s t  t h e  word ' t r u e  ' (o r  whatever) and no ' t r u e l  ' , 
1 t r u e p  ' , e t c .  , a s  i n  T a r s k i  Is languages .  T h i r d ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  
s o r t  of phenomenon which Kripke adduced, v i z , ,  t a l k  of t h e  kind 
which went on dur ing  Watergate ( t o  b e  more f u l l y  desc r ibed  
s h o r t l y ) ,  Four th ,  t r u t h  va lue  gaps e v i d e n t l y  appear  i n  o t h e r  
c o n t e x t s  i n  n a t u r a l  languages,  e .  g . , f a i l u r e  of p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ,  
vague te rms.  
R r i p k e ' s  theory  of  t r u t h  i s  a  p r e c i s e  formula t ion  of a 
language which has  i t s  own t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  and ' avo ids  paradox" 
(i. e .  , has an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n )  . A Kriplce language may b e  con- 
s t r u c t e d  i n  the  fo l lowing way.7k One s t a r t s  o u t  w i t h  a n  i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n  of a l l  t h e  sen tences  i n  t h e  language except  those  
w i t h  t h e  term ' t r u e '  i n  them. Then, i f  a sen tence  i s  t r u e  
i n  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  i t s  Godel number goes i n t o  t h e  ex- 
t e n s i o n  of t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e ;  i f  i t  i s  f a l s e ,  i t s  Godel 
number goes i n t o  t h e  a n t i e x t e n s i o n  of t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e ,  
where t h e  a n t i e x t e n s i o n  of  a  p r e d i c a t e  i s  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  of i t s  
n e g a t i o n .  Once t h i s  i s  done, new sen tences  a r e  thereby d e t e r -  
mined t o  be t r u e  o r  f a l s e  i n  t h e  i n t e r p r e t e d  language,  s i n c e  
I some sen tences  i n  which t h e  term t r u e '  occurs  now w i l l  have 
a de te rmina te  t r u t h  v a l u e .  The Godel numbers of t h e s e  sen tences  
a r e  i n  t u r n  thrown i n t o  t h e  ex tens ion  and an t i ex tens i -on ,  r e -  
s p e c t i v e l y ,  of t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e ,  This  process  i s  i t e r a t e d  
a s  o f t e n  a s  p o s s i b l e .  S ince  t h e r e  a r e  only  countably many 
s e n t e n c e s ,  i t  can go on on ly  countably many times b e f o r e  no new 
sen tences  a r e  determined t o  be t r u e  o r  f a l s e ,  
A s  Kripke p o i n t s  o u t ,  i n  such a  language i t  would be 
p o s s i b l e  t o  d i s c u s s ,  e . g . ,  Watergate .  For i n  Watergate i t  
happened o f t e n  enough t h a t  a  sen tence  was u s e d ,  c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  
1 term t r u e ' ,  which t a l k e d  about  a  sen tence  a l s o  c o n t a i n i n g  
' t r u e ' .  K r i p k e ' s  theory  shows how ' t r u e '  i n  t h e s e  sen tences  
can be understood u n i v o c a l l y .  Because t h e r e  a r e  such s i t u a -  
t i o n s  as Watergate ,  t h e r e  i s  some evidence cha t  ' t r u e '  i s  
"This w i l l  b e  a  s o - c a l l e d  minimal f i x e d  p o i n t  Language, 
sometimes employed i n  t h e  manner Kripke i n d i c a t e s .  Watergate 
was n o t  unique i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  of c o u r s e ;  K r i p k e ' s  theory could 
be motivated wi thou t  Zichard Nixon. 
Kripke n o t e s  t h a t  his languages a r e  incomplece i n  c e r t a i r \  
ways, however, There are p r e d i c a t e s  we would want t o  hold as 
k n t u i t i v e l y  meaningful ,  which cannot  be expressed  i n  h i s  language.  
Mow, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be  some p r e d i c a t e s  which cannot 
be cap tu red  on a  f i x e d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of a  countable  language 
may appear  t o  have a  s imple r  e x p l a n a t i o n .  Bor t h e r e  a r e ,  e . g . ,  
more than  countably many s u b s e t s  of U ;  corresponding t o  each 
such s u b s e t  i s  a p r o p e r t y  of n a t u r a l  n w ~ b e r s .  But f o r  every 
p roper ty  of  n a t u r a l  numbers, t h e r e  i s  a  p r e d i c a t e  i n  srme 
-- 
language which expresses  t h a t  p r o p e r t y ,  t h a t  i s ,  has  t h s c  sub- 
s e t  a s  i t s  e x t e n s i o n .  Against  t h i s ,  however, observe  t l ~ a t  whi l e  
i t  may be t r u e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some such p r e d i c a t e  i n  some language,  
t h i s  language and t h i s  predicat :e  may be r e c a l c i t r a n t  t o  , m y  
e f f o r t  t o  unders tand them, i n  t h a t  we may have no i n t u i t i v e  g rasp  
of t h e  p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c e t e s  of t h i s  language.  It  i s ,  of 
course ,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e x h i b i t  such a  p r e d i c a t e ;  f o r  once one has 
f u l l y  desc r ibed  a  p r e d i c a c e ,  i t  must s u r e l y  f a l l  i n  among 
those  p r e d i c a t e s  t h a t  we do g r a s p ,  Eut t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of 
-
c a r d i n a l i t y  seems t o  e f f e c t i v e l y  r u l e  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
we can understand every p r e d i c a t e  over  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers, 
I n  any e v e n t ,  we can unders tand t h e  p r e d i c a t e s  t h a t  I take! t o  
-
be i n e x p r e s s i b l e  i n  n a t u r a l  language. 
Thus, f o r  example, some sen tences  w i l l  never  g e t  a  t r u t h  
v a l u e  de f ined  i n  t h e  p rocess  I have d e l i n e a t e d ,  e , g , ,  t h e  l i a r  
sen tence  "I am n o t  t r u e .  " We grasp  p e r f e c e l y  w e l l  what i t  
means f o r  a sen tence  n o t  E O  b e  de f ined :  Kripke himself  has  ex- 
p l a i n e d  i t ;  y e t  i n  K r i p k e ' s  languages t h e r e  i s  apparen t ly  no 
p r e d i c a t e  which has  a s  i t s  ex tens ion  a l l  and only the  sen tences  
whose t r u t h  v a l u e  i s  undef ined .  Moreover, t h e r e  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
no p r e d i c a t e  i n  his languages which h a s  a s  i t s  ex tens ion  j u s t  
those  sen tences  which a r e  e i g h e r  f a l s e  o r  undef ined ,  and t h i s  
p r e d i c a t e  i s  a l s o  meaningful t o  u s .  Hence, i n s o f a r  a s  we i n s i s t  
on cons t ru ing  n a t u r a l  language s o  t h a t  i t  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  
t h e  way Kripk2 d e l i n e a t e s ,  na tura l .  language appears  unable  t o  
express  a l l  i n t u i t i v e l y  meaningful p r e d i c a t e s .  
One might t r y  co s t a v e  o f f  t h e  conclus ion  t h a t  n a t u r a l  
language cannot express  a l l  such meaningful p r a d i c a t e s .  As T 
have alre-ady i n d i c a t e d ,  i t  i s  r easonab le  t o  take a n a c u r a l  
language t o  be f l e x i b l e  enough f o r  i t s  p r e d i c a t e s  t o  have a 
v a r i e t y  of ex tens ions  i n  a v a r i e t y  of c i r cums tances ,  That 
t h e  analogous t h i n g  holds  f o r  demonst ra t ives  is obvious .  
One might hope t h a t  t h i s  f l e x i b i l i t y  would a l low n a t u r a l  language 
t o  express  each of t h e s e  meaningful p r e d i c a t e s ,  a l though of 
course  on d i s t i n c t  u s e s ,  The t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
a s  w e l l  as ' x  i s  n o t  t r u e ' ,  may on d i v e r s e  occas ions  have 
d i v e r s e  u s e s .  So one might t r y  t o  use '.u i s  n o t  t r u e '  a t  times 
so t h a t  i t s  e x t e n s i o n  c o n t a i n s  p r e c i s e l y  thosa  sentences  e i c h e r  
f a l s e  a r  undefined i n  t h e  Kripke language ,  Paradox would be  
warded o f f  because ,  a l though t h e  sen tence  ' t h i s  sen tence  i s  
n o t  t r u e '  would be i n t e r p r e t e d  as being n o t  t r u e l  (where n o t  
t r u e l  i s  t h e  new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of ' n o t  t r u e  ' ) no argument 
shows t h a t  t h e  sen tence  i s  a l s o  t r u e  1 ' For one could  no t  
i n f e r  t h a t  s i n c e  t h i s  l i a r  sen tence  says  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  t r u e l ,  
i t  t h e r e f o r e  says  something t r u e  t h a t  i s ,  t r u e  a s  on t h e  1 ' 
o l d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  What i t  does say i s  someelling t r u e 2 ,  
where t r u e 2  i s  t h e  n o t i o n  of t r u t h  f o r  t h e  language w i t h  ' t r u e '  
i n t e r p r e t e d  as t r u e l .  
Now can we proceed t o  i n t e r p r e t  ' t r u e '  a s  t r u e 2 ?  I be- 
l i e v e  t h a t  t a  do  his would v i o l a t e  some i n t u i t i o n s  about  how 
t h e  l i a r  sen tence  should  be unders tood.  For i t  would t u r n  o u t  
t h a t  t h e  l i a r  sen tence  would n o t ,  i n  an impor tant  s e n s e ,  t a l k  
about  i t s e l f .  Thus, suppose w e  do use  ' t r u e '  t o  mean t r u e  2 ' 
A s  I have remarked, t h e  l i a r  sen tence  then g e t s  i n t o  t h e  exten-  
s i o n  of ' t r u e '  i n  t h e  sense  of ' t r u e 2 '  because i t  i s  i n  the  
I e x t e n s i o n  of ' n o t  t r u e '  i n  the  sense  o f  ' n o t  t r u e l  . Hence, 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  - i n  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  of  ' n o t  t r u e '  i n  
1 1 t h e  sense  of ' a o t  t r u e 2  (however t h e  sense  o f  n o t  t r u e p '  
i s  p r e c i s e l y  e x p l i c a t e d )  i s  a l s o  because i t  i s  i n  t h e  ex ten-  
s i o n  of ' n o t  t r u e '  i n  t h e  sense  of ' n o t  t r u e l ' .  That i s ,  
t h e  l i a r .  s en tence  f a i l s  t o  g e t  i n t o  the  e x t e n s i o n  of i t s  own 
p r e d i c a t e  n o t  because of t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i t s  p r e d i c a t e  
p r e s e n t l y  h a s ,  b u t  i n s t e a d  b e c a l ~ s e  of t h e  ex tens ion  i t s  p r e -  
d i c a t e  used t o  have.  Thus, t h e  l i a r  sen tence  does not  t a l k  
about i t s e l f  be ing  under i t s  a c t u a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Ra the r ,  
i t  t a l k s  about  i t s e l f  being under a d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
In g e n e r a l ,  i n  t a k i n g  'not t r u e  ' t o  mean n o t  t r u e 2 ,  any 
sen tence  i n  which ' n o t  t r u e '  a p p e a r s ,  and which r e f e r s  t o  
o t h e r  sen tences  i n  which ' n o t  t r u e '  o c c u r s ,  a t t r i b u t e s  t o  these  
sen tences  a  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  ' n o t  t r u e '  from t h a t  
which i t  possesses  i t s e l f .  This  s i t u a t i o n  i s  unacceptable, 
inasmuch a s  what t h e  l i a r  sen tence  o r  a  s i m i l a r  sen tence  does 
i n  n a t u r a l  language,  i f  i t  does any th ing ,  i s  t o  t a l k  about i t s  
t r u t h  v a l u e  under t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i t  i n  f a c t  h a s ,  The 
only  way i n  which a  n a t u r a l  language could accommodate t h e  
above s o r t  of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  would be i 2  i t  con ta ined  two dis- 
t i n c t  words,  ' t r u e '  and ' t r u e l  ' , and s u r e l y  t h i s  no n a t u r a l  
language does .  It  may seem odd t h a t  t h e  e x p r e s s i v e  l i m i t a t i o n  
of  n a t u r a l  language should a r i s e  o u t  of what appears  t o  be a  
s y n t a c t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n ,  t h e  absence of  ' t r u e l ' ,  o r  t h e  l i k s ,  
from t h e  vocabulary .  But g iven  thac  ' t r u e '  cannot accommodate 
every n o t i o n  of t r u t h ,  a s  I have j u s t  argued i t  canno t ,  i t  i s  
j u s t  such a  " s y n t a c t i c a l "  l i m i t a t i o n  t h a c  would conf ine  t h e  
e x p r e s s i v e  c a p a c i t y  of n a t u r a l  language.  Observe,  moreover, 
t h a t  adding only t h e  words ' t r u e l '  and /o r  ' t r u e  ' t o  Engl i sh  2 
would n o t  r e a l l y  a m e l i o r a t e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  The s o r t  of problems 
which l e d  t o  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  ' t r u e l '  and /o r  ' t r u e 2 '  would 
v i s i t  i n  t u r n  t h i s  new language,  and c a l l  f o r  the  annexat ion 
I I 1 of ' t r u e 3  , t r u e 4  , e t c .  
A t  any r a t e ,  t h a t  n o t  a l l  i n t u i t i v e l y  meaningful p r e d i c a t e s  
can be expressed  i n  a n a t u r a l  language i s  n o t ,  a s  f a r  as  I can 
s e e ,  any cause  t o  d e s p a i r .  There i s  no a p r i o r i  reason t o  s u r -  
mise t h a t  i t  should  b e  o t h e r w i s e ,  In  any e v e n t ,  t h e r e  p l a i n l y  
are formal languages in which thes.. diverse predicates can 
be expressed. But the issue then arises: is there any problem 
dealing with the lier paradox within formal languages? It 
would seen, in the face of Tarski's way of defining truth, 
that there is not: for apparently, we can always set up truth 
theories for a language, a la Tarski, in which it is under- 
stood that the truth predicate does not apply to the meta- 
language itself. This view at first glance seems to offer 
ccmfort and security, but look again. In the case of set 
theory, it is not clear what a Tarski-style truth theory 
comes to. Tarski showed how, in languages of a restricted 
class; cruth theories can be constructed. If the range of che 
-
quantifiers is a set, and we understand the primitive pre- 
dicates of a language, then we can set up a truth theory for 
that language, without recourse to semantical notions. trow- 
ever, on a standard construal of the language of ZF, the 
range of the quantifiers is not a set, not a collection of 
any kind. There will be no way of eliminating semantical 
notions in a truth theory in the typical Tarski fashion. An 
example of a typical Tarski-style truth theory may help to 
explicate this point. Suppose a truth theory for the language 
of arithmetic is sought. The range of the quantifiers is a 
set, the set of all numbers. The Tarski style truth theory 
is effected in a theory in which some set theory is present. 
First, a conjunction of open formulas, call it A ( x ) ,  is 
defined : 
An e x p l i c i t  d e f i n i t i o n  of  s a t i s f a c t i o n  can be g i v e n :  
SU+(*,S\C-, L ACyl k < % l s \ , e y l  
From t h i s ,  we get t r u t h  f o r  c l o s e d  formulas :  
'4' is true tS 3 s %t s) 
11Jhy does t h i s  method miscar ry  f o r  t h e  language of ZF? 
CJell, l e t  us  endeavor t o  succeed.  Here i s  the obvious a t t e m p t :  
Define A(x) a s  t h e  con junc t ion  of  (1) - (4)  below. 
1) VsVnYiVi (k=  ~2 (<e,s>cx ~ - 1  CS); 6 (sbi)) 
r Q' --f Cc*,s> ( < ~ , , S \ C %  V<Vz) s> 6 %)\\ 2) V S Y ~ ( ~ = ' Y ,  
r 4 )  'ds vh d; ( n z  3r i@ 4 C<*,s> & S  t) 3 s'(r': S er=spt ,  
This  c o n d i t i o n  A(x) i s  t r u e  i n  ZF of no s e t  s ~ h a t s o e v e r  , 
';L! C*\ $zsy) i s  s a t i s f i e d  by no s e t .  A(x )  has no s o l u t i o n  
because f o r  c o n d i t i o n  (1) t o  be s a t i s f i e d  by  a  s e t ,  t h a t  s e t  
would have t o  c o n t a i n  ?airs  of  formulas and sequences where 
t h e  sequences a r e  of a r b i t r a r i l y  h igh  rank .  This  no s e t  can d o ,  
Hence, we cannot  hope t o  do a s t r i c t  T a r s k i - s t y l e  t r u t h  
theory  i n  which we can do away yrith sernant ical  n o t i o n s ,  bu t  must 
settle f o r  some rough analogy.  What t h i s  analogy i s ,  w e  s h a l l  
p r e s e n t l y  cons i t ie r .  Let  us remark i n  advance, howevcr, t h a t  
c e r t a i n  hard  problems l i e  i n  u z i t .  Are t h e r e  t h e o r i e s  w h i c h  
we a r e  w i l l i n g  co a c c e p t ,  bu t  whose t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  involve  
p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  we cannot j u s t i f y ,  and whose t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  
we t h e r e f o r e  a r e  indisposed  t o  admit?  I f  we do a s s e n t  to  some- 
t h i n g  l i k e  a  T a r s k i  s t y l e  t r u t h  theory  f o r  any t h e o r y ,  does this 
d e c i s i o n  have any u n d e s i r a b l e  o n t o l o g i c a l  consequences? Par-  
sons has  shown t h a t  what he c a l l s  i iB (Von ileumann Bernays s e t  
theory)  and even N B f  ( t h e  ex tens ion  of NB cha t  a l lows impredica- 
t i v e  c l a s s  formulas i n  - s e t  s e p a r a t i o n  axioms) a r e  t r a n s l a t a ~ l e  
i n t o  ZF p l u s  a  c e r t a i n  T a r s k i - l i k e  t r u t h  theory f o r  Z F ,  The 
ontology o u t s t r i p s  t h a t  o f  ZF; must we concede t o  t h i s  ontology 
i f  w e  accep t  ZF p l u s  i t s  own t r u t h  theory?  Parsons a t  times 
i s  q u i t e  s p p a t h e t i c  w i t h  t h e  v i e v  t h a t  we shou ld ;  he p r q o s e s  
a t  one p o i n t  th.at  a s s e n t i n g  t o  such an ontology might r e q u i r e  
i n  t u r n  admi t t ing  an even r i c h e r  on to logy ,  and f u r t h e r  t h a t  t h e  
o n t o l o g i e s  we should  embrace a r e  indeed e s s e n t i a l l y  open ended. 
Parsons even goes s o  f a r  a s  t o  p r o f f e r  t h i s  a s  p o s s i b l e  evidence 
t h a t  t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  of  s e t  theory  should be understood i n  a 
q u a s i - i n t u i t i o n i s  t i c  manner, 
S t i l l  ano the r  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h i s .  Assume t h e r e  i s  an 
openended c h a r a c t e r  t o  t h e  t h e o r i e s  we a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  a.ff inn, 
v i z . ,  when we hold  e t heory  we w i l l  ho ld  i t s  T a r s k i - l i k e  
t r u t h  t h e o r y ,  How should  d i s c o u r s e  about a l l  t h e o r i e s ,  o r  a l l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  be cons t rued ,  when o s t e n s i b l y  such d i s c o u r s e  
must be i n  t h e  language of some p a r t i c u l a r  cheory? Paradox 
appears  t o  b e  c l o s e  a t  hand.  This problem i s  i n  a  way the  
most i n t r i g u i n g  of a l l ,  buc i t  owes i t s  s p e c i a l  i n t r i g u e  
t o  i t s  b c i n , ~  t h e  most p e r p l e x i n g .  F o r t u n a t e l y  f o r  me, i t  
i s  n o t  germane t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e s  of t h i s  paper .  
Now, be fo re  a t t e n d i n g  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  'What k ind  of 
t r u t h  t h e o r y ,  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of ' f a r s k i ,  can be c o n s t r u c t e d  
f o r  s e t  t h e o r y ? '  i t  i s  important  t o  s e e  t h a t  a  t r u t h  gap 
t r u t h  theory  i s  of no a v a i l  i n  any a t tempt  t o  evade t h e  pro-  
blems f a c i n g  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of a  T a r s k i  l i k e  t r u t h  t h e o r y ,  
For t h e r e  would be no p o i n t  i n s i s t i n 2  on a  T a r s k i  l i k e  t r u t h  
theory  f o r  se t  theory  i f  a  l e s s  problemat ic  a l t e r n a t i v e  e x i s t s .  
One way t o  s e e  t h e  f u t i l i t y  of employing a t r u t h - v a l u e  gap 
approach t o  handle t h e s e  problems i s  t o  answer t h e  q u e s t i o n :  
i s  t h e r e  a way ou t  of t h e  l i a r  paradox,  t h a t  works f o r  both  
n a t u r a l  and formal  languages,  by means of some t r u t h  va lue  
gap approach? I s h a l l  show t h a t ,  i n  an important  s e n s e ,  t h e r e  
cannot  be ,  a l though of course  t h e r e  d o u b t l e s s  i s  some r e s o l u -  
t i o n  of i t  f o r  n a t u r a l  languages (perhaps Kr ipke ' s  theory  
c o n s t i t u t e s  such a  r e s o l u t i o n ) .  Illhat I wish t o  argue i s  t h a t  
w i t h  ve ry  minor assumptions about what p r e d i c a t e s  we f i n d  
meaningful ,  a  language under a  f i x e d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  cannot 
express  a l l  of t h e  meaningful p r e d i c a t e s  t h e r e  a r e ,  This  
i s  t h e  sense  i n  which t h e  l i a r  paradox cannot be g o t  around. 
One might put  t h i s  conclus ion  t h u s :  t h e r e  a r e  no u n i v e r s a l  
languages,  
Suppose: (1) i f  we f i n d  a language meanirtgful then we 
can c r e a t e  a p r e d i c a t e  and a  language and i n t e r p r e t  then i n  
such a way t h a t  t h e  ex tens ion  of the  p red icace  i n  t h a t  langu- 
age w i l l  be e x a c t l y  t h e  t r u e  sen tences  of t h a t  f i r s t  language; 
( 2 )  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  language i n  which a  p r e d i c a t e  i s  mzan i r s fu l  
and has  a  c e r t a i n  e x t e n s i o n ,  then t h e r e  i s  a language i n  
which t h a t  p r e d i c a t e  o c c u r s ,  w i t h  t h e  same e x t e n s i o n ,  and i n  
which t h e r e  i s  what I s h a l l  c a l l  che complementary p r e d i c a t e  
of t h a t  p r e d i c a t e .  The complementary o r e d i c a t e  A1 of a  
p r e d i c a t e  A* i s  a  p r e d i c a t e  which has i n  i t s  ex tens ion  j u s t  
those  th ings  which A. does n o t .  I n  such a  metalanguage i t  
i s  imposs ib le  t h a t  t h e  p r e d i c a t e  having as  i t s  e x t e n s i o n  t h e  
t r u e  sen tences  i n  t h e  o b j e c t  language could be express ing  
i t s  own t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e ,  Suppose o the rwise .  Then t h e  
sen tence  'Th i s  sen tence  i s  n o t  t r u e '  (where ' n o t  t r u e '  i s  t h e  
complementary p r e d i c a t e  of ' t r u e ' )  cor?ld n o t  be i n  t h e  exten-  
s i o n  of t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  o r  of i t s  complementary p r e d i c a t e ,  
y e t  by hypo thes i s  must be i n  a t  l e a s t  one.  The metalanguage,  
hence,  must have g r e a t e r  express ive  power chan t h e  obj e c t  
language. 
I t  i s  noteworthy t h a t  thi.s r e s u l t  holds  i n  a very  wide 
v a r i e t y  of c a s e s .  Thus, even i f  t h e r e  were more than one 
way f o r  a p r e d i c a t e  t o  be undefined (even i n f i n i t e l y  many), 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  of such a  language being i t s  own metalanguage 
is  p rec luded ,  f o r  no mention i s  made of undefined p r e d i c a t e s  
i n  t h e  s t a t ement  of t h e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
How p l a u s i b l e  a r e  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s ?  C e r t a i n l y  prima 
f a c i e  they a r e  eminent ly r easonab le .  Consider c o n d i t i o n  
(1). It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  how we could f i n d  a language 
meaningful ,  and y e t  n o t  g rasp  the  n o t i o n :  sen tence  which i s  
t r u e  i n  t h e  language. But i t  seems t h a t  our g rasp ing  t h i s  
n o t i o n  c o n s i s t s  i n ,  o r  a c  minimum would i n v o l v e ,  being a b l e  
t o  i n t e n d  some language s o  t h a t  one of i t s  p r e d i c a t e s  has 
a s  i t s  ex tens ion  j u s t  t h e  t r u e  sen tences  of t h e  f i r s t  
language. 
Condit ion ( 2 )  a l s o  seems i n e l u c t a b l e .  If w e  can under- 
s t a n d  a  p r e d i c a t e ,  we a r e  a b l e ,  i t  would appear ,  t o  in t end  
t h e  p r e d i c a t e  i n  a  de te rmina te  way t o  apply t o  c e r t a i n  en- 
t i t i e s  and n o t  t o  apply t o  o t h e r s .  But t h i s  i s  i n  some sense  
t o  s p l i t  t h e  u n i v e r s e  i n t o  two mutual ly  e x h a ~ i s t i v e  p a r t s .  
And i f  we can e n v i s i o n  t h e  u n i v e r s e  a s  be ing  chus s p l i t ,  then 
s u r e l y  we could employ a  language i n  which t h e r e  a r e  cwo 
p r e d i c a t e s ,  one of which has a s  i t s  ex tens ion  m e  p a r t  of the  
s p l i t ,  and t h e  o t h e r ,  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t .  But t h i s  i s  j u s t  
c o n d i t i o n  (2 )  . I n  f a c t ,  our  way of c o n s t r u i n g  p r e d i c a t e s  
seems t o  be c l o s e d  i n  o t h e r  ways, t o o ,  Thus, t h e r e  i s  c l o s u r e  
under unions and i n t e r s e c t i o n s  as w e l l  a s  c~omplementations , 4 
Granted,  then ,  t h e  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  of t h e s e  two c o n d i t i o n s ,  
we a r e  d r i v e n  t o  conclude t h a t  t h e  s e r i e s  of languages t h a t  
we should acknowledge a s  meaningful i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  openended. 
T h i s ,  I c la im,  e n t a i l s  t h a t  t h e  s e r i e s  of  t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  we 
should a s s e n t  t o  i s  a l s o  openended. For i f  a metalanguage 
f o r  a  language i s  meaningful t o  u s ,  t h e r e  i s  reason t o  surmise 
t h a t  t h a t  i s  s o  i n  v i r t u e  o f  our having adopted t h e  correspand-  
ing  t r u t h  theory  f o r  t h a t  language. O r ,  more 
weakly, i f  we ho ld  t h e  metalanguage f o r  an o b j e c t  language 
t o  be  meaningful ,  a t  t h e  very  l e a s t  we appear  t o  b e  ob l iged  
t o  hold  t h e  corresponding t r u t h  theory  f o r  t h a t  o b j e c t  
language. S i n c e ,  a s  I have argued,  t h e r e  i s  an openended 
s e r i e s  of metalanguages we f i n d  meaningful ,   here must be a 
corresponding openended s e r i e s  of t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  t h a t  we a r e  
ob l iged  t o  adopt .  
The upshot  of t h e  above i s  t h i s ,  Given any t h e o r y ,  we 
a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  adopt  a  c e r t a i n  metalanguage f o r  t h e  language 
of t h a t  theory .  I n  t h i s  metalanguage, t h e r e  i s  a b i v a l e n t  
t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  s t r o n g  enough t o  provide  a n o t i o n  of t r u t h  
f o r  t h e  language of t h e  t h e o r y .  This  b i v a l e n t  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  
i s  n o t  cap tu red  i n  t h e  Kripke language. Moreover, t h e  t r u t h  
theory  f o r  c h i s  theory  w i l l  be  i n  t h e  s t y l e  of T a r s k i ,  a t  
l e a s t  i n  t h e  impor tant  r e s p e c t s ,  and we a r e  ob l iged  t o  accep t  
t h a t  t r u t h  t h e o r y .  Hence, a  t r u t h  theory analogous t o  
T a r s k i ' s  i s  - de - r i g u e u r ,  however troublesome t o  Eo-mulace i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e s ,  a s  w i t h  t h e  case  of s e t  theory .  
There i s  a more fundamental reason t h a t  K r i p k e ' s  theory 
of t r u t h  o f f e r s  no s a l v a t i o n  from t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  with 
s e t t i n g  up a t y p i c a l  Tar sk i  t r u t h  theory  f o r  t h e  language 
cf s e t  theory .  The f i r s t  s t e p  i n  t h e  process  by which t h e  
t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  s t a r t s  t o  g e t  i t s  p a r t i a l  d e f i n i t i o n  a  l a  
Kripke i s  t h i s .  The sen tences  i n  t h e  ground language are 
determined t o  be t r u e  o r  f a l s e  by t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  
i s  g iven  them; then  the  Godel numbers of t h e s e  sen tences  
a r e  p laced  i n  the  ex tens ion  and a n t i - e x c e n s i o n ,  r e s p e c t i v e -  
l y ,  of t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e .  But i f  t h e  ground language 
under q u e s t i o n  i s  t h e  language of s e t  t h e o r y ,  from the  
s tandpoir l t  of what background theory  a r e  wla going t o  d e t e r -  
mine t h a t  any g iven  sen tence  of  s e t  theory  i s  t r u e ?  To do 
t h i s  i s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  t o  have a  T a r s k i  l i k e  b i v a l e n t  t r u t h  
theory  a t  hand f o r  t h e  language of s e t  theory ;  bu t  L t  i s  
p r e c i s e l y  t h e  problem of g e t t i n g  t h i s  t h a t  now vexes u s .  
However, my p o i n t s  r ega rd ing  t h e  inadequacy of a  t r u t h  
va lue  gap approach a r e  s t i l l  r e l e v a n t ,  For suppose we could 
somehow g e t  our  hands on a  Kripke language f o r  se t  t h e o r y ,  
and we were s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  a l l  t h e  no t ions  of t r u t h  we would 
ever  d e s i r e  t o  express  were expressed  i n  t h a t  language.  
Suppose a l s o  t h a t  w e  g r a n t  Pa r sons '  sugges t ion  t h a t  i f  we 
adopt a  T a r s k i  l i k e  t r u t h  theory f a r  t h e  language of a  t h e o r y ,  
we must admit s u b c o l l e c t i o n s  of t h e  domain of t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  
i n  t h a t  language. Then, a l though t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  i n  the  
language of ZF might n o t  b e  a b l e  t o  range  over a l l  c o l l e c -  
t i o n s ,  i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  conceivable  t h a t  t h e r e  would be only 
k many more ranks of c o l l e c t i o n s ,  where q i s  t h e  f i x e d  p o i n t  
f o r  t h e  Kripke language. Thus, corresponding t o  each l e v e l  
i n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of a  Kripke language would a T a r s k i - s t y l e  
t r u t h  theory  f o r  the  language of t h a t  l e v e l ;  and corresponding 
t o  each such t r u t h  theory  t h e r e  would be a  new rank of 
c o l l e c t i o n s  t o  which we commit o u r s e l v e s ,  as Parsons 
recommends. Whsn thd l e v e l s  run o u t ,  s o  do the  r a n k s .  
Perhaps some new s e t  theory ,  wi th  d i s t i n c t  q u a n t i f i e r s  f o r  
each of t h e s e  Kmany new l e v e l s ,  would have q u a n t i f i e r s  
ranging  over  a l l  c o l l ~ c t i o n s .  But ,  of  c o u r s e ,  a l l  t h i s  
-
would be a p o s s i b i l i t y  only if the  s u p p o s i t i o n s  wi th  which 
I s t a r t e d  were t r u e ,  and a t  l e a s t  t h e  f i r s t  i s  n o t .  
Let  us r e s i g n  o u t s e l v e s  then  t o  an openendedness i n  
the  t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  we a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t .  Now a t  f i r s t  
b lush  t h i s  openendedness might be thought t o  be pure ly  
i d e o l o g i c a l .  For i n  accep t ing  a s t r o n g e r  cheory we are not  
i n  g e n e r a l  compelled t o  embrace a  l a r g e r  on to logy ,  However, 
Parsons has s e t  f o r t h  some reasons  (which 1 have ske tched)  
t,o hold  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  of t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  f o r  s e t  t h e o r i e s ,  
w e  should embrace s t r o n g e r  o n t o l o g i e s  a s  we embrace s t r o n g e r  
i d e o l o g i e s .  I s h a l l  now examine t h e s e  r e a s o n s .  
A s  I have a l r e a d y  observed,  Parsons shows chat  a t r u t h  
theory  f o r  ZF p l u s  ZF i s  of t h e  same s t r e n g t h  a s  t h e  ex ten-  
s i o n  of von Neuman-Bernays s e t  theory by a l lowing impredica-  
t i v e  c l a s s  formulas i n t o  t h e  - s e t  s e p a r a t i o n  axioms; t h e  
two t h e o r i e s  a r e  i n t e r t r a n s l a t a b l e .  Parsons cons ide r s  t h i s  
t o  be  evider-ce t h a t  accep t ing  t h e  t r u t h  theory  f o r  ZF i n -  
volves  us  i n  adopt ing  a l s o  t h e  ontology of NB-t-. However, 
why t h i s  should be s o  i s  n o t  c l e a r ,  It i s  c e r t a i n l y  not  
obvious t h a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  shows t h a t  we 
must adopt NB+ o r  even NB i f  we adopt  ZF p l u s  i t s  t r u t h  
t h e o r y .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  even i n  accep t ing  the  t ruch  eheory 
f o r  ZF p l u s  ZF we w i l l  be c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  embrace c e r t a i n  
e n t i t i e s  which were n o t ,  i n  a  c e r t a i n  s e n s e ,  fo rced  on us 
by ZF a l o n e .  Thus, i n  ZF p l u s  i t s  t r u t h  t h e o r y ,  s e p a r a t i o n  
i s  s t r eng thened  by a l lowing formulas cornposed out  of t h e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  p r e d i c a t e  f o r  ZF t o  s e p a r a t e  o f f  s e t s .  This  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  must be allowed i f  we a r e  t o  prove c e r t a i n  
t r i v i a l  f a c t s  about  ZF, e . g . ,  t h a t  a l l  provable  formulas of 
ZF a r e  t r u e .  So w e  can prove i n  t h i s  theory (which hence- 
f o r t h  w i l l  be  c a l l e d  ZFT) t h a t  c e r t a i n  s e t s  e x i s t  which i n  
ZF a lone  w e  were unable  t o  prove .  However, t h e  sense  i n  
which we must accep t  new e n t i t i e s  i n  t h i s  c a s e  i s  apparen t -  
l y  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  sense  i n  which we must i f  we 
adopt NB o r  N 3 + .  For we cons ide r  t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  of ZF t o  
range over  a l l  t h e  e n t i t i e s  which we can prove t o  e x i s t  
i n  ZFT; we a r e  merely unable  t o  prove i n  ZF t h a t  t h e s e  
e n t i t i e s  e x i s t .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  second o rde r  q u a n ~ i f i e r s  
of NB o r  NB+ range over  e n t i t i e s  t h a t  seemingly could n o t  
be i n  t h e  range  of t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  of ZF, o r  ZFT. 
Granted t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  t h e o r i e s  N 3  and 
NB+ on t h e  one hand, and ZFT on t h e  o t h e r ,  what a r e  the  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  which would l e a d  us t o  adopt ZFT o r  NB o r  
NB+7 
To a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  perhaps 
i t  i s  b e s t  t o  cons ide r  t h e  consequences of t h e  view t h a t  
s i n c e  we should adopt ZFT, we should admit a l s o  NB o r  MB+. 
On t h i s  view, we do n o t  by adopt ing  ZF a l o n e  succeed i n  
having our  q u a n t i f i e r s  range  over  a l l  c o l l e c t i o n s ;  t h e  
proper  c l a s s e s  of NB and NB+ e lude  our  a t t empt  t o  q u a n t i f y  
over  - a l l  c o l l e c t i o n s .  And a  f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  makes 
our  predicament p a r t i c u l a r l y  vexing .  I t  would appear  t h a t  
t h e  same reasons  which l e d  us t o  adopt  NB o r  NB+ w i l l  l ead  
us u l t i m a t e l y  t o  adopt  a  l a r g e r  ontology than t h a t  of NB(+). 
For i n s o f a r  a s  t h e  t r u t h  theory  f o r  NB(+) i s  a  theory  we 
should a c c e p t ,  t h e r e  i s  aga in  t h e  i s s u e :  should we accept  
t h e  ex tens ion  of  NB(+) by c o l l e c t i o n s  over  a l l  
t h e  c l a s s e s  of NB(+), o r  NB(+) p l u s  the  t r u t h  theory  f o r  
NB(+)? Ev iden t ly ,  i f  t h e r e  was reason t o  op t  f o r  NB(+) 
over  ZFT, t h i s  reason w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  mot iva te  t h e  h igher  
o r d e r  ex tens ion  of  NB(+) j u s t  desc r ibed  a s  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
cho ice .  S ince  t h e  t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  which we should adopt  a r e  
openended, and s i n c e  i n  t h e  t r a i n  of each new t r u t h  theory  
would come an expanded ontology n o t  i n  t h e  range of t h e  
q u a n t i f i e r s  of t h e  previous  t h e o r i e s ,  t h e  range o f  our quan- 
t i f i e r s  seems t o  be openended. It i s  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  which 
l e a d s  Parsons t o  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  of s e t  theory 
might b e s t  be understood i n  a  q u a s i - i n t u i t i o n i s t i c  manner, 
I t  behooves u s ,  t h e n ,  t o  s e e  how cogent  a r e  the  reasons  
f o r  choosing NB o r  NB+ over  ZFT a t  t h e  very o n s e t .  I 
s h a l l  a rgue  t h a t  f o r  one w i t h  s t r o n g  p l a t o n i s t  l e a n i n g s ,  
t h e r e  i s  no compelling c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  prompt t h e  adopt ion  
of NB o r  NB+, o r  r a t h e r  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  none a r i s i n g  o u t  of 
t h e  adopt ion  of ZFT. 
The p l a t o n i s t  u s u a l l y  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  we can use  our  
q u a n t i f i e r s  t o  t a k e  on any collection as a v a l u e ,  i f  w e  
s o  i n t e n d  our  q u a n t i f i e r s .  For t h e  domain of a l l  c o l l e c -  
t i o n s  i s  a w e l l  determined t o t a l i t y  which e x m i s t s  independent-  
l y  of u s ,  and i n s o f a r  a s  we can succeed i n  r e f e r r i n g  t o  
mathematical  o b j e c t s  a t  a l l ,  we would seem t o  be a b l e  t o  
t a l k  about  eve ry th ing  i n  t h i s  t o t a l i t y  a t  once.  There a r e  
6 those  ph i losophers ,  f o r  example Jonathan  e ear^ and Parsons ,  
who a s s e r t  t h a t  we cannot q u a n t i f y  over a l l  c o l l e c f i o n s  be- 
cause  w e  cannot have c e r t a i n  k inds  of i n t e n t i o n s  cowards 
a l l  c o l l e c t i o n s ,  and f a i l i n g  t h e s e  i n t e n t i o n s  toward a 
c o l l e c t i o n  we cannot  have i t  as  a va lue  of our v a r i a b l e s ,  
Agains; such a  view I w i l l  a rgue  a t  a  l a t e r  t ime.  I w i l l  
now d e a l  wi th  t h e  q u e s t i o n  whether a  s t a n d a r d ,  s taunch 
p l a t o n i s t  who wants t o  ma in ta in  t h a t  we can make our  v a r i -  
a b l e s  range over  - a l l  c o l l e c t i o n s  should be moved by cons id-  
e r a t i o n s  coming from t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  t o  g i v e  up c h i s  p o s i -  
t i c n .  1 t h i n k  n o t ;  l e t  me e x p l a i n  why, 
I s h a l l  begin  by showing i n  some d e t a i l  what ZFT i s  
l i k e .  To  s t a r t  w i t h ,  one adds t o  t h e  language of ZF a  dyadic  
p r e d i c a t e  ' S a t ( x , y ) ' .  One then  d e f i n e s  s a t i s f a c t i o n  i n  ZF 
induc t i v e  l y  thus  : 
1) VSVW V L V ~  {n= 'xi x c  * C Sa t  (q, S) ++ C S ) ~  e C O j  \) 
Inasmuch a s  we a r e  a l r e a d y  committed t o  ZF, we can cons ide r  
the  c l a u s e s  of t h i s  i n d u c t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  of s a t i s f a c t i o n  t o  
be added a s  axioms t o  ZF. A s  u s u a l ,  t r u t h  i s  def ined  f o r  
any c l o s e d  formula 4 a s  fo l lows : 4 i s  t r u e  i f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
a  sequence s  such t h a t  S a t  ( s , 4  ) .  However, we should 
n o t e  t h a t  t h i s  system j u s t  a s  i t  s t a n d s  i s  inadequate  t o  
prove c e r t a i n  elementary f a c t s  about ZF: e , g . ,  t h a t  a l l  t h e  
theorems of  ZF a r e  t r u e .  To prove t h e s e  f a c t s ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  
a s  I have p r e v i o u s l y  no ted ,  t o  al low formulas i n  which t h e  S a t  
p r e d i c a t e  appears  t o  be used i n  t h e  axiom schema of sepa ra -  
t i o n .  Now i s  t h e r e  any way of j u s t i f y i n g  t h i s  f u r t h e r  ex- 
t e n s i o n  of ZF? Moreover, i n  o rde r  t o  show even t h a t  a l l  t he  
T a r s k i  b i c o n d i t i o n a l s  a r e  p r o v a b l e ,  we must permi t  use of 
mathematical  i n d u c t i o n  w i t h  formulas b u i l t  up o u t  of t h e  S a t  
p r e d i c a t e :  how i s  t h i s  j u s t i f i e d ?  Parsons f i n d s  t h i s  second 
q u e s t i o n  d i f f i c u l t .  A s  i t  t u r n s  o u t ,  t h e r e  i s  an important  
connect ion between t h e  two q u e s t i o n s .  
Let  us d e a l  wi th  t h e  f i r s t  q u e s t i o n ;  t h i s  w i l l  l ead  
n a t u r a l l y  i n t o  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of the  second.  I am persuaded 
t h a t ,  i f  we a l low t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  i n  s e p a r a t i o n ,  i t  i s  i n  
v i r t u e  of a  c e r t a i n  k ind  of mathematical  induc t ion  involv ing  
t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  t h a t  we do s o .  F o r ,  a s  I s h a l l  a r g u e ,  
t h e r e  i s  a use  of mathematical  i n d u c t i o n  t h a t  j u s t i f i e s  t h e  
b e l i e f  t h a t  S a t  i s  a  w e l l  de f ined  p r e d i c a t e ;  and a  p r e d i c a t e  
may be employed i n  s e p a r a t i o n  j u s t  i n  case  t h a t  p r e d i c a t e  i s  
w e l l  d e f i n e d .  This  l a s t  c la im war ran t s  some e x p l a n a t i o n ,  
I n  o r d e r  t o  permi t  a  p r e d i c a c e  i n  s e p a r a t i o n ,  i t  would seem 
enough t h a t  t h e  p r e d i c a t e  i s  used s o  t h a t  i t  app l i ed  d e t e r -  
mina te ly  t o  each o b j e c t  i n  i t s  domain. Thac i s ,  we must 
a s s u r e  t h a t  i t s  usage i s  n o t  such t h a t  t h e r e  i s  an o b j e c t  
of which t h e  p r e d i c a t e  cannot e i t h e r  be  s a i d  t o  apply o r  
s a i d  n o t  t o  app ly .  That t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  should s u f f i c e  
comports w e l l  w i t h  our  i n t u i t i o n s  about  s e t s .  I n  ZF, once 
a  s e t  appears  a t  a  c e r t a i n  r a n k ,  a l l  of t h e  s u b s e t s  of t h a t  
s e t  appear a l s o ,  and any formula of  s e t  theory ,  even one i n  
which t h e r e  a r e  parameters  and unbounded q u a n t i f i e r s ,  can 
s e p a r a t e  o f f  a s u b s e t  of t h a t  o r i g i n a l  s e t ;  o r ,  more p re -  
c i s e l y ,  such a formula w i l l  a l low us t o  s e e  t h a t  t h i s  subset. 
must e x i s t .  Because of what Pau l  Bernays has  c a l l e d  t h e  
combina to r i a l  n a t u r e  of s e t s  (whereof more l a t e r ) ,  w e  can 
s e e  a  s u b s e t  of  a  given s e t  must e x i s t ,  s o  long a s  we can 
conceive some s e r i e s  of  "dec i s ions" ,  p u t t i n g  members i n  
and excluding  members from t h e  s u b s e t .  This  s e r i e s  must ,  
of course ,  be c o n s i s t e n t  and apply i n  a  de terminate  way t o  
each o b j e c t  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s e t .  There a r e  p r e d i c a t e s  of 
ZF t h a t  c o n t a i n  unbounded q u a n t i f i e r s  f o r  which noth ing  short. 
o r  checking t h e  e n t i r e  u n i v e r s e  of s e t s  w i l l  a l low us t o  
determine whether they  hold  of a  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t .  Nonethe- 
l e s s ,  s i n c e  t h e  formula i s  used i n  such a way t h a t  f o r  every 
v a l u e  o f  t h e  f r e e  v a r i a b l e  i t  i s  f i x e d  whether i t  holds  o r  
n o t ,  we can t a k e  t h a t  formula t o  provide  d e c i s i o n s  about 
each member of t h e  s t a r t i n g  set  whether o r  n o t  i t  i s  t o  be i n  
t h e  s u b s e t ;  hence t h e  s u b s e t  should be s a i d  t o  e x i s t ,  
Now t h e r e  i s  noth ing  s p e c i a l  i n  a l l  t h i s  about the  
formula t h a t  performs t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  being a  formula of s e t  
theory .  Any formula t h a t  made t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s  i n  a  s i m i l a r  
f a s h i o n  would c u t  o f f  s u b s e t s  a l s . ? ,  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t hen ,  
i f  t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  i s  thus  w e l l  determined i n  i t s  a p p l i c a -  
-
t i o n ,  i t  too  should be allowed i n  s e p a r a t i o n .  Some p r e d i c a t e s  
do occas ion  doubt a s  t o  how s a t i s f a c t o r y  they would be i n  
s e p a r a t i o n ,  because we l ack  confidence t h a t  t h e i r  usage i s  
de te rmina te .  L a t e r  i n  t h i s  paper I w i l l  d i s c u s s  i n  some 
d e t a i l  a  c e r t a i n  p r e d i c a t e  ' R ( x , y ) '  t h a t  i s  t o  be t r u e  of 
each nonempty s e t  and p r e c i s e l y  cne member of  t h a t  s e t .  
There I argue t h a t  t h e  p r e d i c a t e  i s  n o t  s o  d e f i n i t e  i n  i t s  
usage t h a t  we can r e a l l y  be s a i d  t o  piclc ou t  a  unique i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n  f o r  i t .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  'R(x,y) ' would seem 
u n s u i t a b l e  a s  a p r e d i c a t e  t o  be used i n  s e p a r a t i o n  ( i n  
f a c t ,  i t  seems u n s u i t a b l e  a s  a p r e d i c a t e  t o  be used a t  a l l ,  
a s  I s h a l l  l a t e r  urge) . 
I s h a l l  d e a l  s h o r t l y  wi th  t h e  q u e s t i o n :  why b e l i e v e  t h a t  
t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  i s  w e l l  determined? But f i r s t ,  n o t e  t h a t  
i t  i s  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  should occupy a  philosopher concerned 
wi th  a  " s c i e n t i f i c "  d e f i n i t i o n  of t r u t h ,  and n o t  the  q u e s t i o n :  
Can we e l i m i n a t e  semant i ca l  n o t i o n s ?  What T a r s k i  showed i n  
CTFL was t h a t  semant i ca l  n o t i o n s ,  f o r  c e r t a i n  languages,  
could  be done away wi th  i n  f a v o r  of s e t  t h e o r e t i c  p r e d i c a t e s  
along w i t h  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c a t e s  of t h e  language i n  q u e s t i o n ,  
Our confidence t h a t  t h e s e  s e t  t h e o r e t i c  and p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c a t e s  
a r e  w e l l  determined,  t r a n s f e r s  onto  t h e  no t ions  of  trurh and 
s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  which a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  de f ined  i n  terms of t h e s e  
p r e d i c a t e s .  But t h e r e  should be noth ing  suspec t  about semanti-  
c a l  no t ions  t h a t  cannot be e l i m i n a t e d ,  so  long as w e  have 
some s o r t  of guaran tee  t h a t  t h e  no t ions  a r e  w e l l  decermined: 
-
d e f i n i n g  semant i ca l  i n  terms of  s e t  t h e o r e t i c  and c e r t a i n  
p r i m i t i v e  n o t i o n s  i s  merely a  s p e c i a l  way of o b t a i n i n g  t h i s  
guaran tee .  
We can show t h a t  t h e  p r e d i c a t e  S a t  i s  w e l l  d e f i n e d ,  i f  
we permit: mathematical  i n d u c t i o n  on t h e  S a t  p red ica t -e ,  To 
al low t h i s ,  however, i s  somewhat p rob lemat ic ,  f o r  i n d u c t i o n  
on a  p r e d i c a t e  i s  u s u a l l y  warranted  only on p r e d i c a t e s  a l r e a d y  
secured  t o  be w e l l  d e f i n e d .  Now I t h i n k  t h e r e  i s  a  c i r c l e  
h e r e ,  b u t  a  benign c i r c l e .  I t  w i l l  be  h e l p f u l  h e r e  t o  p re -  
s e n t  i n  some d e t a i l  t h i s  proof t h a t  t h e  p r e d i c a t e  i s  w e l l  
d e f i n e d .  
The S a t  p r e d i c a t e  i s  in tended t o  be i m p l i c i t l y  de f ined  
by  t h e  axioms i n  which i t  occurs .  O r d i n a r i l y ,  t o  demonstrate  
t h a t  a  p r e d i c a t e  occur r ing  i n  such axioms i s  indeed i m p l i c i t -  
l y  de f ined ,  one p r e s e n t s  a  c e r t a i n  k ind  of uniqueness p r o o f .  
F i r s t ,  one shows t h a t  t h e  p r e d i c a t e  has  a t  l e a s t  one e x t e n s i o n ,  
and then  t h a t  i t  has  a t  most one e x t e n s i o n .  But showing a  
p r e d i c a t e  has  an e x t e n s i o n  u s u a l l y  comes down t o  showing 
t h e r e  i s  a  c e r t a i n  c o l l e c t i o n .  T h i s  c o l l e c t i o n  i s  such t h a t ,  
i f  i t s  members a r e  taken t o  be p r e c i s e l y  those  o b j e c t s  t h a t  
s a t i s f y  t h e  p r e d i c a t e ,  then t h e  axioms i n  which t h e  p r e d i c a t e  
occurs  a r e  t r u e .  Likewise,  proving t h a t  a p r e d i c a t e  has a t  
most one ex tens ion  i s  t o  prove t h e r e  i s  a t  mcst one such 
c o l l e c t i o n .  I n  t h e  case  of  t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  p r e s e n t l y  under 
examinat ion,  however, n e i t h e r  of chese th ings  can be demanded: 
f o r  p r e c i s e l y  what i s  a t  d i s p u t e  i s  the  e x i s t e n c e  of t h e s e  
c o l l e c t i o n s .  This  does n o t  mean t h e r e  i s  noth ing  l e f t  t o  
hope f o r .  One can s t i l l  prove t h a t  i f  S a t l  and S a t 2  a r e  two 
p r e d i c a t e s  t h a t  s a t i s f y  t h e  axioms s e t  f o r t h  on page 2 0 ,  then 
(x)  (y) ( S a t l ( x , y ) w S a t g ( x , y ) ) .  One can prove a l s o  t h a t  
whatever we would want t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  does ,  
Formally,  t h i s  l a t t e r  i s  j u s t  t o  show t h e  T a r s k i  b icond i -  
t i o n a l s  f o r  a l l  formulas of  ZF a r e  p rovab le .  Let  us t u r n  
t o  t h e s e  p r o o f s .  
F i r s t ,  t o  show t h a t  (x) ( y )  ( S a t Z  ( x , y ) t - - t S a t p ( x , y ) )  . 
We use  i n d u c t i o n  on t h e  complexity of  t h e  formulas 4 ,  Suppose 
6 i s  of the  form r x i  a X: and s a t l  ( ' x i e x :  , s ) ; s i n c e  axiom 
(1) on page 20 ho lds  of S a t l ,  (S) ia  (sJ~. But t h i s  same axiom 
holds  of S a t p  a l s o ;  hence S a t 2  ( r x i ~  y;, s ) . Symmetr ical ly ,  
if S a t 2  ( ' X ~ C ~ ; ,  J ) then  S a t l  ( ' r i a r c , s ) .  The i n d u c t i v e  
cases  run j u s t  a s  smoothly.  If , S a t l  ( C y :  S ) t) 
r I Tq 9: rp,v4'a, Sst,( @ ,s\- Sqt,('y'l,s)\/ 4 5*+,(r'&s)+-+ 
tS Stfa (Iy:, S) v Ss++('ry:, S) H Sats ('@', r )  
9. 3x iV ,  54+,('3', s)t, 3 r P + s  6 ~ 4 + , ( ~ ~ ~ , 5 > t 3  3s09r s ~ + ~ ( v ,  s S ~  
t) Ssf &C'p: s) 
The demonst ra t ion  t h a t  the T a r s k i  b i c o n d i t i o n a l s  f o r  
all formulas are provable falls out directly from the 
inductive axioms for Sat. For atomic formulas, rhe Tarski 
biconditionals are provable, because it is precisely this 
that (1) states. The inductive cases are only slightly 
more involved. Let us handle just the quantifier case, So 
'w,, s,&,-*,s, 
let t#=3xiy.  Then, by inductive hypothesis, k ~ s ( ( h q f ~ q + , ~ r ) ~ h  J 
So, kVs( '32'9~ s s q t ~ ~ y ' ,  s) t ' S 3 i . r ~  p(s;,,z,., , .  ., k,,). But this 
& L 
is equivalent to : k VS (3s4)rs Sq+ (w I) tr 3% Y)(sj,, s,. ,-, X i , . .  ? SF ) 
L r J- 
where = i g  , some , But by axiom (4), I- i l t  ( r ~ ~ L ~ l , ~ ) ~ J ~ ~ ~ ~ Y ~  
Hence ds  ( S ~ + C ~ A ~ ; + ' ;  s S ) ~  1%: (sj,, $1, . ., k(,. I ,  SJ-)), which waii to 
be proved. By induction, we may now concl~tde that - all T a r s k i  
biconditionals are provable. 
The inductive proofs above are quite trivial, jusc as one 
would anticipate, for they reflect exactly the inductive 
definition of Sat. As I have remarked, ordinarily one would 
hesitate to admit induction on a predicate not a 
known beforehand to be well defined; but in the cave of a 
predicate inductively defined, it does sometimes seem permissible, 
For accepting the inductive definition of a predicate and 
accepting these particular inductive proofs using that predi- 
cate seem to be two aspects of the same intuitive insight. 
This insight is the recognition that, if a predicate is 
inductively defined, then there is jusc one predicate thus 
defined. 
At all events, the proofs above do at least serve as 
some kind of fomal reassurance that the Sat predicate is well 
d e f i n e d .  C e r t a i n l y ,  t h i n g s  would be l e s s  p r o p i t i o u s  i f  no 
f \ 
such proof were for thcoming.  I n  t h e  c a s e  of RCS,~), t h e r e  
i s  indeed no such proof t o  be found,  and our conf idence  t h a t  
t h e  p r e d i c a t e  i s  in tended  "uniquely" by us  i s  thereby under- 
c u t ,  a long wi th  any b e l i e f  t h a t  i n d u c t i o n  invo lv ing  t h i s  
p r e d i c a t e  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e .  
What does Parsons have t o  say  about t h e  i s s u e :  how can 
we j u s t i f y  mathematical  i n d u c t i o n  invo lv ing  t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e ?  
What seems t o  be  r e q u i r e d  h e r e  i s  t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n s  
by i n d u c t i o n  on t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers should be understood 
and accepted  d i r e c t l y  o r  exp la ined  by an argument n o t  of 
a  second o r d e r  c h a r a c t e r .  The f i r s t  course  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
conceivable  and seems a  r easonab le  course  i n  d e a l i n g  wi th  
a s i n g l e  i n d u c t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  such a s  t h a t  of s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
However, i t  renounces t h e  a t t empt  t o  s t a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
involved ,  and i t  i s  hard  t o  s e e  how t o  do t h a t  wi thout  
q u a n t i f y i n g  over  p r o p e r t i e s  o r  c l a s s e s  o r  r e l a t e d  e n t i t i e s  
such as p r o p o s i t i o n s  o r  p r o o f s .  I t  seems t o  me t h a t  
t h e r e  might be sowe a l t e r n a t i v e  t h a t  would use t h e  no- 
t i o n s  of meaningfulness and t r u t h  i n  a  way d i f f e r e n t  
from t h e  u s u a l  uses  i n  formal  semant i c s ,  i n  t h a t  t h e i r  
ex tens ions  would be g r a d u a l l y  c o n s t r u c t e d  r a t h e r  than 
be ing  d e f i n i t e  f o r  a g iven  c o n t e x t . 7  
This  passage i s  n o t  wi thou t  i t s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  i n t e r p r e t a -  
t i o n .  The penu l t ima te  sen tence  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i s  ambiguous. 
When Parsons w r i t e s  ' i t  i s  ha rd  t o  s e e  how t o  do chat  , , , 
does ' t h a t '  r e f e r  t o  t h e  renouncing o f  th2  a t t empt  t o  s t a t e  
the p r i n c i p l e s  involved ,  or t h e  a t t empt  t o  s t a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
involved?  I s u s p e c t  t h a t  Parsons i n t e n d s  t o  say only t h a t  
t h e  a t t empt  t o  s t a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  involved  r e q u i r e s  t a l k  
about p r o p e r t i e s ,  c l a s s e s ,  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  o r  p roa f s  . But then 
Parsons must be t a k i n g  i t  a s  obvious chat  t o  renounce t h e  
a t t empt  t o  s t a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  involved  i s  t o  do something 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e ;  f o r  a t  no p o i n t  does he take  f u r t h e r  account 
of the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of j u s t i f y i n g  induc t ions  d i r e c t l y .  Since 
an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  s t a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  involved seems s o  
l i t t l e  obvious t o  me ( indeed I t h i n k  t h a t ,  s t r i c t l y  speaking ,  
t h e r e  - a r e  no such p r i n c i p l e s ) ,  I b e l i e v e  i t  b e s t  a t  l e a s t  t o  
cons ide r  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  the  s e n t e n c e .  
So, f o r  t h e  moment, l e t  us  t a k e  t h e  sen tence  i n  t h i s  a l t e r n a -  
t i v e  way. 
On t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  Parsons th inks  t h a t  rhe o b s t a c l e  
t o  accep t ing  d i r e c t l y  t h e  i n d u c t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  of s a t i s f a c t i o n  
( o r ,  presumably, t h e  i n d u c t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  of anything)  i s  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  express ing  c e r t a i n  p r i n c i p l e s  which a r e  i m p l i c i t -  
l y  renounced. I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  i n  accep t ing  
d i r e c t l y  i n d u c t i o n  on n a t u r a l  numbers, w e  a r e  somehow con- 
s t r a i n e d  by t h a t  very  a c t  t o  renounce t h e  s o r t s  of p r i n c i p l e s  
Parsons c la ims we a r e .  Presumably, i n  d i r e c t l y  accep t ing  
i n d u c t i o n  on n a t u r a l  numbers f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  p r e d i c a t e s ,  we 
a r e  doing something e n t i r e l y  p o s i t i v e .  We a r e  no t  i n  the  
a c t  i c s e l f  c la iming i m p l i c i t l y  o r  o therwise  t h a t ,  e . g . ,  we 
cannot s t a t e  t h a t  induc t ion  i s  allowed on any c l a s s  ( i n  t h e  
sense  of  NB o r  NB+), a s  Parsons se.ems t o  i n t i m a t e .  Indeed 
t h e r e  i s  noth ing  about  our p o s i t i o n  t o  r e q u i r e  us t o  make such 
a c la im a t  any p o i n t .  Qui te  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  our  p o s i t i o n  
would be one i n  which we would n o t  t a l k  about  c l a s s e s  ( o r  
" r e l a t e d  e n t i t i e s " )  a t  a l l .  Rather  we would l a r g e l y  r e s t r i c t  
our c o m e n t s  t o  those  t h i n g s  which we a l low t o  e x i s t ,  v i z , ,  
sets. If we were ever to talk about classes, it would be 
in the same spirit that one might talk about Pegasus or 
phlogiston even when one does not believe such things exist. 
It is especially strange that Parsons should think that 
we must renounce the attempt to state certain general prin- 
ciples in accepting induction directly because he himself 
shows very effectively that there is no formalization that 
fully captures our intuitive idea of mathematical induction. 
If there is no formalization, of any order, which can cap- 
ture al.1 of the intuitive idea, then there is no general 
principle, one would think, that would express mathematical 
induction as we intuitively understand it, But then in 
recognizing that this is so, we do not somehow embrace or 
even fail to embrace a general principle which supposedly 
would capture mathematical induction; we are in the course 
of perceiving that there is no such general principle. 
We cannot be renouncing the attempt to state the principles 
involved when our very stand is that there are no general 
principles involved, hence none to renounce the attempt co 
state. Our intuitive concept of mathematical induction is 
openended; given any formulation, there is a property not 
expressible in that formalism for which we would also allow 
mathematical induction. Granted this, we must accept the 
different versions of mathematical induction theory by 
tl:eory, not all at once. When we License mathematical 
induction on the Sat predicate directly, we are merely taking 
one of t h e  never  ending s t e p s  i n  t h i s  theory by theory 
enrichment of i n d u c t i o n .  
I n  t h e  f i n a l  sen tence  i n  the  passage from Parsons ,  he 
sugges t s  t h e r e  may be a  way t o  j u s t i f y  i n d u c t i o n  wi thou t  
second o r d e r  r eason ing :  e v i d e n t l y ,  by somehow having t h e  
e x t e n s i o n  of t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  g r a d u a l l y  c o n s t r u c t e d ;  
Parsons says  noth ing  more about  what t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  might 
come t o .  I confess  t o  being unable t o  understand t h i s  
a l t e r n a t i v e  w e l l  enough t o  pursue  i t  f u r t h e r .  For my 
purposes however, i t  i s  n o t  impor tant  t h a t  I do pursue i t .  
I t  i s  enough t h a t  Pa r sons '  misgiv ings  about accep t ing  induc- 
t i o n  d i r e c t l y  do no t  appear  w e l l  founded. For t h e  " j u s t i -  
f i c a t i o n "  I have s e t  f o r t h  f o r  induc t ion  on t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  
i s  j u s t  t h a t  i t  i s  seen  t o  be warranted  d i r e c t l y ,  i n  a 
sense .  A s  I have a l r e a d y  observed,  however, t h i s  d i r e c t  
warrant  i s  unusual  because i t  r e q u i r e s  the  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  t o  
be w e l l  de f ined ,  and, f o r  a formal  demonstrat ion of t h i s  
l a t t e r  f a c t ,  i n d u c t i o n  on t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  must be employed, 
I t  i s  indeed t h e  very  presence  of  a  c i r c l e  he re  t h a t  i n c l i n e s  
me t o  say t h a t  we accep t  t h e  l eg i t imacy  of both  t h e  i n d u c t i v e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of  S a t ,  and of t h e  use  of i n d u c t i o n  on S a t  d i r e c t l y ,  
We have n o t  s o  f a r  been confronted by a  knockdown argu- 
ment t h a t  shows i n d u c t i o n  on a  p r e d i c a t e  cannot be endorsed 
d i r e c t l y .  But maybe t o  expect  t h i s  i s  somewhat t o  m i s s  t h e  
p o i n t .  Perhaps t h e  i d e a  i s  r a t h e r  t h a t  chere  i s  a c e r t a i n  
a r t i f i c i a l i t y  i n  d i r e c t l y  accep t ing  such i n d u c t i o n ,  Thus, 
conceivably, whenever we motivate, in the privacy of our own 
hearts, first order induction, we invake the existence of 
subcollections of the domain of the quantifiers. \Je may 
for the outside world expunge all talk of these subcollec- 
tions; however, to ourselves, in understanding induction, 
we may mutter: but still they must exist. Now I think it is 
true that we sometimes do appeal to second order reasoning 
in order to motivate first order induction; for example first 
order induction in Peano arithmetic might on occasion be 
secured in our minds by the recognition that the principle 
2 
of second order induction in second order PA (PA ) is legi- 
2 timate. However, the second order quantifiers of PA range 
over entities of whose existence we feel totally assured; 
hence, the naturalness of the transition to second order 
reasoning does not seem to count for much. 
But the motivation of first order induction for the 
formulas of ZF does not appear to involve appeals to higher 
order reasoning. To see this, it is illuminating to consider 
how mathematical induction is proved for the formulas o f  ZF, 
The proof that induction holds for all formulas of set theory 
is brief enough to include here. What is to be proved is 
that, for any formula 6 in the language' of ZF, ( @ (0) & 
V* (x ij on i.*qcr 3 <#@) 4 $ O t  11))- Vs C* a 4- 1 7 9 e v  + 9~))) 
Well, suppose not, for formula # .  Then consider A= l x  \ X  is an 
integer &- 4*3 , By foundation, there must be a minimal x 
in the sense of in this set, Since the < relation among 
numbers i s  j u s t  t h e  € r e l a t i o n ,  we have p icked a  minimal 
such x i n  the  sense  of < a l s o .  C l e a r l y  c h i s  x i s  not  0 ,  
s i n c e  by hypothes is  0 )  , Hence, x = y f l  f o r  some y .  
Since y ( x ,  y i s  n o t  i n  A .  So #Q). But * \ + # f y ~ ) .  So q&). 
C o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  s i n c e  > ( € A .  
Is Lhere something wanting i n  t h i s  p roof?  I f ,  i n  some 
corne r  of our  minds, we always sought second o r d e r  reasoning  
when i n d u c t i o n  was being j u s t i f i e d ,  we would s u r e l y  n o t  be 
a l t o g e t h e r  comfortable  w i t h  t h e  proof j u s t  a s  i t  s t a n d s ,  
For t h e  proof  has an e n t i r e l y  f i r s t  o r d e r  n a t u r e .  One 
p o s s i b l e  p o i n t  of weakness i n  t h e  p roceed i~~ lgs  might be 
simply t h i s .  The f i r s t  o r d e r  p r i n c i p l e  of i n d u c t i o n ,  even 
t o  be asserted, r e q u i r e s  t h e  a s s e r r i o n  of  an i n f i n i t e  
number o f  formulas a t  once,  one i n d u c t i o n  mat r ix  f o r  each 
formula of s e t  t h e o r y .  Being f i n i t e  b e i n g s ,  how can w e  do 
t h i s ?  And i f  w e  can do i t ,  i s  i t  n o t  because w e  s e e  each 
of t h e s e  i n s t a n c e s  a s  fo l lowing from t h e  second o r d e r  p r i n -  
c i p l e s  cf  i n d u c t i o n ,  which, of course ,  can be s t a t e d  i n  a  
s i n g l e  sen tence?  I f a i l  t o  be convinced by t h i s  l i n e  of 
argument. ( G .  Boolos has  an unpublished paper t h a t  
addresses ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  an i s s u e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  s o r t  
of i s s u e .  My o b j e c t i o n s  on t h i s  s c o r e  owe much t o  h i s  argu-  
1 
rnents t h e r e . )  Consider t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  ~ c h e m a ' ~ ( ~ w  + Fx) . 
Suppose I have a  p a r t i c u l a r  language a t  hand, and T wish t o  
a s s e r t  a t  once a l l  of t h e  i n s t a n c e s  of t h a t  schema i n  t h a t  
language. I know what a l l  t h e  fonnu las  a r e :  I know what i t  
would be and how t o  a s s e r t  each i n d i v i d u a l  i n s t a n c e ;  I 
a l s o  d e s i r e  t o  a s s e r t  each i n s t a n c e ,  and ,  f i n a l l y ,  to 
a s s e r t  a l l  t h e  i n s t a n c e s  a t  once.  What could prevent  nie  
from doing t h i s  l a s t ?  
\ 
I may f u r t h e r  recognize  t h a t  'W)(FX + ~ x ) i s  v a l i d .  
Does my i n s i g h t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  s o  depend i n  any way on an 
4 i m p l i c i t  acknowledgement t h a t  (F')@)(F~ F*)' i s  v a l i d ?  I 
s e e  no reason t o  t h i n k  i c  does .  For t h e r e  i s  noth ing  
pecu l i a , r ly  c o l l e c t i o n -  t h e o r e t i c  i n  my i n t u i t i o n  t h a t  
'(%)(F* 3 ~ x ) '  i s  v a l i d .  Thus, i t  i s  n o t  t h a t  I f i r s t  
s e t  b e f o r e  my mind a l l  s u b c o l l e c t i o n s  of the  d i v e r s e  
domains f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e ,  and then  observe t h a t  i f  x 
i s  some such c o l l e c t i o n ,  i t  i s  i n  t h a t  very  same c o l l e c t i o n .  
Now i f  t h e r e  were some use of  t h e  combina to r i a l  n a t u r e  of 
1 
such c o l l e c t i o n s  t a c i t  i n  my i n t u i t i o n  t h a t  'cu)(F~ Fr) 
were v a l i d ,  then I would indeed be r e s o r t i n g  t o  t h e  second 
o rde r  v e r s i o n  t o  underpin t h i s  i n t u i t i o n .  However, no such 
use s l i p s  i n ,  as f a r  a s  I can s e e .  Ra the r ,  t h e r e  i s  noth-  
ing more involved  than t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  boolean 
p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  p r e d i c a t e s  have;  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  p roper ty  
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r i v i a l :  v i z . ,  i f  a p r e d i c a t e  holds  of an 
o b j e c t  then  i t  holds  of  t h a t  o b j e c t .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  
r ecogn iz ing  t h i s  schema t o  be v a l i d  may o b l i g e  us t o  make an 
e x t e n s i v e  su rvey ,  o f  an i n f i n i t e  number of f i r s t  o rde r  
p r e d i c a t e s ,  and perhaps t h i s  i s  thought t o  be p rob lemat ic ,  
But i t  i s  no more problemat ic  than  the  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  which i s  
t o  survey an i n f i n i t e  number of s u b c o l l e ~ t i o n s  of t h e  
domains. 
Let us  r e t u r n  t o  the  case  of induc t ion  f o r  t h e  language 
of ZF, and n o t e  t h e  p a r a l l e l s .  We of course  have a c l e a r  
i d e a  of  what a  formula of  ZF i s ;  we understand and wish t o  
a s s e r t  t h e  i n d u c t i o n  m a t r i x  f o r  each formula ,  f o r  we s e e  
they each h o l d .  Why c a n ' t  we a s s e r t  them a l l  s imultaneous-  
l y ?  There should  be no d i f f i c u l ~ y  h e r e ,  i f  t h e r e  was none 
f o r  ' ( y ) ( ~ ~ +  ~ ~ 1 ' .  What, then ,  about mot iva t ing  f i r s t  o r d e r  
i n d u c t i o n :  does t h a t  involve  t h e  second o r d e r  v e r s i o n ?  As 
\ 
wi th  t h e  i n t u i t i o n  t h a t  ' & ) ( ~ x + ~ ; ) i s  v a l i d ,  t h e r e  appears  t o  
be no e s s e n t i a l  use  of c o l l e c t i o n  t h e o r e t i c  r eason ing .  
For each i n d i v i d u a l  formula of s e t  theory ,  w e  can run through 
t h e  proof s t a t e d  above, and s e e  t h a t  i t  a p p l i e s ,  and t h a t  
t h e r e f o r e  t h e  induc t ion  m a t r i x  f o r  t h a t  formula h o l d s .  But 
we can a l s o  survey a11 t h e s e  p roofs  a t  once; o r  a t  l e a s t  w e  
can i f  we can survey a l l  of  t h e  r e l e v a n t  s u b c o l l e c t i o n s  of 
t he  domain, a s  we would have t o  i f  we were t o  appeal  t o  
second o rde r  i n d u c t i o n .  
' A l l  t h i s  may be w e l l  and g o o d , '  one might demur, ' t o  
mot iva te  t h e  use of i n d u c t i o n  f o r  formulas of  ZF, But t h e s e  
formulas a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  independent ly of t h e  use of induc t ion  
on them. The S a t  p r e d i c a t e  i s  n o t  s o  b l e s s e d ;  p r e c i s e l y  i t s  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s  i n  d i s p u t e .  ' Now c e r t a i n l y  che re  i s  t h i s  
impor tant  d i f f e r e n c e  between mot iva t ing  induc t ion  formulas 
of ZF and doing i t  f o r  t h e  Sat p r e d i c a t e .  But t h e  p o i n t  i s  
t h ~ t  h e r e  i s  no precedent  f o r  t u r n i n g  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of 
second o r d e r  reasoning  t o  mot iva te  induc t ion  on t h e  Sa t  
p r e d i c a t e ;  hence we should n o t  a p r i o r i  expect  the  j u s c i f i c a -  
t i o n  t o  come from t h a t  q u a r t e r .  
Of course ,  the  S a t - p r e d i c a t e  i s  s p e c i a l ,  being induc- 
t i v e l y  de f ined  i n  t h e  way i t  i s ,  and t h i s  may c a l l  f o r  
second o r d e r  reasoning  i n  i t s  c a s e ,  bu t  t h e  i n t u i t i o n  under- 
l y i n g  our  endorsement o f  t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  a s  we l l  de f ined  
does n o t  appear  genuine ly  c o l l e c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c .  Here a g a i n ,  
no s t r i c t l y  combina to r i a l  p r i n c i p l e s  seem t o  i n t r u d e ,  To 
s e c u r e  t h i s  c l a im,  cons ide r  a  t y p i c a l  i n d u c t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n .  
,3uppose I i n d u c t i v e l y  d e f i n e  formulas i n  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n -  
I a 1  c a l c u l u s .  I say t h a t  p ,  , ' p 2  , . . .  e e c ,  a r e  a l l  
formulas;  f u r t h e r ,  i f  yll,  and y 2  a r e  formulas ,  so  a r e  
r r 
'-(Y:, v and y, g ~2 ; f i n a l l y ,  noth ing  i s  
formula u n l e s s  ob ta ined  by one of t h e s e  s t e p s .  To under- 
s t a n d  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  we may imagine what may be metaphori-  
c a l l y  d e s c r i b e d  a s  a c e r t a i n  i n f i n i t e  p r o c e s s .  This  process  
begins  w i t h  the  sen tence  l e t t e r s  ' p o l ,  I p l ' ,  . . . ,  e t c . '  
f from t h e s e ,  i t  goes on t o  c r e a t e  new formulas ,  e .  g.  , (p,,v ps')' , 
f \ 
f347 j from t h i s  s t a g e ,  i t  advances t o  g e n e r a t e  s t i l l  
C I 
more formulas ,  e.g . ,  (-pq,vCp,,v p.); and s o  f o r t h .  Now 
\ 
suppose we come a c r o s s  some o b j e c t ,  say * ( - p , b ~  (fi v)) , 
and we want t o  determine whether i t  i s  a formula .  F i r s t ,  we 
check t h a t  i t  i s  b u i l t  up from a f i n i t e  number of occurrences  
. I t  i s ;  s o  we check 
whether i t  i s  ever  reached i n  t h i s  i n f i n i t e  p r o c e s s .  Well, 
we may reason ,  i f  i t  were reached a t  some s t a g e ,  t h e n ,  s i n c e  
' v '  i s  t h e  main connec t ive ,  a t  t h e  previous  s taget-p, ;  and 
' ' must have been e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  be formulas .  But l e t  
us  examine ' ( p b v ) ' .  A t  what s t a g e  could t h i s  have been 
reached? A s  b e f o r e ,  formulas wi th  ' v '  a s  t h e  main connec- 
t i v e  must have a  w f f  on e i t h e r  s i d e  of them ' ( p , v )  does n o t .  
Hence t h i s  express ion  i s  n o t  a  formula ;  but  then  n e i t h e r  i s  
4 
( ' We observe t h a t  t h i s  method a p p l i e s  f o r  
any o b j e c t ,  s o  t h a t  i t  w i l l  determine whether o r  n o t  t h a t  
o b j e c t  i s  formula.  
Now a t  what p o i n t ,  i f  any,  i s  c o l l e c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c  
r eason ing  employed i n  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  o r  i n  s e e i n g  t h a t  
t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  works? Let  us examine t h e  impor tant  s t e p s ,  
' No assumption i s  made t h a t ,  a t  t h e  s t a r t ,  ' p o f ,  I p L 1 ,  ' p 2  , 
e t c . ,  a r e  a l l  conta ined  i n  some c o l l e c t i o n .  The d e f i n i t i o n  
could j u s t  a s  e a s i l y  have begun by l e t t i n g ,  say ,  each of the  
n 
o r d i n a l s  be a sen tence  l e t t e r ;  t h i s  sequence we would have 
comprehended q u i t e  as w e l l .  When we s e t  be fo re  our  mind 
t h i s  i n f i n i t e  p r o c e s s ,  i t  i s  n o t  t h a t  we  must suppose t h e r e  
i s  a c o l l e c t i o n  t h a t  corresponds t o  t h e  completion of t h i s  
i n f i n i t e  p r o c e s s ,  g a t h e r i n g  up a l l  t h e  formulas genera ted  
along t h e  l i n e .  I t  seems unnecessary a l s o  t h a t  a t  each s t a g e  
on t h e  way t h e r e  be a c o l l e c t i o n  t h a t  c o n t a i n s  a l l  t h e  formulas 
genera ted  s o  f a r .  Indeed,  i t  s t r i k e s  r11e a s  no more o b l i g a t o r y  
t o  suppose t h a t  f o r  each of t h e s e  s t a g e s ,  o r  f o r  t h e  completion 
of a l l  t h e  s t a g e s ,  t h e r e  be a c o l l e c t i o n  of the  formulas o b t a i n -  
ed a t  those  p o i n t s ,  than i t  i s  t o  assume t h a t  the  i t e r a t i v e  
process  i n  s e t  theory  must be captured  by some c o l l e c t i o n ,  
F i n a l l y ,  cons ide r  t h e  i n s i g h t  t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  works. 
Take an a r b i t r a r y  o b j e c t .  \.&ether o r  n o t  i t  i s  b u i l t  up of 
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a  f i n i t e  number of occurrences  of '-', V ,  'L', P. I P I ,  p, @ L C .  , 
i s  s u r e l y  n o t  something t h a t  e n t a i l s  second o rde r  r eason ing ,  
I f  i t  i s  s o  c o n s t r u c t e d ,  t h e  s t e p s  r equ i red  t o  reduce i t  e i t h e r  
t o  s u b p a r t s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  formulas ,  i f  i t  i s  no t  a  formula ,  o r  
t o  sen tence  l e t t e r s ,  i f  i t  i s ,  invoke no th ing  c o l l e c t i o n -  
t h e o r e t i c .  Ana n e i t h e r ,  i t  seems, does t h e  i n s i g h t  t h a t  t h i s  
method does t h e  job  f o r  any o b j e c t .  
No;? t h e  i n d u c t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  of S a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  r e a l l y  no 
d i f f e r e n t  from t h i s  i n  i t s  m o t i v a t i o n .  The f i r s t  s t e p  d i f f e r s  
somewhat, inasmuch a s  t h e r e  a r e  countably  many sen tence  l e t t e r s ,  
bu t  more than s e t  many p a i r s  f o r  which t h e  S a t  p r e d i c a t e  ho lds .  
But t h i s  i n e s s e n t i a l  d ivergence  can be remedied by t a k i n g ,  as  I 
sugges ted ,  a l l  o r d i n a l s  a s  sen tence  l e t t e r s  i n  t h e  i n d u c t i v e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of a  formula.  
Enough, t h e n ,  of a l l  t h i s .  Perhaps t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  reasons  
f o r  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  accep t ing  ZFT i s  tantamount t o  accep t ing  
NB o r  even NB+. I s h a l l  p r e s e n t  ano the r  p o s s i b l e  defense  of 
t h e  view, b u t  i t  w i l l  t a k e  some work t o  mot iva te ,  We know 
t h a t  f o r  any f i r s t  o r d e r  theory  which i s  c o n s i s t e n t ,  t h e r e  i s  a  
model i n  t h e  n a t u r a l  numbers; t h i s  i s  i n  e s s e n c e  t h e  c o n t e n t  
of t h e  Lowenheim-Skolem theorem.  But i f  t h i s  i s  s o ,  how i s  
i t  t h a t  w e  succeed  i n  p i c k i a g  o u t  s e t s  a s  t h e  domain ove r  
which ou r  q u a n t i f i e r s  r a n g e ,  and n o t  numbers a s  t h i s  model 
would p r o v i d e ?  Moreover,  why i s  i t  t h a t  w e  do n o t  t a k e  t h e  
Lowenheim-Skolem theorem as a  r e d u c t i o n  o f  s e t s  t o  n a t u r a l  
numbers? An obvious  r e s p o n s e  i s  Q u i n e ' s :  we do nor  e f f e c t  a 
genu ine  r e d u c t i o n  because  t h e r e  i s  a  s e r i o u s  p r i c e  p a i d  i n  
i deo logy  f o r  t h e  s a v i n g s  i n  o n t o l o g y .  No m a t t e r  which model 
of  ZF w i t h  i t s  domain c o n s i s t i n g  of t h e  n a t u r a l  nunbers  we 
choose ,  w e  have t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p red icamen t ,  There  w i l l  be  
r e l a t i o n s  among t h e  numbers t h a t  a r e ,  i n  t h e s e  models ,  t h e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  fo rmulas  i n  t h e  language of ZF, y e t  a r e  n o t  
e x p r e s s i b l e  by any formula  i n  t h e  language of  a r i t h m e t i c ,  Thus,  
g r a n t e d  c h a t  t h e  i deo logy  of  ZF must be  c o n s i d e r a b l y  more 
powerfu l  t h a n  t h a t  of  a r i t h m e t i c ,  why t h i n k  t h a t  we can  g e t  
away w i t h  a  weaker on to logy  mere ly  by p o i n t i n g  t o  t h e  conc lu -  
s i o n  o f  t h e  Lowenheim-Skolem theorem? I s n ' t  t o  embrace rhe  
s t r o n g e r  i d e o l o g y ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  t o  embrace t h e  s t r o n g e r  on to logy?  
Quine p u t s  t h e  p o i n t  c h i s  way: 
Blanke t  pythagoreanism on t h e s e  terms i s  u n a t t r a c -  
t i v e ,  f o r  i t  mere ly  o f f e r s  new and o b s c u r e r  a c c o u n t s  
of  o l d  moves and o l d  problems.  On t h i s  s c o r e  a g a i n ,  
t h e n ,  t h e  r e l a t i v i s t i c  p r o p o s i t i o n  seems r e a s o n a b l e :  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no a b s o l u t e  s e n s e  i n  s a y i n g  t h a t  a l l  
t h e  o b j e c t s  of  a t h e o r y  a r e  numbers, o r  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  
s e t s ,  o r  b o d i e s ,  o r  sometiling e l s e ;  t h i s  makes no 
s e n s e  u n l e s s  r e l a t i v e  t o  some background t h e o r y .  The 
r e l e v a n t  p r e d i c a t e s  --"number4', "set", "body", o r  wl~a t - 
ever--would be  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from one a n o t h e r  i n  t h e  
background t h e o r y  by , t h e  r o l e s  t hey  p l a y  i n  t h e  
laws of t h a t  t h e o r y .  b 
Quine h imse l f  i n s i s t s  t h a t  a  proxy f u n c t i o n  be a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  t h e r e  t o  be  a  genu ine  o n t o l o g i c a l  r e d u c t i o n ,  and t h i s  
c l e a r l y  i s  n o t  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  purporced  r e d u c t i o n  
o f  s e t s  t o  numbers.  (There  a r e  r e a s o n s  t o  doubt  t h a t  t h i s  
r equ i r emen t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t ,  however, as I s h a l l  a r g u e  l a t e r  
i n  t hc  paper  . )  
The same s o r t s  o f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t h a t  v i t i a t e  any a t t e m p t  
t o  r e d u c e  se ts  t o  numbers might  be a d r o i t l y  p a r l a y e d  t o  t r y  
t o  show w e  a r e  comni t t ed  t o  liB o r  even WE!+, For t h e  i deo logy  
of ZFT, t o  which we  a re  committed,  c l e a r l y  o u t s t r i p s  t h a t  of 
ZF by i t s e l f .  There  a r e  r e l a t i o n s  e x p r e s s i b l e  i n  ZFT n o t  
e x p r e s s i b l e  i n  ZF a l o n e ;  v i z .  , t h o s e  which i n v o l v e  t h e  n o t i o n s  
of  t r u t h  o r  s a t i s f a c t i o n .  Granted t h i s  i n c r e a s e  i n  i d e o l o g y ,  
i t  i s  n o t  i m p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  i t  a c t u a l l y  commits us  t o  a s t r o n g e r  
o n t o l o g y .  And s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  a  t r a n s l a t i o n  from I J B ( ~ ' I B + )  i n t o  
ZFT, embracing che  ideo logy  oZ ZFT i s  i n  e f f e c t  t o  embrace t h a t  
of  NB(NBS). But i f  we have MB(i.la+) a s  ou r  background t h e o r y ,  
o r  something t h a t  i t  i s  t r a n s l a t a b l e  i n t o ,  namely Z B T ,  we 
appear  t o  be  embro i led  i n  t h e  u n i v e r s e  of  WB(WB+), F o r ,  t o  
employ Q u i n e ' s  p o i n t ,  t h e r e  s p p e a r s  t o  be  no a b s o l u t e  s e n s e  
i n  s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e ,  o r  a r e  n o t ,  p rope r  c l a s s e s ;  from t h e  
s t a n d p o i n t  o f  NB(NB+) a s  a background t h e o r y ,  t h e r e  of  c o u r s e  
w i l l  b e ,  
The r e a d e r  has  s u r e l y  a l r e a d y  no ted  t h e  o b f u s c a t i o n  p re senc  
i n  t h i s  argument a s  i t  s t a n d s .  I n  e s s e n c e ,  the  argument pro-  
ceeds thus :  t o  be committed t o  t h e  ontology of a theory i s  
noth ing  more than  t o  be committed t o  i t s  ideology;  w e  a r e  
c o m i t t e d  a t  l e a s t  t o  t h e  ideology of ZFT; b u t  NB(NB+) i s  
t r a n s l a t a b l e  i n t o  ZFT: t h e r e f o r e ,  we a r e  committed t o  those 
e n t i t i e s  t o  which MB(NB+) would commit u s .  However, the  a rgu-  
ment e l i d e s  t h e  c r i t i c a l  q u e s t i o n :  g iven  t h a t  i.iB(LIB+) and ZFT 
a r e  t r a n s l a t a b l e ,  t h e  f i r s t  i n t o  t h e  second, i n  t h e  sense  i n  
which they a r e ,  rvhich ontology should we a c c e p t ?  E v i d e n t l y ,  
t h e  i d e a  behind t h e  argument i s  t h a t ,  i f  Ire accep t  a theory ,  
we a r e  committed t o  a l l  t h e  e n t i t i e s  t h a t  t h a t  t h e o r y ,  o r  any 
theory  t r a n s l a t a b l e  i n t o  i t ,  a l l e g e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e .  
A t  f i r s t  b l u s h ,  t h i s  might appear  t o  f l y  i n  t h e  f a c e  oE 
what goes on i n  t h e  c a s e  of o n t o l o g i c a l  r e d u c t i o n .  For  p r e -  
sumably when w e  reduce one onto logy co ano the r  t h e r e  a re  two 
t h e o r i e s ,  one of t h e s e  t r a n s l a t a b l e  v i a  a  proxy f u n c t i o n  i n t o  
t h e  o t h e r ,  and t h e  former theory  c la ims t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  
t h i n g s  t h e  l a t t e r  does n o t .  We cons ide r  t h i s  t r a n s l a t a b i -  
of  t h e  one i n t o  t h e  o t h e r  t o  show t h a t  w e  can d i spense  wi th  ~31 
one ontology i n  f avor  of t h e  o t h e r .  But i n  f a c t ,  i t  i s  not: 
c l e a r  that t h i s  i s  the b e s t  way t o  unders tand o n t o l o g i c a l  r e -  
d u c t i o n .  Let  us  cons ide r  a paradigm c a s e  of o n t o l o g i c a l  r e -  
d u c t i o n ,  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of  number theory  t o  s e t  t h e o r y .  Liow 
i t  w i l l  be convenient ,  f o r  l a t e r  purposes ,  t o  t ransform the  
r e d u c t i o n  i n t o  one between two e q u i v a l e n t  t h e o r i e s .  So c o n s t r u c t  
a  two s o r t e d  t h e o r y ,  i n  which one k i n d  of q u a n t i f i e r  ranges  
over numbers, and t h e  o t h e r  kind of q u a n r i f i e r  ranges over  
s e t s .  That p a r t  of t h e  theory  which nas q u a n t i f i e r s  over  
s e t s  would have t h e  power of ZF; t h e  p a r t  which has  q u a n t i f i e r s  
over  numbers would be of t h e  s t r e n g t h  of P A .  I n  t h e  two s o r t e d  
t h e o r y ,  ' 3  € 5 '  f o r  example would n o t  be meaningful ;  u h i l e  i t  
would be i n  t h e  proposed theory  t o  which t h e  two s o r t e d  theory 
would be reduced,  ZF,  For a l l  t h a t ,  however, under t h e  usua l  
t r a n s l a t i o n  t h e  two t h e o r i e s  would be e q u i v a l e n t .  So h e r e  we 
might seem t o  have a  c a s e  i n  which t h e r e  a r e  two i n t e r t r a n s l a t - ,  
a b l e  t h e o r i e s ,  one of which holds t h e r e  a r e  th ings  which t h e  
o t h e r  does n o t .  And w e  s u r e l y  cons ide r  t h i s  an o n t o l o g i c a l  
r e d u c t i o n .  
But i s  t h e r e  good reason t o  say t h a t  t h e  two s o r t e d  theory 
c la ims t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  e n t i t i e s  which ZF does n o t ?  !Say 
we n o t  t a k e  t h e  r e s u l t  t o  be p r e c i s e l y  ciiat numbers, over  wl~ich  
one se t  of q u a n t i f i e r s  i n  t h e  two s o r t e d  theory  r a n g e ,  j u s t  
a r e  s e t s ?  To put  i t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  might be under -  
s tood  t o  show t h a t  any b e l i e f  w e  n i g h t  have had ,  whi l e  accep t ing  
t h e  two s o r t e d  theory ,  t h a t  numbers were d i s t i n c t  from s e t s ,  i s  
mis taken;  i n  f a c t  numbers a r e  noth ing  but  s e t s .  ( O f  c o u r s e ,  i E  
we had had t h i s  b e l i e f ,  i t  i s  not  sori.ething t h a t  t h e  two s o r t e d  
theory  a l o n e  conlmits us  t o  o r  should persuade us o f , )  The pro-  
posa l  h e r e  i s  n o t  t h a t  numbers a r e  o b j e c t s  i n  t h e  sense  o f  Frege .  9 
T 
Rather ,  the p o i n t  is  t h a t  i n  committ ing o u r s e l v e s  t o  ZF a l o n e ,  
w e  a r e  n o t  e scap ing  comi~i tment  t o  numbers, I n  l lo lding ZF, 
we a r e  a s  much committed co numbers a s  we would be i n  
a d o p t i n g  ZF+PA; t h i s  i s  what t h e  o n t o l o g i c a l  r e d u c t i o n  i s  
talcen t o  show. 
Assume, t h e n ,  t h a t  o n t o l o g i c a l  r e d u c t i o n  between 
t h e o r i e s  i n v o l v e s  p r e c i s e l y  a  demons t r a t i on  t h a t  c e r t a i n  
e n c i t i e s  of  s o r t  A a r e  r e a l l y  c e r t a i n  e n t i t i e s  o f  s o r t  B .  
Where does  t h i s  l e a v e  u s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  NB(NB+)  and ZFT? 
I t  might  appea r  t o  show t h a t  w e  a r e  n o t  a v o i d i n g  t h e  
on to logy  of  NB(MB+) b y  a c c e p t i n g  ZFT; f o r  t h e  on to logy  o f  
NB(NB+) might  sonehow be t h e  on to logy  of  ZFT. 
-
Although t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  NB o r  NB+ can be reduced 
t o  ZFT may seem r a t h e r  b i z a r r e ,  i t  w i l l  be  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  
d e l i b e r a t e  t h i s  q u e s t i o n .  Aside f r o m  i t s  d i r e c t  consequences  f o r  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  ou r  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  admi t  p r o p e r  c l a s s e s ,  we s h a l l  
s e e  t h a t ,  i n  c o n s i d e r i n g  i t ,  t h e r e  i s  much t o  b e  l e a r n e d  t h a t  w i l l  
b e a r  on what we have a l r e a d y  c o v e r e d ,  Moreover,  w h i l e  t h e  p r o p o s a l  
may appea r  a t  be sc  something o f  a c u r i o s i t y ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
a b j u r e  on p r i n c i p l e d  grounds .  A t  any r a t e ,  t h i s  p r o p o s a l  s h a l l  
occupy us  i n  t h e  l a s t  c h a p t e r  of t h i s  t h e s i s ,  
ClUPTER I1 
TRUTH THEORIES AND THE HIERARCHY OF V 
In  "Sets  and Classes  , I "  Parsons observes  t h a t  t h e r e  
is  a  t r a n s l a t i o n  betweell NB+ and ZFT.* What Parsons c a l l s  
NB+ i s  n o t  what is  u s u a l l y  in tended by  t h e  term. O r d i n a r i l y ,  
by 'NB+' i s  meant Kel ley Morse s e t  theory :  t h e  ex tens ion  
of NB ob ta ined  by a l lowing bound c l a s s  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  
c l a s s  e x i s t e n c e  axioms. For Parsons ,  N B f  i s  t h e  theory  got  
by extending  t h e  replacement axioms ( f o r  s e t s )  t o  inc lude  
those  w i t h  bound c l a s s  v a r i a b l e s .  This  i s  a  much weaker 
theory  than Kelley Morse s e t  t h e o r y ;  how much weaker may b e s t  
be seen by a  proof t h a t  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  from WBf (as  Par-  
sons i n t e n d s  t h e  term) t o  ZFT f a i l s  a s  a  t r a n s l a t i o n  Erom 
Icelley Morse s e t  theory  i n t o  ZFT. The t r a n s l a t i o n  Parsons 
has i n  mind i s  t h i s .  Take a  formula of P J B t .  We can con- 
s i d e r  '(*) ' t o  be de f ined  a s  ' - ( 3 Y )  - ' . Now wherever 
3Y(q * * Y  *) o c c u r s ,  r e p l a c e  i t  wi th  3,3,(a3 j u ( S q f ( q , s " ) l  - .  -') 
s 0'" i s  t h e  sequence j u s t  l i k e  s  save  t h a t  u i s  sub- 
s t i t u t e d  a t  t h e  0 t h  p l a c e .  El iminate  t h e  a b s t r a c t ,  which i s  
v i r t u a l .  This formula w i l l  be t r u e  i n  ZFT i f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
*By ZFT I mean what I meant i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of  my p a p e r ,  
Take t h e  language of ZF; add a  two p l a c e  p r e d i c a t e  S a t ( x , y ) ,  
Adjoin t h e  ZF axioms which d e f i n e  i n d u c t i v e l y  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
f o r  t h e  formulas of  ZF. F i n a l l y  a l low formulas b u i l t  ilp out: 
of S a t ( x , y )  t o  be used i n  replacement axioms. 
formula was t r u e  i n  N B t  (on a  s t a n d a r d  n o t i o n  of t r u t h  f o r  
Suppose t h e  same t r a n s l a t i o n  worked f o r  Kelley Morse 
set  t h e o r y .  I c la im t h e  fo l lowing i s  provable  i n  Kel ley 
Morse : 
1) 3)(\I*, dr* LCV" ( u e  X-  S A T  ( n , s 0 1 * ) ) 3  
Here SAT(x,y) i s  a  p r e d i c a t e  of NB+ (hence of Kel ley Morse) 
t h a t  expresses  s a t i s f a c t i o n  f o r  formulas i n  ZF,  ob ta ined  i n  
t h e  manner Parsons s u g g e s t s .  The t r a n s l a t i o n  of 1) i s  
0 2) '3n, as, % vs (5 'Vu ( Sqt Cn,, s:av)t-4 S H T *  (n, s 
where SAT* i s  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  of SAT. Hence, by q u a n t i f i e r  
l o g i c  t h e r e  i s  a  no,  so, uo, such t h a t  
3) S a t  (no, S, O a u O )  C f S  SAT* <no, s,O#") 
But c o n s i d e r :  i n  Kel ley Morse a l l  t h e  Tarsk i  b i c o n d i t i o n a l s  
f o r  formulas of  ZF a r e  p rovab le ,  and s i n c e  Kelley Norse i s  
n o t  b i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  no must be t h e  godel  number of a  genuine 
formula,  say q . Hence, 
4 )  
 SAT(^^,^?^^) C )  q ( s o ,  x ~ , ~ ~ ~ , 8 ~ / u ~ ~  S L , . ~ ~ , ~ ~ )  
i s  p rovab le .  But i t s  t r a n s l a t i o n  5 )  should then be provable 
i n  ZFT. 
' I  "f' ~ 2 % )  Q ( X , K ~ , ~ ~ ~ , X ~ / U , ,  s;  v W a ,  s )  , 
Yet i n  ZFT, a l l  T a r s k i  b i c o n d i t i o n a l s  a r e  p rovab le ,  inc lud ing  
6 )  Sq+ ( nu, s ,OtUO)  t3 Q (  KO, 8 ; )  v g . ,  x ~ / v ~ ,  s i ) .  .., s 4 )  
But 5) and 6 )  g i v e  us  
7) S A T *  (h., S , O ' ~ O )  H Sst (no, s,"I 4) 
which c o n t r a d i c t s  3 ) .  
I t  remains t o  show t h a t  1 )  i s  provable  i n  Kelley 
Morse. I n  essence  t h i s  i s  j u s t  an a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  C a n t o r ' s  
proof t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  more members i n  t h e  power s e t  of a  s e t  
than i n  t h e  s e t  i t s e l f .  
Proof of  1 ) .  Suppose t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y  t h a t  
8) VX 3~ 3s L(u) (U 6 X H SATCh,  sO'")I 
Define A thus : 
9 )  A = 5 4 n , s >  1 3~ ((u) < S A T ( n ,  s o l u ) ~  ~ E Y )  &- <%s> # y ) j  
A must e x i s t  i n  Kel ly Morse. By our  h y p o t h e s i s ,  t h e r e  i s  a 
n L ,  and a  s l  such t h a t  
10) Vo ( u a A H S A T  (n, , sptu)) 
But any such Y must,  of course ,  be i d e n t i c a l  t o  A ;  hence 
(n,, s,) { y . Suppose now t h a t  (n,,s,) $ A .  We11 then 8) 
must be t r u e  by EG on A .  But then <n, , r , )€A.  C o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  
We can s e e  how f a r  s h o r t  of Kel ley Morse s e t  theory i s  
ZFT (and NBi-) . Now l e t  us  cons ide r  the  f o l l o w i n g .  Suppose 
we s t a r t  ou t  wi th  ZFT, recognize  i t s  equiva lence  with N B t ,  
and then go on t o  adopt NB+; n e x t  we e s t a b l i s h  a t r u t h  theory 
f o r  NB+, recognize  i t s  equiva lence  t o  a  f u r t h e r  s u p e r - c l a s s  
t h e o r y ,  and suppose we i t e r a t e  t h i s  process  a s  o f t e n  a s  we 
s e e  f i t .  What w i l l  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  we g e t  by t h e s e  means look 
l i k e ?  We s h a l l  s e e  t h a t  i t  b e a r s  no g r e a t  resemblance t o  a  
cont inued i t e r a t i o n  of  t h e  ranks  of  V .  R e f l e c t  on t h e  impl ica-  
t i o n s  of t h i s  f a c t .  Pa r sons '  argument t h a t  we cannot q u a n t i f y  
over  a l l  s e t s  might be put  t h u s .  We seem t o  need a t r u t h  
t heory  f o r  ZF; but  t h i s  t r u t h  theory  r e q u i r e s  f o r  i t s  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  (o r  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a  theory  which inc ludes )  
proper  c l a s s e c .  But t h e s e  proper  c l a s s e s  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  
a  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  i t e r a t i v e  h i e r a r c h y .  Yet once w e  
in t roduce  new ranks  i n  the  i t e r a t i v e  h i e r a r c h y ,  we should 
con t inue  a s  t h e  axioms of  replacement and power s e t  would 
r e q u i r e .  I s n ' t  t h e  most p l a u s i b l e  way t o  make sense  of 
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  t o  hold  t h a t  our  q u a n t i f i e r s  never  r e a l l y  
range over  a l l  s e t s ,  bu t  only  over  Vo( f o r  s o m e q ?  
Parsons 'argument  i s  s e r i o u s l y  undermined i f  we s e e  
t h a t  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a  t r u t h  t h e o r y ,  even i f  i t  i n -  
volved us  i n  proper  c l a s s e s ,  and s u p e r c l a s s e s ,  e t c . ,  a t  
no p o i n t  involved us i n  a  commitment even t o  one a d d i t i o n a l ,  
complete rank of c o l l e c t i o n s ,  For then t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
tempta t ion  t o  s e e  t h e  l e v e l  of proper  c l a s s e s  a s  a  cont inua-  
t i o n  of t h e  i t e r a t i v e  h i e r a r c h y .  And c e r t a i n l y  t h e r e  w i l l  
be  no impetus t o  s t a r t  apply ing  t h e  axiom schema o f  r ep lace -  
ment i f  even t h e  l e v e l  of proper  c l a s s e s  i s  n o t  a  p l a u s i b l e  
cand ida te  f o r  having been ob ta ined  ( i n  p a r t )  by a f u l l  
blooded s e p a r a t i o n  axiom. Let  me e x p l a i n  t h i s  l a s t  p o i n t ,  
The p r i n c i p l e  which most c l e a r l y  e x h i b i t s  t h e  combinator ia l  
f e a t u r e  of  c o l l e c t i o n s  i s  t h e  axiom schema of s e p a r a t i o n  
( o r ,  i n  a  more powerful way, t h e  axiom schema of rep lacement) ,  
The power s e t  o p e r a t i o n  by i t s e l f  does n o t  r e a l l y  provide  us 
wi th  t h e  combina to r i a l  a s p e c t ,  s i n c e  t h e  s e t  of a l l  - s u b s e t s  
may be very  smal l  i f  we d o n ' t  p e n i t  s t r o n g  p r i n c i p l e s  
f o r  s e p a r a t i n g  o f f  s u b s e t s .  Ra the r ,  t h e  power s e t  axiom 
i s  b e s t  understood a s  merely a  p r i n c i p l e  f o r  i t e r a t i n g  
new Levels of s e t s .  The axiom of s e p a r a t i o n  a r i s e s  from 
t h e  i d e a  t h a t  a  s u b s e t  of a s e t  should be h e l d  t o  e x i s t ,  
no m a t t e r  how t h e  "dec is ions"  t o  inc lude  and exclude mem- 
b e r s  of  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s e t  a r e  made, so long a s  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  
a r e  made f o r  a l l  members, and t h e  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  
( t h a t  i s ,  t h e r e  a r e  n o t  two d e c i s i o n s ,  one t o  throw t h e  
member i n ,  and one t o  throw i t  o u t ) .  The axiom of r e p l a c e -  
ment i s  mot iva ted  by a  k ind  of ex tens ion  of t h i s  r eason ing .  
It  h a s ,  I t h i n k ,  been i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  recognized t o  
what e x t e n t  ZF embodies an i t e r a t i v e - c o m b i n a t o r i a l  concep- 
t i o n  of s e t ,  and n o t  j u s t  an i t e r a t i v e  concept ion of s e t .  
Thus a s  I have s a i d  s e p a r a t i o n  and replacement can be 
j u s t i f i e d  on combinator ia l  grounds but  n o t  on pure ly  i t e r a -  
t i v e  grounds.  I n  a d d i t i o n  t h e  axiom of cho ice ,  whi l e  of 
course  independent of  ZF, p u r p o r t s  ( r i g h t l y ,  1 t h ink)  t o  
be j u s t i f i e d  c o m b i n a t o r i a l l y ,  and aga in  i s  n o t  j u s t i f i e d  by  
t h e  i t e r a t i v e  concept ion  a l o n e .  S i m i l a r  p o i n t s  h o l d ,  I 
b e l i e v e ,  f o r  h i g h e r  axioms of i n f i n i t y ,  e . g , ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
of  a  s t r o n g l y  i n a c c e s s i b l e  c a r d i n a l .  But more on t h i s  i n  
t h e  n e x t  chap te r  of my t h e s i s .  
Now t h e  e x t e n s i o n  of  ZF, desc r ibed  above by proper  
c l a s s e s ,  then by s u p e r - c l a s s e s ,  then  by s u p e r - s u p e r - c l a s s e s ,  
fte 
e t c , ,  w i l l  never  g i v e  us  a  f u l l  rank of c o l l e c t i o n s  a t  t h e  
l e v e l  of proper  c l a s s e s .  What I mean by a  f u l l  rank of 
c o l l e c t i o n s  i s  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of impred ica t ive  
c l a s s e s  should be provable ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  Kel ley 
Morse s e t  theory  be p rovab le .  Given t h a t  t h i s  ex tens ion  
i s  s o  impoverished combina to r i a l ly  by comparison t o  Kelley 
l lorse s e t  theory ,  we have l i t t l e  reason t o  conclude rhe 
q u a n t i f i e r s  of ZF should be understood t o  range over  a  s e t .  
-
For the  n e x t  rank above t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  would 
i n  t h i s  case  inc lude  even impred ica t ive ly  def ined  s u b s e t s  
of t h e  s e t  which i s  t h e  range  of t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s ;  the  com- 
b i n a t o r i a l  f e a t u r e  of s e t s  h e r e  would r e q u i r e  t h a t  such sub-  
s e t s  would e x i s t .  But t h e r e  i s  no impetus t o  th ink  t h a t  
the  c o l l e c t i o n s  we g e t  by the  i t e r a t i o n  above desc r ibed  a r e  
s o  c l o s e d ,  f o r  t h e i r  mot iva t ion  i s  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  i n  
c h a r a c t e r ;  they need only  provide  a  backdrop a g a i n s t  which 
c e r t a i n  t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  may be developed. S ince  t h e  combin- 
a t o r i a l  f e a t u r e  of s e t s  i s  an e n t i r e l y  c e n t r a l  one i n  our 
concept ion  of  t h e  s e t s  i n  ZF, t h e r e  seems t o  beno  a b s o l u t e l y  
compelling ground, d e r i v i n g  from our  acceptance  of t h i s  
h i e r a r c h y ,  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  range of t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  of 
ZF should be cons t rued  a s  a  s e t ,  
Le t  us  s e e  more t e c h n i c a l l y  what my claims come t o .  
P r k c i s e l y ,  t h e  t h i r d  o r d e r  theory we might adop t ,  i n  o r d e r  
t o  have a  theory  t h a t  does f o r  NB+ what NB+ d i d  f o r  ZF, 
i s  t h i s .  The new, a d d i t i o n a l  c l a s s  axioms a r e  a l l  i n s t a n c e s  
of 3 ~ ~ ~ 7 '  CY'e (4C~'))where 9 i s  any formula of N B + ,  
2 X i s  a  t h i r d  o r d e r  v a r i a b l e ,  and Y' i s  a  second o r d e r  
v a r i a b l e  ranging over  t h e  c l a s s e s  ~f N B t ,  Now, i f  we 
a r e  going t o  prove t h a t  induc t ion  on formulas of t h i s  new 
theory  works, a s  we must i f  we a r e  t o  prove ,  e , g . ,  a l l  
provable formulas of NB+ a r e  t r u e ,  then  we must add t h e  
fo l lowing replacement axioms, 
v x  3 ! v  CP CX,V)-) vu3v W-Yy ( C Q C L ) ~ ) ~ * Y ~ V )  
f o r  a l l  formulas of  t h e  new t h i r d  o r d e r  t h e o r y ,  Note 
t h a t  we have t h i s  replacement axiom only f o r  s e t s ,  We could 
have thrown i n  a  (kind o f )  replacement axiom (which j u s t  
amounts t o  a  s e p a r a t i o n  axiom schema) f o r  proper  c l a s s e s  a s  
w e l l ,  thus:  
i s  a  formula of  t h e  new theory .  This  axiom i m p l i e s ,  of 
c o u r s e ,  Kel ley Morse s e t  t h e o r y ,  But w e  do n o t  have t o  add 
t h i s  axiom t o  prove t h e  semant ica l  f a c t s  we s e t  out  t o  prove 
i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ;  f o r  t h e  syntax  of NB+ can be completely 
coded up i n  ZF ( i n  f a c t ,  i n  t h e  s e t  of h e r e d i t a r i l y  f i n i t e  
s e t s ) .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  t o  show t h a t  e . g .  a l l  provable 
formulas of N B t  a r e  t r u e  we need only  t h e  axiom of replacement 
f o r  s e t s  ( indeed,  we need only  t h e  r e l a t e d  axiom of s e p a r a t i o n  
f o r  s u b s e t s  of o). T f  we were t o  adopt  t h i s  axiom, i t  would 
have t o  be f o r  reasons  o t h e r  than  those  which o r i g i n a t e  from 
our  d e s i r e  f o r  semant ica l  t h e o r i e s .  
We may develop f o u r t h  o r d e r ,  f i f t h  o r d e r ,  e t c . ,  
t h e o r i e s  analogous t o  t h i s  t h i r d  o r d e r  t h e o r y .  A n a t u r a l  
q u e s t i o n  t o  a s k  i s :  how high  up do we want t o  have t h e s e  
t h e o r i e s  t o  be i t e r a t e d ?  Presumably, a s  high a s  we want 
t o  accep t  t h e  corresponding t r u t h  t h e o r i e s .  But how high 
up i s  t h a t ?  In t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of my paper ,  I was cagey 
about  t h i s  i s s u e ;  I i n t e n d  t o  remain cagey.  However, l e t  
me n o t e  some ex tenua t ing  circumstances f o r  being t h i s  way, 
To begin w i t h ,  i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  admits 
of a  d e f i n i t e  answer;  nor  i s  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  i f  i t  d i d  have 
a d e f i n i t e  answer t h a t  we would eve r  be a b l e  t o  know i t .  
Since  i t  does appear  t h a t  i f  we accep t  a  g iven  t r u t h  theory ,  
we w i l l  a ccep t  a  t r u t h  theory  f o r  t h a t  t h e o r y ,  a  d e f i n i t e  
answer t o  t h e  ques t ion  must t ake  t h e  form of a  l e a s t  upper 
bound on t h e  l e v e l s  of t h e  t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  we should (o r  
might) adop t .  Now perhaps t h e r e  i s  no way we could g i v e  the  
express ion  ' t h e o r i e s  we should (o r  mighi) a d o p t '  a  con ten t  
de terminate  enough t h a t  such a  bound could reasonably  be 
thought t o  be f i x e d .  But suppose we d i d  t h i n k  such a  bound 
were de te rmina te .  We a r e  a l l  f a m i l i a r  wi th  t h e  arguments 
t h a t  we may be l i k e  c e r t a i n  Turing machines,  i n  t h e  theorems 
w e  can prove ,  but  cannot know which Turing machines we 
a r e  l i k e P 2  A s i m i l a r  argument might show t h a t ,  though t h e r e  
may be a  d e f i n i t e  answer t o  t h e  ques t ion  of how high  up we 
can go w i t h  our  t r u t h  t h e o r i e s ,  we can never  know tha t  
answer t o  be t h e  answer.  
One might hope that . even i f  t h e r e  i s  no l e a s t  upper 
bound, o r  i f  t h e r e  i s  one bu t  we cannot know i t ,  w e  can a t  
l e a s t  know some upper bound. The level. of t h e  f i r s t  uncount- 
a b l e  o r d i n a l  might appear  t o  be such a  l e v e l ,  For i c  might 
seem t h a t  we cannot  con t inue  beyond a  countzble  level . ,  be- 
cause t h e  n a c u r a l  way of doing t h i s  would r e q u i r e  us t o  
embrace a  theory wi th  an uncountable  1,anguage. But w e  can 
~ n d e r s t a n d  only  countable  languages;  hence t h e  r e l e v a n t  
t r u t h  theory  would be i n  an important  sense  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e  
t o  u s .  (The t r u t h  theory  would have t o  have an uncountable  
language i f  a l l  t h e  Tarsk i  b i c o n d i t i o n a l s  f o r  t h e  languages 
below t h e  uncountable  l e v e l  a r e  t o  be p r o v a b l e . )  I am n o t  
e n t i r e l y  convinced,  however, t h a t  we cannot understand an 
uncountable  language a s  n e a t l y  formulable  as  t h i s ,  
But i n  any c a s e ,  i t  i s  f a i r  t o  say t h a t  we cannot go 
t o  a  l e v e l  s o  h igh  t h a t  (speaking somewhat loose ly )  t h e r e  
a r e  more ( c a r d i n a l l y )  such l e v e l s  than t h e r e  a r e  o r d i n a l s  
i n  t h e  range of t h e  ZF q u a n t i f i e r s .  Plot, a t  l e a s t ,  u n l e s s  
we have a l r e a d y  determined t h e r e  a r e  more ( c a r d i n a l l y )  
o r d i n a l s  than t h e r e  a r e  o r d i n a l s  i n  t h e  range of  t h e  ZF 
q u a n t i f i e r s ,  For i f  we have never  had any reason t o  b e l i e v e  
t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  c a r d i n a l l y  more o b j e c t s  i n  t h e  u n i v e r s e  than 
t h e r e  a r e  o r d i n a l s  i n  t h e  range of  t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  of ZF, 
what reason could we have t o  i t e r e r - e  t h e  t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  more 
t imes than t h e r e  a r e  o r d i n a l s  i n  ZF? 
A t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  observe  what Kel ley Morse s e t  theory 
does i n  one f e l l  swoop: provide  an ontology of o b j e c t s  
g r e a t e r  i n  c a r d i n a l i t y  than a l l  the o b j e c t s  i n  ZF.  It  was 
e s s e n t i a l l y  a  proof of t h i s  f a c t  t h a t  s~ilowed t h e  would-be 
t r a n s l a t i o n  of Kel ley Morse i n t o  : 2'1' f a i l e d .  I t  i s  f a i r l y  
easy t o  s e e  t h a t ,  s i n c e  we can i t e r a t e  t h e s e  t h e o r i e s  only 
a s  many times a s  t h e r e  a r e  o r d i n a l s  i n  ZF, t l lese  c l a s s  
t h e o r i e s  w i l l  never commit us  t o  more than t h e  number of 
o b j e c t s  i n  t h e  u n i v e r s e  of ZF. 
These c a r d i n a l i t y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  sugges t  q u i t e  power- 
f u l l y  how d i f f e r e n t  i s  a  commitment t o  the  s o r t s  02 c l a s s  
h i e r a r c h i e s  t h a t  t r u t h  t h e o r i e s  might seem t o  r e q u i r e  from 
a  commitment t o  j u s t  one more f u l l  l e v e l  i n  t h e  i t e r a t i v e -  
combina to r i a l  h i e r a r c h y .  
Another way t o  s e e  t h e  d i s p a r i t y  between t h e  combinator- 
i a l  n o t i o n  of c o l l e c t i o n  and an e s s e n t i a l l y  p r e d i c a t i v e  no t ion  
i s  t o  cons ide r  t h e  fo l lowing p o s s i b i l i t y ,  s e t  f o r t h  by Parsons .  
Suppose we t ake  ZF,  extend i t s  language t a  inc lude  new pr imi-  
t i v e  p r e d i c a t e s ,  and permit  replacement f o r  formulas b u i l t  up 
out  of t h e s e  p r e d i c a t e s .  We can then s e t  up a  c l a s s  ~ h e o r y  
which assumes t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  c l a s s  corresponding t o  t h e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of each new p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c a t e ,  and t o  t h e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  each new compound p r e d i c a t e  g o t  by first 
o r d e r  o p e r a t i o n s .  Parsons says  t h a t  u n l e s s  we a r e  engaged 
i n  'obvious c h e a t i n g ' ,  such  a s  p o s t u l a t i n g  f o r  each impredi- 
c a t i v e  c l a s s  a  new p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c a t e  t h a t  w i l l  have t h a t  
c l a s s  a s  i t s  e x t e n s i o n ,  he  does n o t  s e e  how we could g e t  
thus  a l l  impred ica t ive  c l a s s e s .  
Now t h e  proof of t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  between 
Kelley Morse and ZFT can be extended t o  a proof of something 
much s t r o n g e r ;  i t  can be u t i l i z e d  t o  show how obvious such 
chea t ing  must be :  even i f  we a l low a s  many new p r i m i t i v e  
p r e d i c a t e s  a s  t h e r e  a r e  o b j e c t s  on ZF, and each of them has 
a  d i s t i n c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  we cannot g e t  from them a l l  
impred ica t ive  c l a s s e s .  Hence, t o  cover a l l  impred ica t ive  
c l a s s e s  i n  t h e  manner Parsons o u t l i n e s ,  one would have t o  
assume t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  syntax  a s  grand i n  p ropor t ions  a s  
t h e  l e v e l  of  impred ica t ive  c l a s s e s  would b e .  What i s  
s p e c i a l l y  noteworthy about  t h i s  f a c t  i s  how qu ick ly  t h e  
a t tempt  t o  develop ,  p r e d i c a t i v e l y ,  an impred ica t ive  c l a s s  
theory  runs  aground, f o r  one might imagine t h a t  i t  would 
be i n  t h e  realm of  semantics  t h a t  problems would f i r s t  a r i s e ,  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  wi th  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of how we could 
succeed i n  in tend ing  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c a t e s  s o  t h a t  t h e i r  
ex tens ions  taken t o g e t h e r ,  covered a l l  impred ica t ive  c l a s s e s .  
Desp i t e  a l l  I have shown, one might s t i l l  a rgue  t h u s .  
The b e s t  way t o  t a k e  t h e  new l e v e l s  of c o l l e c t i o s s  i n  t h e  
t h e o r i e s  d e s c r i b e d  b e f o r e  i s  t o  s e e  them t o  be  con t inued  
l e v e l s  i n  t h e  i t e r a t i v e - c o m b i n a t o r i a l  h i e r a r c h y .  14erl ly 
because  we cannot  p rove  t h a t  any of t h e s e  l e v e l s  a r e  f u l l  
l e v e l s  does  n o t  mean we cannot  ex t end  o u r  t h e o r i e s  and t a k e  
them t o  be  s u c h .  And t a k i n g  t h e  r a n g e  of  t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  of 
ZF t o  be  a  s e t  seems n e a t e r  t h a n  t o  adopt  t h i s  somewhat 
repugnant  h i e r a r c h y  of s t u n t e d  r a n k s .  
There  i s  some m e r i t  t o  t h i s  argument ,  I thinlc;  b u t  
I s h a l l  u s e  t h e  argurnent t o  o p p o s i t e  e f f e c t ,  For  I i n t e n d  
t o  show t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  conxnit o u r s e l v e s  t o  
p rope r  c l a s s e s  of any k i n d ,  n o t  even t h o s e  of  N B .  Hut- t h i s  
I w i l l  do i n  t h e  l a s t  c h a p t e r  of  my t h e s i s ,  
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For y e a r s ,  W .  V .  Quine has h e l d  t h a t  i n  view of 
R u s s e l l ' s  paradox, no one s e t  theory  should enjoy p re -  
eminence. It i s  something of an embarrassment t o  Qui.z?els 
p o s i t i o n  t h a t  l o g i c i a n s  a r e ,  on t h e  whole, s e r i o u s l y  i n t e r -  
e s t e d  i n  j u s t  one s e t  theory ,  ZF (and i t s  co l l serva t ive  exten-  
s i o n ,  NB). One n a t u r a l l y  expec t s  t h e  l o g i c i a n s '  f a s c i n a t i o n  
t o  be expla ined  by  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  cornpelling no t ion  of sek em- 
bodied i n  ZF. And one i s  n o t  d i s a p p o i n t e d ,  This  no t ion  of s e t  
has been desc r ibed  a s  t h e  i t e r a t i v e  concept ion of  s e t .  Now 
whi le  I a g r e e  t h a t  ZF expresscs  an i t e r a t i v e  concept ion ,  I am 
persuaded t h e r e  i s  another  a s p e c t  of t h e  s e t s  of ZF n o t  a p t l y  
dep ic ted  a s  i t e r a t i v e .  Following ~ e r n a ~ s  , '  I s h a l l  c a l l  t h i s  
a s p e c t  t h e  combina to r i a l .  On i t e r a t i v e  grounds a l o n e ,  t h e  r e -  
placement axiom, t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  axiom, t h e  axiom of c h o i c e ,  
and p o s s i b l y  even t h e  axiom of union a r e  p rob lemat ic .  But t h e  
combina to r i a l  f e a t u r e  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y  j u s t i f i e s  t h e s e  axioms, 
Two axioms, t h e  axiom of foundat ion  and the  axiom a f  
power s e t  express  t h a t  a s p e c t  of s e t s  t h a t  I c a l l  i t e r a t i v e ,  
The power s e t  axiom by i t s e l f  ep i tomizes  a  very  important  
proper  p a r t  of t h i s  concep t ion ,  what one might term q u a s i -  
i t e r a t i v e .  The axiom of foundat ion  c o n s t r a i n s  how i t  i s  t h a t  
s e t s  can come t o  b e .  The core  i d e a  may be put  i n  a  metaphor: 
i f  we can d i s c e r n  a  s e t ,  we can s e t  up a  l adder  t o  g e t  t o  i t ,  
That is, metaphor excised, all the members of a set are 
ontologically anterior to the set itself. Hence there can 
ke no set that has itself as a member, no set one of whose 
members has it as a member, no set one of whose member's 
members has it as a member; etc. More strongly, there is 
no set with an infinitely descending c-chain, so that..~K~eX~i.X~ 
This last principle is reasonable, since if a set depends for 
its existence on its members, it seems unacceptab1.e to shift 
the burden without end: in time we must come to an object 
that stands on its own. The axiom of power set does not 
impose constraints, but rather provides for ',:he creation of new 
sets from old; if we have a set, we can get f r ~ m  it the set 
of all its subsets. Significantly, of these two principles, 
the axiom of foundation was the later to be conceived and 
admitted in the development of ZP. It is significant because 
the axiom is purported to be the most decisive in ruling out 
Russell's paradox, and is almost the soul of the iterative 
conception. One can only wonder: if this axiom is so much 
what ZF is about, what picture stood behind the set theory 
proposc-l by Zermelo, before this axiom was even thought of? 
For Zermelo's theory was only quasi-iterative; it sanctioned 
the generation of powerful new sets from given sets, but offer- 
ed no explanation of how the given sets came t o  be given, 
Moreover, in an even earlier prefiguration of ZF, the partial 
system Cantor set out in his 1899 letter to Dedekind, not even 
t h e  power s e t  axiom i s  inr - luded.  Such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s e t  
one d i r e c t l y  t o  muse about what i s  r e a l l y  a f o o t  i n  ZF.  I n  
t h i s  doub t fu l  s t a t e ,  i t  behooves us  t o  look wi th  c a r e  a t  t h e  
h i s t o r i c a l  development of Z F .  For t h i s  h i s t o r y  we l l  r e f l e c t s  
t h e  i n t u i t i v e  mot iva t ion  of t h e  concept ion  of s e t  i n  LF. 
One l e a r n s  i n  phi losophy c l a s s e s ,  and i n  mathematicdl 
l o g i c  c l a s s e s  a s  w e l l ,  t h a t  i t  was R u s s e l l ' s  paradox t h a t  l a i d  
t o  r e s t  t h e  " l o g i c a l "  concept of s e t .  On t h i s  concept ,  f o r  
any p r e d i c a t e ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s e t  t h a t  i s  i t s  e x t e n s i o n .  For 
F r e g e ' s  a t t empt  t o  reduce mather.~atics t o  l o g i c ,  R u s s e l l ' s  
paradox was c a t a s t r o p h i c ;  f o r  though perhaps a r i t h m e t i c  dirl 
n o t  r e a l l y  t o t t e r ,  F r e g e ' s  program c e r t a i n l y  d i d .  This con- 
f r o n t a t i o n  between F r e g e ' s  would-be r e d u c t i o n  and R u s s e l l ' s  
e l e g a n t  paradox i s  f a s c i n a t i n g - - i n d e e d  too  f a s c i n a t i n g ,  For 
t h e  t h r a l l  i t  has  e x e r t e d  over phi losophers  of mathematics has 
tended t o  obscure t h e  paradox t h a t  I b e l i e v e  a c t u a l l y  l i e s  be- 
h ind  t h e  development of ZF. I am t a l k i n g  about t h e  Cantor 
paradox. 
I t  should come a s  no s u r p r i s e  t h a t  i t  should be Cantor 
who f i r s t  saw what d i r e c t i o n  s e t  theory should t a k e ,  and t h a t  
he should i s o l a t e  t h e  paradox t h a t  was t h e  source  of t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  t h e  " l o g i c a l "  no t ion  of s e t .  For fundamentally 
Cantor was n o t  engaged i n  some program i n  epistemology and 
metaphysics ,  a s  was Frege;  r a t h e r ,  he was t r y i n g  t o  make ou t  
what s e t s  were.  While t h e  l o g i c a l  n o t i o n  of s e t  i s  r i g h t l y  
so  c a l l e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  of F rege ,  s i n c e  he was preoccupied by 
l o g i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  f o r  Cantor i t  i s  more b e f i t t i n g  LO regard  
t h e  un l imi ted  comprehension axiom a s  formula t ing  a  n a i v e  n o t i o n  
of s e t .  Wres t l ing  wi th  t h i s  concept ,  he s a w ,  q u i c k l y  enough 
i n  view of t h e  s u b t l e t y  of t h e  i s s u e s  invo lved ,  i t  was a no- 
t i o n  t h a t  could n o t  be s u s t a i n e d ,  and must be r ep laced  by a 
more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  n o t i o n .  In  r e a c t i o n  t o  R u s s e l l ' s  paradox, 
t h e r e  i s  a tendency,  q u i t e  n a t u r a l  i f  one i s  approaching t h e  
u n l i m i t e d  comprehension axiom from F r e g e ' s  p o i n t  of view,  
t o  ask  t h e  fo l lowing q u e s t i o n :  Since R u s s e l l ' s  paradox has 
l a i d  low t h e  f u l l  comprehension axiom, how must we r e s t r i c t  
t h i s  axiom t o  g e t  one t h a t  w i l l  no t  burgeon i n t o  a  c o n t r a d i c -  
t i o n ,  and y e t  w i l l  be a s  c l o s e  an approximation t o  t h i s  axiom 
a s  p o s s i b l e ?  This  tendency i s  n a t u r a l  from F r e g e ' s  p o i n t  of 
view, s i n c e  f o r  Frege t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  comprehension 
axiom i s  c h i e f l y  l o g i c a l ,  and one wants t o  save a s  much of 
l o g i c  a s  one can .  Quine, e v i d e n t l y ,  has  i n c l i n e d  t o  view t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  wi th  t h e  l o g i c a l  ( a l i a s  n a i v e )  no t ion  of s e t  i n  j u s t  
t h i s  l i g h t ,  and has asked p r e c i s e l y  t h e  above q u e s t i o n .  No 
wonder, then ,  t h a t  Quine ' s  way out  of R u s s e l l ' s  paradox i n  UF 
i s  t o  impose a  pure ly  s y n t a c t i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  seems t o  l e t  
as many p r e d i c a t e s  appear  i n  t h e  ~ o m p r e h e ~ l s i o n  axiom as c o n s i s -  
tency  w i l l  s u f f e r  (and,  i n  i t s  f i r s t  fo rmula t ion ,  Quine ' s  con- 
s t r a i n t  allowed more).  
For Cantor ,  t h e  c h i e f  antinomy t o  come t o  terms with was 
not really Russell's, but one just a few steps removed from 
it: If every set has less cardinality than its power set, 
then the set of all sets, which is its own power set, must 
have greater cardinality than itself. A natural response to 
this antinomy (though probably not to Russell's) is that 
there cannot be a set of all sets, because there are too many, 
-
sets. For a condition on a multitude being collected together 
into a set is that it have a determinate number of members, a 
fixed cardinality; but precisely this the set of all sets could 
not have. 
Now from Cantor's 1899 letter,2 it is clear that the 
consideration of cardinality seemed to him decisive in deter- 
mining whether a set exists. In the face of his paradox, 
Cantor held firm on the following principles: a multitude is 
a set if it has the same cardinality as a set; all sub-collec- 
ti.ons of a set exist as sets; the union set of a set exists, 
These principles show up in ZF, of course, as the axioms of 
replacement, separation, and union. What, if anything, do 
these principles share? They are combinatorial . 
What - is it for a principle to be combinatorial? Qn the 
finite level, combinatorics studies the number of elements in 
certain sets, the relative sizes of various sets, the number 
of all the possible permutations of a set meeting certain con- 
ditions. In a word, combinatorics is concerned with issues of 
cardinality, particularly as they bear on permutations of a 
set, The last business with permutations epitomizes one 
f e a t u r e  t h a t  t r a n s f e r r e d  from t h e  f i n i t e  case  t o  t h e  
i n f i n i t e .  Bernays p u t s  t h e  p o i n t  t h u s :  
Pass ing  t o  t h e  i n f i n i t e  c a s e ,  we imagine 
f u n c t i o n s  engendered by an i n f i n i t y  of independent 
de te rmina t ions  which a s s i g n  t o  each i n t e g e r  an i n t e g e r ,  
and we reason about t h e  t o t a l i t y  of  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s .  
I n  t h e  same way, one views a  s e t  of i n t e g e r s  a s  t h e  
r e s u l t  of i n f i n i t e l y  many a c t s  of dec id ing  f o r  ea h 
number whether i t  should be inc luded o r  exc luded,  9 
The axiom of s e p a r a t i o n  i s  j u s t i f i e d  on t h e s e  grounds:  given 
a  s e t ,  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  member x ,  e i t h e r  $(x) holds  o r  i t  
does n o t ;  t h i s  formula w i l l  "decide" f o r  i t  whether i t  i s  t o  
be inc luded .  But so  a l s o  i s  t h e  axiom of c h o i c e .  Consider 
t h i s  fo rmula t ion  of t h e  axiom of cho ice :  For any x ,  i f  x i s  
a  r e l a t i o n  wi th  domain u ,  then  t h e r e  i s  a  s u b r e l a t i o n  of x ,  
w i t h  domain u ,  which i s  a  f u n c t i o n ,  Why i s  t h i s  a t  a l l  p l au -  
s i b l e ?  We may imagine a  c e r t a i n  s e r i e s  of independent "dec i -  
s i o n s " ,  one d e c i s i o n  f o r  each ordered  p a i r  i n  t h e  r e l a t i o n  x ,  
I n  t h i s  s e r i e s ,  a s  i t  t u r n s  o u t ,  f o r  each f i r s t  coord ina te  i n  
some ordered  p a i r  i n  x ,  t h e r e  i s  e x a c t l y  one ordered  p a i r  wi th  
t h a t  f i r s t  coord ina te  decided t o  be i n  t h e  s u b s e t  of x ,  If 
d e c i s i o n s  t o  inc lude  and exclude members a r e  independent of 
each o t h e r  and b a s i c a l l y  a r b i t r a r y ,  how could i t  be t h a t  t h e r e  
would n o t  be such a s e r i e s ?  That we cannot d e f i n e  t h i s  s e r i e s  
by a s e p a r a t i o n  axiom should n o t  erode our  confidence i n  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  of such a s e r i e s .  
Now i t  may seem t h a t  t o  assume such a  s e r i e s  i s  a t  any 
r a t e  e x a c t l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  axiom of cho ice ,  
and s o  cannot j u s t i f y  such a  b e l i e f ,  But t h i s  i s  t o  misunder- 
s t a n d  how t h i s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  in tended t o  underpin t h e  axiom 
of c h o i c e .  Mark h e r e  t h e  analogy wi th  t h e  mot iva t ion  of mathe- 
m a t i c a l  i n d u c t i o n .  One o f t e n  h e a r s  induc t ion  formulated i n  
t h e  fo l lowing way. I f  0  has a  p roper ty  P ,  and i f  whenever n 
has  P ,  n+l has  i t ,  then a l l  numbers have P .  But i n  our  more 
r e f l e c t i v e  moments, w e  l i k e l y  wish t o  r i d  o u r s e l v e s  of p roper ty  
t a l k ;  and we c e r t a i n l y  wish t o  e x t i r p a t e  t h e  assumption t h a t  
corresponding t o  every p r e d i c a t e  t h e r e  i s  a p r o p e r t y ,  f o r  t h a t  
way l i e s  i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  Yet once we t r y  t o  c a s t  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  
i n  some formal ized  language,  we s e e  we can never  f u l l y  c a p t u r e  
t h e  i n t u i t i v e  con ten t  of t h e  o r i g i n a l  p r i n c i p l e .  C e r t a i n l y  
no f i r s t  o r d e r  formula t ion  covers  a l l  of  i t ,  s i n c e  f o r  any 
f i r s t  o r d e r  language, i t  i s  obvious enough t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  
be  p r e d i c a t e s  n o t  e x p r e s s i b l e  i n  t h a t  language,  And t h e  
second o r d e r  formula t ion  i s  no b e t t e r  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  inasmuch 
a s  t h e r e  a r e  p r e d i c a t e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  t r u t h  p r e d i c a t e  of 
t h e  second o r d e r  language,  which cannot be expressed i n  t h e  
second o r d e r  language. And s o  on f o r  even h igher  o rde r  l a n -  
guages.  Does t h i s  mean t h a t  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  a s  o r i g i n a l l y  
s t a t e d  cannot s e r v e  a s  a  h e u r i s t i c ,  mot iva t ing  i n  a senae t h e  
sundry formal  ex tens ions  of mathematical  i n d u c t i a n ?  We might 
t r y  perhaps t o  sa lvage  t h e  f u l l  g e n e r a l i t y  of t h e  o r i g i n a l  
i n t u i t i v e  p r i n c i p l e ,  wi thou t  t h e  imper fec t ions  of t h a t  p r i n c i p l e ,  
t h u s :  F Q ~  any p r e d i c a t e  6 i n  any language w e  f i n d  meaningful ,  
if f~ (0) holds, and if whenever 4(n) holds, so does 4 (n+l )  , 
then for all n, @(n)  holds. But this principle is only as 
transparent as the expression 'in any language we find mean- 
ingful', and how to construe talk about all - such languages 
is a problem notorious for its intractability: the crew of 
heterological paradoxes lurks here. So if we are to find 
some way to indicate the generality of the principl~ of mathe- 
matical induction, we must settle for something that is heuris 
tic, something schematic. 
Now it is just such a role that the talk of independent 
decisions plays, in suggesting one aspect of combinatorial 
closure. If such discourse seems more nebulous than the in- 
tuitive statement of induction, it is because combinatorial 
closure is by its very nature a less tidy notion. An intui- 
tive statement of a general separation axiom, e,g., for any 
property P and any set z, there is a subset of z of precisely 
those members of z that have property P, is in closer analogy 
to the case of mathematical induction. But the essentially 
non-predicative nature of combinatorial closure will not yield 
a heuristic principle that can be as neatly formulated as 
that for mathematical induction. Nor does this intuitive 
statement of the separation axiom indicate its fundamental 
justification. Such justification derives from the more basic 
picture that lies behind the axiom oE choice also. 
Go back,  now, t o  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  axiom of choice  and 
t h e  p i c t u r e  of t h e  s e r i e s  of independent d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  p u r p o r t s  
t o  j u s t i f y  i t .  Asse r t ing  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of t h e  s e r i e s  of 
d e c i s i o n s ,  which was desc r ibed  b e f o r e  and which would j u s t i f y  
t h e  axiom of choice  i s  very  much l i k e  assuming t h e  axiom of 
choice  i t s e l f .  But t h e  o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e  does g i v e  us reason 
t o  b e l i e v e  i n  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of t h e  s e r i e s .  For i t  seems such 
p i c t u r e s  s e r v e  n o t  only  t o  i n s t r u c t ,  but  a l s o  t o  j u s t i f y ,  i n  
t h a t  t h e  p i c t u r e s  enab le  us t o  mot iva te  t h e  axioms. 
I should say a  word about t h e  axiom of un ion ,  This 
axiom i s  one whose ground appears  t o  be a s  much i t e r a t i v e  
a s  i t  i s  combina to r i a l .  For i f  a t  some rank we have a  s e t ,  
then  i t s  members must a l l  have been p r e s e n t  a t  a  rank below, 
and t h e r e f o r e  a l l  i t s  members' members p r e s e n t  a t  even lower 
r a n k s .  If a t  each new rank we form a l l  s u b s e t s  of s e t s  i n  
lower r a n k s ,  s u r e l y  t h e  union s e t  w i l l  be t h e r e !  But h e r e ,  
a s  wi th  s e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  c a t c h  i s  t h i s :  how a r e  we t o  a s c e r t a i n  
what a l l  t h e  s u b s e t s  of a  s e t  a r e ?  The p o i n t  of c a l l i n g  t h i s  
p r i n c i p l e  i s  p a r t  combinator ia l  i s  w e l l  e x h i b i t e d  i n  an inde-  
pendence proof f o r  t h e  axiom of union:  f o r  t h e r e  what t h e  
axiom would do i s  o b t a i n  a  s e t  of g r e a t e r  c a r d i n a l i t y  than 
a l l  t h e  s e t s  of t h e  model. The independence proof i s  s imple 
enough, Let  t h e  model be t h e  s e t  of a l l  s e t s  which a r e  here-  
d i t a r i l y  l e s s  than  i n  c a r d i n a l i t y .  I n t e r p r e t i n g  'g' a s  € ,  
a l l  t h e  axioms of ZF a r e  t r u e  i n  t h i s  model, save  f o r  t h e  
axiom of union. For the set C 1 would be a member of 
II "<u 
the model, but its union, C w ,  would not. 
But what of the axiom of replacement? Here is a stick- 
ing point for any purely iterative conception of set. For, 
as Parsons has remarked, even if we allow that there are 
ranks as high as each well ordering generated in the itera- 
tive conception, we cannot get the generality of the axiom of 
replacement. In due time, I shall challenge the claim that 
the iterative conception can by itself support the existence 
of ranks corresponding to such well orderinga. But remark 
that even on this generous interpretation of the iterative 
conception, we see we cannot get the axiom of replacement 
genetically; that is, given that we have iterated the ranks 
of V up to V#, there is nothing in the structure of VN, no 
encoded "information", that would lead us to conjecture ranks 
as high as the axiom of replacement would furnish us. The 
axiom of replacement permits us to focus exclusively on 
cardinality considerations in postulating further ranks. By 
'cardinality' here is not of course meant the existence of a 
1-1 function, as an object, but of a functional, that is, a 
formula F(x,y) of ZF such that (x) ( E ! x ) F ( x , y )  . Otherwise 
the axiom of replacement would follow trivially from separation. 
Since so much of ZF is not accounted for on the itera- 
tive conception, should this conception of set be abandoned? 
No: supplemented with the combinatorial aspect of sots, it 
s t a n d s .  On t h e  combinator ia l  n o t i o n ,  a s  I am p o r t r a y i n g  i t ,  
i f  t h e r e  a r e  n o t  too  many t h i n g s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  par embers 
of a  g iven  s e t ,  then  a l l  t hose  th ings  a r e  bound up i n t o  a  
s e t .  And what i s  a  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  way of making a  r e s t r i c -  
t i o n  on how many t h i n g s  pe r  member t h e r e  can be? By p e r m i t t i n g  
only  one - t h i n g  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  each member. The i d e a  behind 
replacement i s  i n  a  c e r t a i n  sense  the  converse idea  of t h e  
thought t h e  Cantor paradox l e d  t o .  The Cantor paradox 
demonstrated t h e r e  were too  many s e t s  f o r  them a l l  t o  be  
c o l l e c t e d  i n t o  a s e t .  This  p r i n c i p l e  says  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  a r e  
n o t  too  many members of a  m u l t i t u d e ,  then t h a t  mul t i tude  i s  
a  s e t .  
Now t h e  combinator ia l  p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  of course  concerned 
wi th  i s s u e s  of c a r d i n a . l i t y ,  and t h e  axiom of replacement g ives  
guaran tees  of t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of c e r t a i n  s e t s  based on cons ide ra -  
t i o n s  of c a r d i n a l i t y .  This  sugges t s  t h a t  t h e  axiom of r e p l a c e -  
ment may be c l a s s i f i e d  a s  combina to r i a l ,  But sugges t ion  i s  no t  
enough; we want more f e e l i n g  f o r  how t h i s  p i c t u r e  works,  The 
r e f l e c t i o n s  belcw may h e l p  h e r e .  
The paradoxes occasioned our  f a l l  from Cantor 'u  o r i g i n a l  
p a r a d i s e .  A f t e r  t h i s  debac le ,  Quine has  i t ,  we can only  
s t r i v e  v a r i o u s l y  t o  r e c a p t u r e  i n  our  s e t  t h e o r i e s  what we 
can of  t h e  former ly  e x a l t e d  s t a t u s  of t h e  na ive  n o t i o n .  
Now t h e r e  may be some j u s t i c e  i n  t h e  f e e l i n g  t h a t ,  a f t e r  t h e  
paradoxes,  we a r e  seeking  t o  r e g a i n  what we can ,  but  n o t  a b l e  
t o  g e t  e v e r y t h i n g .  But only  one such program appears  t o  be 
w e l l  mot iva ted ,  t h a t  of Cantor and Zermelo. The idea  of V 
may be cons t rued ,  somewhat q u a i n t l y ,  a s  a  r e g u l a t i v e  p r i n c i p l e ;  
V thus  becomes a  k ind  of tower of Babel,  i f  n o t  a  p a r a d i s e  i t -  
s e l f .  Once c a r d i n a l i t y  was seen  t o  f i g u r e  s o  c r u c i a l l y  i n  
se thood,  t h e  axiom of replacement was a  f i r s t  n a t u r a l  s t e p  t o  
r e s t o r e  some of t h e  bygone s t r e n g t h  t o  t h e  new s e t  t h e o r y .  
Other such devices  a r e  t h e  sundry h igher  axioms of i n f i n i t y  
t h a t  deman,d i n c r e a s i n g  h e i g h t  t o  t h e  u n i v e r s e .  These h igher  
axioms of  i n f i n i . t y  a s s e r t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of d i v e r s e  s o r t s  of  
c a r d i n a l s ,  f o r  example, an i n a c c e s s i b l e  c a r d i n a l ,  a  Mahlo 
c a r d i n a l ,  a  measurable c a r d i n a l ,  a  compact c a r d i n a l ,  In  a11 
such c a s e s ,  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  t h e  c a r d i n a l s  a r e  t o  possess  a r e  
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  of p r o p e r t i e s  t h a t  & h a s .  So f a r ,  t h e r e  a r e  
no incompatible  l a r g e  c a r d i n a l  axioms, But t h e  f a c t  t h a t  V-L 
i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  measurable c a r d i n a l  
i n t i m a t e s  t h i s  might happen. What t h i s  r e s u l t  sugges t s  i s  
t h a t  t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of a  measurable c a r d i n a l  i n  L i s  due 
t o  t h e  narrowness of L ,  inasmuch a s  L cannot  con ta in  a  measure 
f o r  any c a r d i n a l .  That i s ,  'There e x i s t s  a  measurable c a r d i n a l '  
impl i e s  a  c e r t a i n  k ind  of b read th  t o  t h e  u n i v e r s e  a s  w e l l  a s  a 
c e r t a i n  h e i g h t .  There i s  then  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a  new 
h igher  axiom of i n f i n i t y  would e n t a i l  a  d i f f e r e n t ,  incompatible  
f i l l i n g  ou t  of  t h e  ranks of t h e  u n i v e r s e .  Such a  p o s s i b i l i t y  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  combinator ia l  n o t i o n  of s e t  i s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  
de te rmina te ;  but  t h i s  should  n o t  amaze a f t e r  Godel ' s  i n -  
completeness theorem. 
The axiom of c o n s t r u c t i b i l i t y  has t o  most s e t  t h e o r i s t s  
seemed a  very  implaus ib le  one .  But t o  t ake  such a view i s  
t o  have a  p e c u l i a r  i d e a  of how t h e  ranks of V must be f l e s h e d  
o u t .  It i s  i n  e s s e n s e  a  r e j e c t i o n  of t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  of a s e t  depends i n  dny way upon d e f i n a b i l i t y ,  and 
i s  an embracing of t h e  opposing,  combina to r i a l  p i c t u r e ,  
which se ts  w i l l  e x i s t  i n  a s  a r b i t r a r y  ways a s  w e  can conceive .  
Indeed,  even t h e  Continuum Hypothes is ,  which t o  Cantor and 
H i l b e r t  appeared c l e a r l y  t r u e ,  but  j u s t  i n  need of p r o o f ,  i s  
b e c ~ m i n g  ever  more viewed wi th  s c e p t i c i s m ,  Such s c e p t i c i s m  
has  i t s  r o o t s  i n  t h e  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  of how s u b s e t s  of a  se t  may 
"come t,o be". Thus Cohen has  t h i s  t o  s a y :  
A p o i n t  of view which t h e  au thor  f e e l s  may 
e v e n t u a l l y  come t o  be accepted  i s  t h a t  CH i s  ob- 
v i o u s l y  f a l s e ,  The main reason one a c c e p t s  t h e  
Axiom of  i n f i n i t y  i s  probably t h a t  we f e e l  i t  
absurd  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  process  of  adding only 
one s e t  a t  a  t ime can exhaus t  t h e  e n t i r e  u n i v e r s e .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  wi th  t h e  h igher  axioms of  i n f i n i t y .  
Now f!1 i s  t h e  set of coun tab le  o r d i n a l s  and t h i s  
i s  merely a  s p e c i a l  and t h e  s i m p l e s t  way of  gen- 
e r a t i n g  a  h igher  c a r d i n a l .  The s e t  C i s ,  i n  con- 
t r a s t ,  genera ted  by a  t o t a l l y  new and more power- 
f u l  p r i n c i p l e ,  namely t h e  Power S e t  axiom, I t  i s  
unreasonable  t o  expect  t h a t  any d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a 
l a r g e r  c a r d i n a l  which a t t empts  t o  b u i l d  up t h a t  
c a r d i n a l  from i d e a s  d e r i v i n g  from t h e  Replacement 
Axiom can eve r  r each  C .  Thus C i s  g r e a t e r  than 
e,,,C(, +\  where^= t5,etc. This  p o i n t  o f  
n e w  r e g a r d s  C as an i n c r e d i b l y  r i c h  s e t  g iven  t o  
us by one b a l d  new axiom, which can never be 
approached by any piecemeal process  of c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  
Perhaps  l a t e r   generation^^ w i l l  s e e  t h e  problem 
more c l e a r 1  and e x p r e s s  themse lves  more 
e l o q u e n t l y .  X 
Now Cohen i n  t h i s  pas sage  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  t h e  " i n c r e d i b l y  r i c h  
set  C" i s  g i v e n  t o  u s  by t h e  power s e t  axiom, and o f  c o u r s e  
t h i s  i s  i n  p a r t  a c c u r a t e .  For  w i t h o u t  t h e  power s e t  axiom 
t h e  m u l t i t u d e  o f  s u b s e t s  o f  a  s e t  would n o t  be  a  s e t .  But 
-
t h e  " i n c r e d i b l e  r i c h n e s s "  o f  t h i s  se t  o r i g i n a t e s  e l s e w h e r e ,  
namely i n  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  ways a s u b s e t  of a  s e t  can come 
a b o u t .  
I have spoken h e r e  of  how sets  "come abou t " ;  and I 
have spoken a l s o  o f  s e r i e s  of  independent  " d e c i s i o n s "  which 
s e p a r a t e  o f f  s u b s e t s .  Such t a l k  may seem t o  i n t i m a t e  a  c e r t a i n  
c o n s t r u c t i v e  e lement  i n  o u r  concept  of  s e t .  But t o  t a k e  such 
t a l k  t h i s  way i s  p r e c i s e l y  t o  mi sunde r s t and  i t .  For  a  s a l i e n t  
f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  c o m b i n a t o r i a l  n o t i o n  i s  j u s t  i t s  s e p a r a t i o n  of 
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s e thood  from a n y t h i n g  mind dependent :  t h e  
c o m b i n a t o r i a l  view of  s e t s  i s  t h e  most f u l l - b o d i e d  e x p r e s s i o n  
o f  ma thema t i ca l  p l a t o n i s m .  Tha t  we shou ld  r e v e r t  t o  an th ropo-  
morphic and p h y s i c a l  metaphors  i n  o u r  a t t e m p t  t o  d e l i n e a t e  
t h i s  concept  i s  n o t  be  marve led  a t ;  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  how 
we could  a t  f i r s t  come t o  g r i p s  w i t h  i t ,  w i t h o u t  i d e a l i z i n g  
c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s  and human c a p a c i t i e s ,  Thus t h e  t a l k  of a s e r i e s  o f  
independent  d e c i s i o n s  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  convey how t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
of  a  s e t  i s  de te rmined  e n t i r e l y  by what o b t a i n s  "out t h e r e " ,  
And when I say  t h a t  a s u b s e t  o f  a s e t  comes abou t  by such a 
s e r i e s ,  I am r a t h e r  t r a c i n g  t h e  p rogress  of our  r e c o g n i t i o n  
t h a t  t h i s  s u b s e t  must e x i s t  than d e s c r i b i n g  some metaphysical  
process  of  g e n e r a t i o n .  There i s  one p o i n t  a t  which i t  may 
seem a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  d e p i c t  s e t s  a s  be ing  generated; t h i s  
l i e s  i n  t h e  more s t r i c t l y  i t e r a t i v e  a s p e c t  of s e t s  of ZF. 
llowevcr, even h e r e  i t  i s  q u i t e  metaphor ica l  t o  p o r t r a y  i t  
a s  g e n e r a t i v e .  To t h i s  p o i n t  I w i l l  r e t u r n ,  In  any c a s e ,  
i d e a l l y ,  a f t e r  g e t t i n g  a  handle on t h e  concept of s e t ,  our  
i n t u i t i o n s  w i l l  be so  sharpened t h a t  metaphors w i l l  be no 
longer  n e c e s s a r y .  
The sugges t ion  Cohen makes i n  t h e  passage quoted l i n k s  
up i n  a  remarkable way two seemingly d i s p a r a t e  a s p e c t s  of 
t h e  cornbinator ial  n o t i o n :  t h e  b read th  of each rank of V ,  and 
t h e  h e i g h t  of V .  The proposa l  would rega rd  t h e  successor  
ranks  a s  so  broad t h a t ,  speaking l o o s e l y ,  a l l  t h e  power of 
replacement on o r d i n a l s  t h a t  can be desc r ibed  a t  t h a t  rank 
could  n o t  f u r n i s h  a  c a r d i n a l  l a r g e  enough t o  match t h e  rank 
i t s e l f .  Hence, when replacement i s  used on t h a t  r ank ,  a s  i t  
can be when i t  i s  ga the red  up i n t o  a  s e t  a t  t h e  very next  r a n k ,  
i t  shoo t s  up t h e  h e i g h t  of t h e  u n i v e r s e  more than  could be 
dreamt of b e f o r e .  
While Cohen's thought  seems prompted by combina to r i a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  such could  a l s o  be invoked a g a i n s t  i t ,  Thus 
i f  t h e r e  a r e  s o  very  many s u b s e t s  of a  s e t ,  won' t  t h e r e  be j u s t  
a tremendous number of f u n c t i o n s  genera ted  a t  each rank?  And 
might n o t  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  s e r v e  t o  p r e s s  down t h e  c a r d i n a l i t y  
of t h e  power s e t  of a  s e t ?  To defend Cohen's view,  one must 
appeal  t o  complicated i n t u i t i o n s  about how i t  i s  much e a s i e r  
t o  b r i n g  about random s e t s  than  f u n c t i o n s  from s e t s  i n t o  
very  proper  s u b s e t s ,  I t h i n k  such an i n t u i t i o n  can be defended. 
For t h e  combina to r i a l  n o t i o n  seems t o  be l i k e  a  p r i n c i p l e  of 
g r e a t e s t  en t ropy :  mathematical  o b j e c t s ,  t h a t  i s ,  s e t s ,  a r e  
a s  d i so rgan ized  and unsys temat ic  i n  t h e  ways they  come t o  be 
a s  p o s s i b l e ;  and t h e  ge;~ei-at ion of f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  suppress  
c a r d i n a l i t y  seems t o  imbue t h i s  g e n e r a t i o n  too much wi th  a  
sense  of o r d e r  and method. 
A generous r e a d e r  may f o r g i v e  t h i s  unre f ined  specula-  
t i o n .  A t  a l l  e v e n t s , ,  s u f f i c e  i t  h e r e  t o  remark t h e  c l o s e  
t i e  between t h e  pe rce ived  h e i g h t  and t h e  breadth  of t h e  u n i -  
v e r s e :  f o r  depending upon how we t ake  t h e  ranks t o  be f i l l e d  
o u t ,  t h e  apparenc h e i g h t  of t h e  u n i v e r s e  may vary d r a m a t i c a l l y ,  
The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  of t h e  perce ived  h e i g h t  and b read th  i s  
s u b t l e  and complicated.  Thus, a s  I have poin ted  o u t ,  t h e  
a s s e r t i o n  of t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  measurable c a r d i n a l ,  whi le  t o  
a l l  appearances an axiom about  t h e  h e i g h t  of t h e  u n i v e r s e ,  
would imply something about i t s  b r e a d t h .  But what i s  more 
remarkable i s  t h a t  t h e  axiom r e q u i r e s  t h a t  /zY/ be a count-  
a b l e  o r d i n a l ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  t h e r e  be f u n c t i o n s  i n  t h e  u n i v e r s e  
u c (obviously nct i n  L )  t h a t  map ua onto  / 2 / . Thus i f  a  measurW 
a b l e  c a r d i n a l  exists, t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of L i s  c o l l a p s e d  i n t o  a  
meagre residuum. So in a sense we have come full circle, 
An axiom ostensibly about the height of V shows that the ranks 
of V must have a rich kind of fleshing out. And the sort of 
breadth these ranks have demands in turn that 6,in the uni- 
L 
verse be extraordinarily high, namely, much higher than /2&/ , 
Another striking result is this. The axiom of determi- 
nacy (AD), an assertion at its base about the power set of 4, 
that is, about Vw+,, impiies properties for cardinals lying 
far above V,, . For if AD, then 3, and H,are measurable, s, 
5 (i1?2) are Jonsson, and &is Rowbottom. Here we see what im- 
pact a statement quantifying over the members of a very low 
rank may have upon the height of V. 
Of course, another consequence of AD is that the axiom 
of choice is false. And it may seem ironic that I should claim 
the axiom of choice is justifiable combinatorially, when AD is 
precisely a generalization to the infinite of a principle of 
finite combinatorics. At this juncture, there is little else 
to bdy than that there are more and less credible generaliza- 
tions Erom the finite; indeed there are generalizations Erom 
the finite that are provably false. As far as I can tell, AD 
has no intrinsic plausibility as a generalization from the 
finite. The manner in which the finite case of "determinacy" 
gets its plausibility seems to be clearly inapplicable to the 
infinite case. The finite case can be proved because one knows 
that a schema equivalent to it, is true, by quantifier logic: 
namely, one takes the negation sign in front of the matrix 
F(xt,YtI . . . ,  X,,Y,) in the second disjunct, and drives it to 
the front of the disjunct, getting 
(x~~3yl )&3(3y3 - . -  6h)(3y.) F(x, ,y , ,  *, yz ,..., w,,  y,) v 
' ( ~ , ) ( ~ , ) ( ~ d g ~ ~ )  "' (xdC3yb) (*,, 7,) r*,ya,* .;, x h , h )  
which is of course true by excluded middle. But the Axiom of 
Determinacy would be equivalent to a schema containing an in- 
finite number of quantifiers in front of a matrix: 
v @ g t ) C y t ) * ~ *  b ~ q ) ( ~ m ) ~ ~ *  F ( * ~ , Y , , . *  *rxn,Yn,p** 1 
But how do we get an analogous result here? If we try to 
drive the negation out, where does it go? There is an infinite 
series of quantifiers in front of the matrix, and no latest 
place for the negation to land. The non-wellfoundedness of 
the series of quantifiers seems to destroy any credibility 
for AD that might derive from the finite case. The status 
of AD seems to be strictly one of a hypothesis entertained and 
worked with. I can contrive no intuition that would indicate 
P(w) to conform to the axiom of determinacy. On the other 
hand, strong intuitions recommend the axiom of choice; we can 
easily conceive how the sets which verify the axiom of choice 
would arise. 
I have said that the combinatorial notion of set is 
the most full-bodied form of mathematical platonism. It is 
in this light that one can perceive the colnmon elements in 
its claims about the height of V, and about the breadth of V ,  
In both cases, it holds V is as large as possible, is created 
in as arbitrary ways as possible. For inasmuch as this creation 
goes on out in mathematical reality, why should V not be just 
extraordinarily luxuriant? A consequence of this view of sets 
is that our knowledge of what V actually looks like is incon- 
ceivably impoverished. Perhaps it is this sort of view that 
led Godel to the unusual position that the reflection principles 
should be accepted as intuitively obvious because of the un- 
knowability of the absolute. 
Some philosophers have taken the paucity of our knowledge 
of V to imply that we can never even refer to all sets. For, 
so the argument goes, our beliefs about sets are ineluctably 
so deficient that we can always construe our quantifiers to 
range over Vd for some W ,  and preserve all our beliefs, Why 
then not understand our quantifiers as ambiguous as to the 
height of the domain over which they range? Somehow, on this 
view, we do succeed in quantifying over all subsets of a set, 
if we quantify over the set itself, despite the fact that we 
may have very little idea of the details of how, say, the 
power set of a given ordinal is filled out. 1 find the 
difference between the ways the two cases are dealt with to be 
unfounded. Let us return once more to measurable cardinals, 
Had we not conceived of such a cardinal, would this mean our 
quantifiers might be considered to range over a set V k  for k 
measurable, or rather over a kind of inner model of ZF in 
which a measure for this ordinal did not exist? This question 
does not appear to admit a determinate answer. 
One can see this point another way. Recall the result 
that AD implies /Y is measurable. AD can be construed as en- 
t 
tailing that P(& is extremely "thick". Suppose one for some 
reason were to doubt AC (as some do), and had not yet envision- 
ed either AD or measurable cardinals, and, bizarrely enough, 
AD were true. Now surely we will have managed to refer to 3. 
I 
So if there were vagueness about what one's quantifiers were 
to range over, it would be better understood as vagueness with 
respect to how many subsets of they would range over, 
rather than w.r.t. the height of the universe. Of course, in 
the presence of choice it is possible to prove that if k is 
the first measurable cardinal, then there are k many inaccessible 
cardinals beneath it, And so if AC is true, as surely it is, 
a measurable cardinal is secured to be very high, But the 
result with AD may serve to suggest that exactly how high it 
is seen to be may depend critically on our assumptions about 
how the ranks of V should be fleshed out, And so the purported 
ambiguity of our discourse is not to be pegged exclusively on 
neight . 
Maybe some who believe there is this vagueness in our 
quantifiers are not easily troubled, and will not blanch at 
the possibility we cannot quantify even over all subsets of, 
say,w. But it strikes me as more reasonable to surmise that 
we can so quantify, and that we can moreover quantify over 
all sets whatsoever. That I should not know how high V is or 
how wide it is, or more generally what are the truth values 
of the infinitely many formulas of ZF does not surprise me, 
nor does it make me any less inclined to think I am in ZF 
talking about - all sets in V. After all, I do know this much 
about each set in V: the axioms of ZF hold f o r  it. Why should 
not this knowledge avail in trying to talk about all sets? 
The incompleteness of my knowledge of V does not detract 
from my intention to be talking about all of V. This intention 
can be made so explicitly and emphatically that it would seem 
mildly perverse to go ahead anyway and construe my quantifiers 
over some set, instead of over all sets. For if sets really 
-
do exist independently of the mind, a belief the platonist 
holds so dear, how is it that this intention can miscarry7 
Jonathan Lear has argued6 that if we do not have the appropri- 
ate intentions toward a set we cannot quantify over it, For 
example, if we have never conceived of inaccessible cardinals, 
we cannot be said to have one in the range of our quantifiers, 
Now Lear never spells out what the suitable kinds of intentions 
are. While Parsons seems to have a view similar to Lear's in 
this respect, he is no more explicit on this issue than Lear. 
And yet it is entirely critical to their claims that this be 
made clear. 
Both Parsons and Lear presuppose that we - can somehow 
succeed in quantifying over all subsets of U ,  and that, in 
fact, if we can quantify over a set, we can quantify over 
all - the subsets of that set. They need this first, weaker 
assumption to lend their view any credibility; failing the 
assumption, there is no ground for believing we are not quanti- 
fying only over a countable standard model of, say, all the 
true sentences of ZF. For there is only one way to assure 
that our quantifiers are not understood in this manner. We 
must be able to quantify over a subset ofcr, that codes up a 
function that collapses this countable standard model. The 
basic task facing a defense of Parsons' and Lear's view, then, 
is this. On what principled grounds can we say we can quanti- 
fy over all - subsets of s say)^, which would not lead us to 
believe we can quantify as well over all sets whatsoever? 
Already I have urged that the connection between tbe height 
and the breadth of the universe is too intimate to make plaus- 
ible the claim we can be confident we are quantifying over 
all sets in a rank, and be in doubt as to whether we are 
quantifying over all cardinals, 
Let me further explicate some of these points. Return 
to the issue of intentions, In ZFT -t= choice it is easy en~ugh 
t o  prove t h e r e  i s  a s t andard  model f o r  a l l  t h e  t r u e  sentences  
of ZFC. For example, i f  t h e r e  i s  a  measurable c a r d i n a l ,  
t h e r e  w i l l  be an o r d i n a l  i n  t h i s  model t h a t  s a t i s f i e d  ' x  i s  
a  measurable c a r d i n a l ' ;  and i t  w i l l  be t r u e  i n  t h i s  model t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  a s  many i n a c c e s s i b l e  c a r d i n a l s ,  i n  t h e  sense  of the  
model, beneath t h i s  o r d i n a l  a s  t h e r e  a r e  members of t h e  o r d i n a l .  
A l l  t h e s e  s p l e n d i d  p r o p e r t i e s  of  t h i s  o r d i n a l  a r e  cheaply g o t ,  
however, by excluding  any s u b s e t s  of a t h a t  would v i t i a t e  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e .  i3ut what i n t e n t i o n s  a r e  no t  cap tu red  by t h i s  model? 
A l l  - t h e  t r u t h s  of ZF a r e  t r u e  h e r e ;  hence i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a l l  
t h e  sentences  we might ever  b e l i e v e  i n  t h e  language of ZF 
about t h e  d i v e r s e  ranks  of ZF a r e  t r u e ,  So we a r e  c u t  o f f  
from t e l l i n g  t h i s  s t o r y :  we cannot: be q u a n t i f y i n g  over  a l l  
s u b s e t s  of & because t h e r e  a r e  sentences  we might accep t  
about P(&) t h a t  a r e  perhaps decided the  wrong way i n  t h i s  model 
( c e r t a i n l y  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  i f  we seek on ly  a  model f o r  t h e  
theorems of ZF o r  some r e c u r s i v e  ex tens ion  t h e r e o f ) .  Such a  
s t o r y  would be of dubious v a l u e  i n  any c a s e ,  s i n c e  a  l i k e  s t o r y  
could be p r o f e r r e d  on behal f  of t h e  view t h a t  we cannot t a k e  
our  q u a n t i f i e r s  t o  range  over  Vk f o r  some k .  That i s ,  we may 
i n  t ime adopt c e r t a i n  h igher  axioms of i n f i n i t y ,  and y e t  they 
might be f a l s e  i f  we t a k e  t h e  range of  t h e  q u a n t i f i e r s  t o  be 
some Vk t h a t  makes t r u e  a l l  t hose  axioms we accep t  now. 
If t h e r e  a r e  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  make i t  seem reasonab le  
t h a t  w e  can q u a n t i f y  over  a l l  s u b s e t s  of a s e t ,  bu t  n o t  over  
a l l  o r d i n a l s ,  they would seem t o  have t o  do wi th  our  somehow 
having a  much f i rmer  g rasp  of what an a r b i t r a r y  s u b s e t  o f  a 
s e t  i s ,  than we have of t h e  autonomous, uncons t ra ined  genera-  
t i o n  of  new r a n k s .  Now i t  does impreis  me a s  c o r r e c ~  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  some metaphysical  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  manner i n  
which a  s u b s e t  of a  s e t  depends f o r  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  on the  o r i g -  
i n a l  s e t ,  and t h e  manner i n  which t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  s e t  de- 
pends on i t s  members. Indeed,  one might say t h a t  a  s u b s e t  
of a s e t  i s  i n  no way c o n d i t i o n a l  on t h e  s e t  f o r  i t s  e x i s t e n c e ,  
but  only on t h a t  s u b s e t ' s  members. But I do no t  s e e  llow t o  
p a r l a y  t h i s  o n t i c  d i f f e r e n c e  i n t o  a  r e l e v a n t  ep i s t emic  one ,  
I f  one has t h e  i d e a  t h a t  somehow we - have t o  g a t h e r  up t h e  
members of a  s e t  i n t o  t h a t  s e t ,  a t  each new rank ,  f o r  t h e s e  
members t o  c o n s t i t u t e  a  s e t ,  then i t  might be t h a t  t h e r e  would 
be an open-endedness i n  how high we can q u a n t i f y .  But t h i s  
i s  t o  s e e  s e t s  a s  a t  t h e  c o r e  c o n s t r u c t i v e ,  and t h e  p l a t o n i s t  
w i l l  have no t r u c k  wi th  t h a t .  However, I t h i n k  i t  i s  t h i s  
p i c t u r e  t h a t  o p e r a t e s  i n  t h e  back of o n e ' s  mind when one t h i n k s  
we cannot q u a n t i f y  a l l  t h e  way u p .  Once we d i v e s t  our se lves  
of t h i s  p i c t u r e ,  and acknowledge t h e  independence of such 
s e t  "genera t ion"  from our own minds, t h e  openendedness i n  
j u s t  one d i r e c t i o n  seems b a s e l e s s .  
There i s  but  one o t h e r  way t o  t r y  t o  d r i v e  a wedge 
between t h e  two d i f f e r e n t  c a s e s .  And t h a t  i s  t o  observe t h a t  
t h e  c a r d i n a l i t y  of t h e  s u b s e t s  of  a s e t ,  even t ak ing  i n t o  
account  our  use  of  replacement ,  w i l l  never f u r n i s h  us  a l l  t h e  
i t e r a t i o n s  of new ranks  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e .  And t h e  number of 
such i t e r a t i o n s  is  s o  stupendous t h a t  we cannot encompass them 
a t  once,  whi l e  t h e  number of  s u b s e t s  of a  s e t ,  however a r b i -  
t r a r i l y  engendered, we can .  Here I can bu t  invoke once more 
Cohen's sugges t ion  t o  t r y  t o  undermine t h i s  move, For i t  may 
be t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no way we can a t t a i n  t h e  c a r d i n a l i t y  of t h e  
power s e t  of  a  s e t  working up by replacemdnt from below. Yet 
we do t h i n k  we unders tand what an a r b i t r a r y  subse t  of a  s e t  i s .  
I would l i k e  t o  pursue  now some f u r t h e r  i s s u e s  about 
t h e  combina to r i a l  n o t i o n .  Parsons b e l i e v e s  t h a t  Wang has 
captured  t h e  motivati .on f o r  replacement when Warlg says  t h a t  : 
Once we adopt t h e  view p o i n t  t h a t  we can 
i n  an i d e a l i z e d  s e n s e  run  through a l l  members 
of  a  g iven  s e t ,  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of SAR ( i , e , ,  
replacement)  i s  immediate. That i s ,  i f ,  f o r  
each element of t h e  s e t ,  we put  some o t h e r  g iven  
o b j e c t  t h e r e ,  we a r e  a b l e  t o  run through t h e  re-  
s u l t i n g  m u l t i t u d e  a s  w e l l .  I n  t h i s  manner, we a r e  
j u s t i f i e d  i n  forming new s e t s  by replacements .  I f ,  
however, we do n o t  have t h i s  idea  of running through 
a l l  members of a  g iven  s e t ,  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of 
t h e  replacement axiom i s  more complex. 7 
Now I s e e  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  replacement axiom a s  a r i s -  
ing  more b a s i c a l l y  from t h e  c a r d i n a l i t y  p r i n c i p l e :  i f  t h e r e  
a r e  n o t  too  many s e t s  i n  a  m u l t i t u d e ,  they a r e  bound up i n t o  
a s e t ,  On my vjew, t h ~ g h  perhaps n o t  C a n t o r ' s ,  t h i s  b a s i c  
p i c t u r e  would suppor t  n o t  on ly  replacement ,  bu t  a l s o  power s e t  
( i n  conjunct ion  wi th  s e p a r a t i o n ) .  In  t h i s  l a t t e r  case  we know 
t h e  s e t  ob ta ived  i s  of  g r e a t e r  c a r d i n a l i t y ;  perhaps of 
fantastically greater cardinality. In Cantor's 1899 letter 
to Dedekind, he proposed what was essentially the axiom of 
replacement, but curiously not the axiom of power set, as 
part of a new foundation for set theory. Eow it may be this 
was just an oversight of Calltor's. On the other hand, it 
might have been in acknowledgement of the force of the power 
set-separation principle that he hesitated. For how could he 
know that in general, if one took a set, and then formed its 
power set, one did not go to a multitude so large as to be an 
"inconsistent multiplicity"? Or that the upshot of a repeated 
use of this principle was not such a multitude? It must have 
seemed quite evident to Cantor that the multitude of natural 
numbers was a set, and that arbitrary submultitudes of the 
natural numbers must be sets; for this much must, evidently, 
be true if analysis is to be at all possible. But analysis by 
itself does not require the existence of the set of all sub- 
sets of & .  Even Cantor's proof that there are more real 
numbers than there are rational numbers goes through unimpeded 
inside of classical analysis; here there is no obligation for 
the subsets of W a l l  to be fastened up into a set, So in 
postulating such a thing one must have the temerity to step 
beyond what classical mathematics would seem to uphold. In 
view of Kronecker's attack on Cantor, and Kronecker's claim 
that only the natural numbers really existed, it must have 
been difficult enough for Cantor to sustain even what analysis 
seemed to demand. 
However fair the foregoing may seem as a reconstruction 
of Cantor's views in 1899, it well represents a possible rest- 
ing point in the development of the notion of set in ZF.  The 
position is actually quite conservative, despite its embracing 
the axiom of replacement; for lacking the power set axiom, 
there is no way to engender sets of high cardinality. 
What is all this in service of? Simply this. Parsons 
asserts Wang has, in the passage quoted, put well the intuitive 
underpinning of the axiom of repldcement. But insofar ~ i i  one 
sees the axiom as a principle whose chief purpose is to assure 
sethood by forestalling any explosion into an inconsistent 
multitude, a more fundamental picture would seem to underlie 
it. It is not that we, in some sense, take each element of 
the original set, replace it with its associated set, and then 
see that the resulting multitudb Pa bound up into a set. The 
act of replacement does not figure importantly in our counte- 
nancing the multitude as a set; it is rather that we infer it 
is 3 set because we see it cannot have surged into an incon- 
sistent multiplicity, since there is no surging at all, This 
is perhaps a rather subtle distinction; but it seems to adhere 
better to the underlying picture that justifies higher axioms 
of infinity, the axiom of choice, and separation, The follow- 
ing point may focus the distinction I have in mind. Our in- 
sight that a multitude is a set should, not the ideal case, 
follow strictly why it is that that multitude i s  a set. Now 
the act of replacing each member of a set with that member's 
correlated set is not something that presumably transpires 
out in mathematical reality, Or, to remove the metaphor, the 
existence of the new set is not contingent in any way upon 
the existence of the old. As I have urged before, the only 
juncture at which it is clearly proper to speak of such 
contingency is when a set is said to depend for its existence 
upon its members. To repeat, replacement is best understood 
as capturing in part the idea that the iteration of levels 
occurs as often as we can conceive; this viewpoint makes it 
one with the higher axioms of infinity and separation in its 
deepest motivation. 
G In a footnote, Parsons criticizes Boolos (1971) for 
not having seen the ranks of V and the sets of V as being 
formed in a certain fashion together, so that if a well order- 
ing were to come about in some rank in V ,  there should be a 
rank as high as that well ordering. But the motivation for 
replacement, as I have set it forth, would vindicate Boolas' 
original approach. For there is no sense in which the 
existence of a well ordering should oblige us to believe there 
is a rank as high, short of adopting the c~mbinatorial notion, 
that justifies at once the full force of the replacement axiam, 
It is not as if such well ordering9 should be conceived to 
generate the new ranks, as Parsons' criticism apparently 
p r e s u p p o s e s .  One though t  t h a t  might  seem, even s o ,  t o  en-  
courage  t a k i n g  w e l l  o r d e r i n g s  t o  g e n e r a t e  new r a n k s  i s  t h i s ,  
I f  t h e r e  were n o t  such  r a n k s ,  t h e r e  would n o t  be an  o r d i n a l  
f o r  e v e r y  w e l l  o r d e r i n g ,  on von Neumann's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  o r d i n a l s .  But t h i s  i s  a  f r a i l  r e e d  t o  r e s t  s o  much upon,  
inasmuch as i t  i s  q u i t e  e a s y  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  o r d i n a l s  w i t h  
c e r t a i n  e q u i v a l e n c e  c l a s s e s  o f  w e l l  o r d e r i n g s ,  u s i n g  S c o t t ' s  
t r i c k .  
A p a r t i n g  remark on a  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  i s s u e .  Pa r sons  
e n t e r t a i n s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o s s i b i l i t y .  C l e a r l y  we can con-  
s t r u c t  a  t h e o r y  of  o r d i n a l s  t h a t  w i l l  n o t  have t h e  f u l l  power 
o f  ZF. Suppose t h e n  t h a t  we t a k e  a l l  o r d i n a l s  a s  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  
r a t h e r  t han  o b t a i n i n g  them i n  t h e  u s u a l  f a s h i o n  by s e t  t h e o r e t i c  
means. Then i t  seems a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  o p e r a t e  upon t h e s e  
o r d i n a l s  a s  we would upon any m u l t i t u d e  o f  i n d i v u a l s ,  and 
g a t h e r  t o g e t h e r  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  s e t  of a l l  - o r d i n a l s .  But 
when t h i s  i s  done,  i t  seems w e  can deve lop  a  v e r s i o n  of t h e  
B u r a l i  F o r t i  paradox ,  by d e f i n i n g  a  new r e l a t i o n < ,  which i s  
a w e l l  o r d e r i n g :  
X<Y iff x , y a r e  o r d i n a l s  which a r e  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and x(y on 
t h a t  o r d e r i n g  r e l a t i o n ,  o r  y i s  t h e  s e t  of  a l l  such  o r d i n a l s ,  
and xey .  
On t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  t h e  se t  of  a l l  o r d i n a l s  w i l l  be g r e a t e r  i n  
t h e  s e n s e  o f  < t h a n  a l l  o r d i n a l s ;  b u t  ( i s  a well o r d e r i n g ;  
hence t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  o r d i n a l s  would have t o  be o r d i n a l l y  g r e a t -  
er  t h a n  i t s e l f ,  s i n c e  i t  would be  an  o r d i n a l .  C o n t r a d i c t i o n .  
A certain observation will obviate this would be 
contradiction. We can in the typical fashion reduce ordinals 
to the sets of ZF. This means that ordlnals just are sets; 
that is, to be conunitted to an ordinal is to be committed to 
sets. Of course, there are multifarious ways to identify 
ordinals with sets. But the fundamental point is that sets 
exhaust the mathematical universe (with the possible excep- 
tion of categories); the reductions of the several branches 
of mathematics, including any theory of ordinals, to set 
theory should be taken to demonstrate just this fact, In 
consequence, it is no more legitimate to construe all ordinals 
as individuals from which sets can be formed than it would be 
to construe all sets as individualsfrom which new sets can be 
formed. And this latter we surely deem to be wrongheaded. 
CHAPTER IV 
The translation Parsons constructs between ZFT and 
NB, in the direction that concerns us, is this. In ZFT, 
classes are understood as pairs (n,s), n a formula of ZF, and 
s a sequence of sets. Take any occurrence of 3Y (I * Y 0 )  , 
replace it by 
3 n  3 s  < *  % X  I S q t  Chi so#*)P . . .) 
then eliminate the abstract. How convincing is this transla- 
tion as a demonstration that classes just are such pairs? One 
problem with such an identification of classes with pairs is 
that, under the translation Parsons sets forth, for each class 
there will be more than one pair corresponding to it. Thus, 
the universal class will correspond to any pair of the form 
('x=?,s), regardless of the sequence s, on this translation. 
In this respect, the translation differs markedly from that of 
PA + ZF into ZF, since in the latter translation there is but 
one entity in ZF correlated with each number. It is true that 
there is a variety of ways to identify numbers with sets; we 
can use von Neumann's method or Zermeln's; but the relevant 
fact is that on a given translation there is a unique set 
correlated with each number. But i f  there is this failure in 
uniqueness, some questiotl exists as to whether the translation 
provides an ontological reduction. What we might be seeking, 
in order to effect a reduction, is a proxy Euncti~n, in the 
2 
sense  of Quine. That i s ,  a s  Quine p u t s  i t :  
We s p e c i f y  a  f u n c t i o n ,  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n  t h e  
n o t a t i o n  of 0  o r  0 '  [ t h e  reduced,  and reducing 
t h e o r i e s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ]  which admits  a s  arguments 
a l l  o b j e c t s  i n  t h e  u n i v e r s e  of 0  and t akes  v a l u e s  
i n  t h e  u n i v e r s e  0'. This  i s  t h e  proxy f u n c t i o n ,  
Then t o  each n -p lace  p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c a t e  of 0 ,  f o r  
each n ,  we e f f e c t i v e l y  a s s o c i a t e  an open sentence  
of  0 '  i n  n  f r e e  v a r i a b l e s ,  i n  such a  way t h a t  t h e  
p r e d i c a t e  i s  f u l f i l l e d  by an n - t u p l e  of arguments 
of t h e  proxy f u n c t i o n  always and only  when t h e  open 
sen tence  i s  f u l f i l l e d  by t h e  corresponding n - t u p l e  
v a l u e s .  3 
Now i s  t h e r e  a  way of modifying Par sons '  t r a n s l a t i o n  
so  t h a t  i t  does g i v e  a  unique e n t i t y  f o r  each c l a s s ?  There 
i s ,  bu t  t h e  mast n a t u r a l  way of changing t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  
p r e s e n t s  some s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  Sin.ce Pa r sons '  t r a n s -  
l a t i o n  i s  one-many, t h e  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  manner of a l t e r i n g  
i t  would be t o  p ick  ou t  one of t h e  many p a i r s  r e l a t e d  t o  
each c l a s s  a s  i t s  proxy. However, a s  even t h e  language 
h i n t s ,  a t  l e a s t  t h e  axiom of choice  i s  i n e x t r i c a b l y  involv-  
ed i n  t h i s  maneuver; indeed,  a s  we s h a l l  s e e ,  an even more 
powerful p r i n c i p l e  i s  demanded. Now, t o  begin w i t h ,  i t  
would seem t r o u b l i n g  f o r  a  p r i n c i p l e  l i k e  choice  t o  be 
r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h i s  s o r t  of t r a n s l a t i o n  t o  be e f f e c t e d :  
i n t u i t i v e l y ,  such a r e d u c t i o n  would n o t  appear  t o  r e s t  on 
such an axiom; i f  c l a s s e s  a r e  s e t s ,  t h e  axiom of  choice  
should n o t  be needed f o r  u s  t o  s e e  t h i s  i s  s o ,  
Hence i f  i t  were NB+ p l u s  AC which were be ing  reduced t o  
ZFT + A C ,  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  would a l r e a d y  be suspec t  because of 
t h e  presence  of c h o i c e .  However, a s  I have n o t e d ,  t o  choose 
a  unique p a i r  f o r  each c l a s s  demands an even s t r o n g e r  back- 
ground theory  than  ZFT t A C ,  namely what I s h a l l  c a l l  ZFT+ 
t WO. While we a r e  n o t  compelled t o  use  t h i s  s t r o n g e r  t h e o r y ,  
save  i f  we wish t o  s i n g l e  ou t  a  p a i r  among those  t h a t  Pa r sons '  
t r a n s l a t i o n  f u r n i s h e s ,  a s  t h e  c o r r e l a t e  of  each c l a s s ,  w e  s h a l l  
be i n s t r u c t e d  by examining t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  
ZFT+ t WO i s  t h e  fo l lowing t h e o r y .  Take t h e  language 
of  ZF and extend i t  by adding a two p l a c e  p r e d i c a t e ,  R ( x , y ) .  
Then WO i s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e :  
'k (a# $ - + ( 3 ! v ) ( u r q  & R(4,u)) 
To g e t  ZFT+, e n r i c h  t h e  Eruth theory  by adding a  c l a u s e  f o r  
p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c a t e  R ( x , y ) ,  supply ing  a  t r u t h  theory  f o r  t h e  
extended language;  f i n a l l y ,  l e t  s e p a r a t i o n  be extended t o  i n -  
c lude  t h i s  new p r e d i c a t e ,  t h e  s t r eng thened  S a t  p r e d i c a t e ,  and 
f i r s t  o r d e r  compounds t h e r e o f .  
Now we seek t o  reduce ZFTf + WO t o  N B  f AC+,  Here A C t  
i s  t h e  fo l lowing theory ,  c l o s e l y  analogous t o  WO: 
3 R V *  ( Y #  p * Q ! u ) C u ~ +  & <%,u> ef i \ ' l  
However, d e s p i t e  t h e  s t r o n g  formal s i m i l a r i t i e s  between Act 
and WO, we s h a l l  encounter  reason t o  doubt t h a t  t h e  p l a u s i b i l i t y  
of appending AC+ t o  NB should confe r  any m e r i t  upon the  a d d i t i o n  
of WO t o  ZFT. 
We want t o  f i n d  a proxy f u n c t i o n  between c l a s s e s  and 
p a i r s .  A s  Quine p o i n t s  o u t ,  t h i s  must be done from a back- 
ground theory  t h a t  a s s e r t s  t h a t  both  e x i s t .  The background 
theory  h e r e ,  t h e n ,  w i l l  be one t h a t  has a t  l e a s t  t h e  power 
of  NB + AC+ + ZFT++WO. This  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  r educ t ion  of 
PA + ZF t o  ZF. For t h e r e  t h e  background theory  i s  PA +ZF, 
which v i a  a  proxy f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t s  i t s  own reduc t ion  t o  ZF .  
This  l a t t e r  r e d u c t i o n  i s  accepted  i n  t h e  s p i r i t  of r e d u c t i o  
ad - absurdum, a s  Quine s a y s ;  from a theory  t h a t  embraces nuin- 
b e r s  and s e t s ,  we show t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no need f o r  anyth ing  bu t  
s e t s .  The same mot iva t ion  i s  p r e s e n t  i n  our  a t t empt  t o  r e -  
duce NB + AC+ + ZFT+ + FJO t o  ZFT+ + \JO . I n  any c a s e ,  t h e  
t r a n s l a t i o n  proceeds t h u s .  In  our  background t h e o r y ,  NB + 
AC+ + ZFT+ + WO, we have t h e  r e l a t i o n  R such t h a t  f o r  every 
nonempty s e t  a ,  t h e r e  i s  a unique u  such t h a t  R(a ,u )  & uea .  
Analogously t o  what Parsons shows, Tor every  c l a s s  X i n  NB + 
AC+,  t h e r e  w i l l  be some p a i r  ( n ,  s )  such t h a t  
b'x (. Ss+ (n, s o 1 ' ) H  w a x )  
where S a t  i s  ob ta ined  from ZFT+. For each c l a s s  X I  t ake  t h e  
s e t  of a l l  p a i r s  of  minimal rank which thus  correspond t o  t h e  
c l a s s .  Using r e l a t i o n  R ,  choose f o r  each c l a s s  a member of 
t h e  s e t  s o  ob ta ined  f o r  t h a t  c l a s s .  That member w i l l  be t h e  
unique p a i r  i n  ZFTS + WO t h a t  corresponds t o  i t .  The r e s t  of 
t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  goes through p r e t t y  much a s  b e f o r e :  we r e p l a c e  
a l l  occurrences  of Q Y) ( *  X * 1 by 
Again, the abstract is eliminated. On this translation, the 
proxy function F(X,z) would be defined thus: 
*bt))& y is oq win. n ~ k  & ~ ( x , t ) &  3 4 ~  t y 6 v  - V= ( 1 6  ~ t )  s+c(~)~,(YL, 
Let us now review the circumstances that drove us to & RU, 4 
consider NB + AC+ and ZFT+ + WO in the first place. We were 
rightly committed to ZFT; but MB was translatable into ZFT. 
We speculated that to be committed to the entities of ZFT 
might be the same as being committed to the encities of NB, 
in view of the translation. However, it seemed that this final 
conclusion would not follow unless we could somehow reduce 
WB to ZFT, and this required a proxy function; such was not 
possible on Parsons' translation. In order to bring about 
the proxy function in a natural way, we adopted ZFT+ t WO, 
So, unless we are committed to ZFT+ f WO, and not merely to 
ZFT, we are not committed in virtue of the new translation to 
the existence of classes. 
How credible, then, is ZFTf + WO? Not credible at all, 
I am convinced. And the details of the defence of my answer 
are of considerable interest to us. 1 call WO by that name 
because it is equivalent to the existence o f  a definable well 
ordering of the universe of sets. WO may at first blush 
appear rather more appealing than V=L (which in a sense 
YCHere 'x codes up a class' is the obvious expression. 
implies WO, since ZF + V=L + WO is a conservative extension 
of ZF + V=L), but in fact WO imposes a neatness on the uni- 
verse that is, insofar as we treat it as a primitive predicate, 
even more difficult to believe. For the formula R(x,y) thaL 
allots us our definable well ordering is not a formula of 
set theory, as is the formula I x < ~ Y I  that well orders the 
constructible universe; it is a primitive formula that we 
somehow manage to intend so that it well orders the universe. 
But how could we have such a nature, and the universe of sets 
have such a nature, that we could succeed at this? 
Now a result of Easton's implies that ZFT+ + WO is not 
equivalent to ZFT + the axiom of choice for sets.4 But one 
might think that, despite the fact that ZPTf + WO is strictly 
stronger than ZFTf + AC, the intuitions underpinning AC could 
be extended to justify an axiom like WO. After all, the WO 
principle seems to play a role in ZFT closely analogous to 
the role played by AC+ in NB, and powerful set theoretic 
intuitions support AC+ in the context of NB. Why may they 
not be taken to sustain WO in the context of ZFT? However, 
this line of argument would be misguided, I think, and it is 
of some importance to recognize why. Our set theoretic in- 
tuitions do indeed tend to uphold AC+ for NB; but these are 
intuitions about collections, not a b ~ u t  extensions of predi- 
cates. We will allow there is a class that codes up a Eunc- 
tional from each set to exactly one member of that set, but 
t h i s ,  I am pe r suaded ,  i s  because  we s e e  c l a s s e s  t o  be  c o l l e c -  
t i o n s  and t h e r e f o r e  c l o s e d  under  many o f  t h e  same o p e r a t i o n s  
s e t s  a r e ,  Cons ider  t h a t  when w e  ground t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  such 
a  c l a s s ,  we c e r t a i n l y  do noc go about  i t  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
f a s h i o n .  F i r s t ,  w e  s e e  t h a t  we can i n t e n d  a  p r e d i c a t e  t o  be 
t r u e  o f  p r e c i s e l y  each  s e t  and a  un ique  member of  t h a t  s e t ;  
t h e n  we proceed  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  c l a s s  t h a t  i s  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  
o f  t h a t  p r e d i c a t e .  
R a t h e r ,  ou r  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  would advanck qhus ,  Once 
a c o l l e c t i o n  i s  g i v e n ,  t h e  s u b c o l l e c t i o n s  t h a t  a l s o  must e x i s t  
come about  i n  p r e t t y  much a r b i t r a r y  ways. (Of t h i s  mac te r  I 
s h a l l  be  w r i t i n g  a t  l e n g t h  i n  a i lo ther  p o r t i o n  of my t h a s i s . )  
Now t h e r e  i s  i n  NB a c l a s s  t h a t  codes  up t h e  r e l a t i o n  between 
each  s e t  and a l l  t h e  members ot '  t h a t  s e t .  Why should  t h e r e  
n o t  be  a  c l a s s  t h a t  would be t h e  s u b c o l l e c t i o n  of t h i s  coded 
r e l a t i o n  g o t  by r e s t r i c t i n g  i t  t o  a  f u n c t i o n ?  T h i s  fiort of  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  a p p e a l s  v e r y  s t r o n g l y  t o  what Paul  Bernays had 
d e p i c t e d  a s  t h e  c o m b i n a t o r i a l  c h a r a c t e r  of  s e t s  o r  c o l l e c t i o n s .  
A s  sugges t ed  above ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  how one could  
somehow i n t e n d  o u t r i g h t  a p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c a t e  s o  t h a t  i t  would 
be t r u e  of e x a c t l y  each  s e t  and a  un ique  member o f  t h a t  s e t ;  
and i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  a l s o  t o  s e e  how one cou ld  b u i l d  up a corn- 
p l e x  p r e d i c a t e  t h a t  would do t h e  same j o b  s t a r t i n g  o u t  w i t h  
p r i m i t i v e  p r e d i c a t e s  t h a t  a r e  i n t u i t i v e l y  a c c e p t a b l e .  I n  view 
of t h i s ,  one would a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  from t h e  s t andpo in t  of ZP 
o r  ZFT, i n  which a l l  c o l l e c t i o n s  a r e  s e t s ,  and n o t  proper  
c l a s s e s ,  t h e r e  would be no way t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  use  of a  
p r e d i c a t e  a s  WO r e q u i r e s :  the  r e l e v a n t  combinator ia l  p r i n -  
c i p l e s  would n o t  apply f o r  a  mere ex tens ion  of a p r e d i c a t e ,  
A s  I have observed e a r l i e r ,  p r e d i c a t e s  do have c e r t a i n  c l o s u r e  
p r o p e r t i e s :  f o r  example, i f  t h e r e  i s  a  language meaningful t o  
us  con ta in ing  a p r e d i c a t e  wi th  a  c e r t a i n  e x t e n s i o n ,  then 
t h e r e  i s  a  language meaningful t o  us  con ta in ing  a  p r e d i c a t e  
whose ex tens ion  i s  t h e  complement of t h a t  e x t e n s i o n .  How- 
ever  i t  may be t h a t  we a r e  a b l e  t o  do i t ,  we - a r e  a b l e  t o  i n -  
tend  p r e d i c a t e s  so t h a t  t h e  complementary p r e d i c a t e  of a  
p r e d i c a t e  has  meaning i f  t h e  p r e d i c a t e  has i t .  In  g e n e r a l ,  
moreover, p r e d i c a t e s  a r e  c losed  i n  t h i s  manner under t h e  
Boolean o p e r a t i o n s  union ,  i n t e r s e c t i o n ,  complement. These 
p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  from t h e  combina to r i a l  p r i n c i p l e s  
apply ing  t o  s e t s ,  s i n c e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  we do no t  b e l i e v e  
s e t s  a r e  c l o s e d  under complementation: t h e  complement of t h e  
empty s e t  would be a  s e t  c o n t a i n i n g  e v e r y t h i n g ,  
The obse rva t ions  above a r e  r e l e v a n t ,  though we do n o t  
have t o  use  ZFTf f WO t o  e f f e c t  a  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  because they 
i n d i c a t e  a  c e r t a i n  view on which t h e  p o i n t  of NB i s  not  simply 
t o  supply c e r t a i n  e n t i t i e s ,  namely c l a s s e s ,  a s  ex tens ions  of 
a l l  t h e  p r e d i c a t e s  of ZF. For i f  t h i s  were a l l  t h a t  would 
ground NB, then  NB + Act w ~ u l d  n o t  seem an i n t u i t i v e  e x t e s ~ s i o n  
of NB, inasmuch as the motivation for A C f  is so different 
from what predicative considerations alone would allow. 
Parsons, in "Sets and Classes" argues that it is precisely 
as a way of giving any extension of a predicate a correspond- 
ing class that NB is adopted. This view, if correct, would 
seem to confer a certain credibility upon his conclusion 
that the quantifiers of set theory should be construed in- 
tuitionistically, by the following argument. Suppose the 
classes of NB are to be understood as merely the extensions 
of predicates of ZF. Now we are surely committed to ZF, and 
to the meaningfulness of the predicates of ZF, that is, to 
the fact that the extensions of the predj-cates of ZF are 
determinate. Since NB appears to be just a convenient way 
of capturing these commitments, we seem bound up with the 
classes of NB as objects. But the classes are set-like ob- 
jects, and once we have allowed predicative classes, most of 
the same operations under which sets are closed would apply 
also to these classes. A natural next step would be to grant 
that the class asserted to exist by AC+ does exist. After 
that, there would seem to be little to prevent us from gaing 
further and countenancing impredicative classes, and, after 
that, little to stop us from taking all collections of 
classes to exist, etc. Intuitionistic-like quantifiers seem 
then to be forced upon us. 
By now, it should be evident how t~ block such an argu- 
ment. Either t a l k  of the c lasses  of NE i s  to  be understood 
merely as  a  kind of shorthand fo r  t a l k  of the extensions 
of predicates i n  ZF, or t a l k  of the c lasses  of NB i s  t o  be 
in te rpre ted  as  re fe r r ing  to  s e t - l i k e  e n t i t i e s ,  with the 
combinatorial proper t ies  such e n t i t i e s  must possess. In the  
f i r s t  case,  there  i s  no reason to  proceed from our acceptance 
of NB t o  an adoption o f ,  say, NB + AC+. For t h a t  would be 
to  t r e a t  the extensions as s e t - l i k e  objec ts ,  and by hypothesis 
we have avoided t h a t .  On the other hand, i f  the  c lasses  of 
NB a r e  construed as s e t - l i k e  objec ts ,  then probably we want 
to  advance to  NB + AC+. We might want t o  go fu r the r  to  impre- 
d ica t ive  c lasses ;  but t h i s  move i s  not usually made, precisely  
-
because t h i s  would open up the i t e r a t i v e  process once again 
on these c lasses .  I?. R.  Drake, i n  Set Theory, puts the point  
-
t h i s  way : 
This impredicative extension (KeUgr-Morse 
Set Theory) has an unsat isfactory nature 
from the point of view of the cumulative type 
s t ruc tu re .  I f  we consider V to  be the universe 
of a l l  s e t s ,  then c lasses  a re . subcol lec t ions  
of things from V; i f  we quantify over 
c l a s ses ,  t h i s  implies tha t  we have the col lec-  
t i on  a l l  c lasses  t a l k  about, and the 
col lec t ion  of a l l  c lasses  would be exactly 
the thing we should t ake  as the next  l e v e l ,  
following a l l  the levels  used to  make up V .  
In other words, talking about a l l  classes 
i s  tantamount t o  saying that  we have not 
-
taken a l l  levels ,  with no end, but we have 
another one, the level  of c lasses ,  which we 
have notused fo r  making s e t s .  From t h i s  
point of view, i t  i s  more natural  to  regard 
classes as not forming a completed col lect ion,  
so tha t  we should not quantify over classes .  5 
Now we should take with a grain of s a l t  Drake's claim tha t  
we are  in  Kelley Morse s e t  theory talking about the col lect ion 
of a l l  classes;  f o r  h i s  purposes, it suff ices  tha t  we must 
be talking about - a l l  (with a very broad sweep of the hands) 
classes in  Kelley Morse s e t  theory. A t  a l l  events, since any 
in tu i t ion  tha t  would uphold AC+ would evidently uphold Kelley 
Morse s e t  theory, and since Kelley Morse s e t  theory c lear ly  
does suggest fur ther  levels ,  i t  seems best  to  stop the regress 
a t  i t s  root: the idea tha t  the c lass  quant if iers  of NB should 
be construed objectively.  
My own preference i s  to adopt NB, but in terpre t  i t s  
class quantifiers i n  a semi-substitutional fashion, an a l t e r -  
native Parsons outlines a t  one point. This approach would 
seem to  absolve us of any ontological commitment to proper 
c lasses  in  employing the theory of NB. Precisely because NB,  
with i t s  c lass  quant if iers  construed objectually,  i s  so 
del ica te ly  poised on the brink of the excessive ontological  
commitment of Kenq Morse s e t  theory, and because the in-  
tu i t ions  tha t  ground t h i s  de l ica te  posi t ion a re  so tenuous, 
doing away with the extra  ontological  baggage of WB i s  fo r  
me the favored course. But na tu ra l ly ,  i f  t o  be committed 
to  ZFT i s  i n  i t s e l f  t o  be committed t o  the ontology of NB, 
then t h i s  posi t ion i s  not  tenable anyway; so l e t  us re turn  
to  t h i s  question. 
How can a  one-one t r ans la t ion  d i r e c t l y  between NB and 
ZFT be obtained? For each c l a s s ,  there  i s  a  s e t  of pa i r s  of 
minimal rank t h a t  corresponds to  tha t  c l a s s  on Parsons' 
t r ans l a t ion .  Let t h i s  s e t  be iden t i f i ed  with the c l a s s .  
Whenever there  i s  an occurrence of 3 Y  ( . Y ) , put 
i n  i t s  place: 
3% Lr a s  bp a svax E-eiyl  ((vk,tv~,?')f * * *  3 
where again the abs t rac t  i s  purely v i r t u a l .  'x codes up a  
df 
c l a s s '  i s  defined: x codes up a  c l a s s  
6s Vu,v 6s (Lkbh  &*k(q) g 
&- 3u v t c ~ q ~ k  v <nawk WW V ~ ( S ~ ~ ( U ~ , ~ ~ ' Y ) W J ~ ~ ( ~ , ~ ~ ' )  
The proxy function ~ ( k , ~ )  i s  the formula: 
y  codes up a  c l a s s  & h e y  Vu YH Sq+ c&, rp 'O))  
It should be noted tha t  we cannot prove, i n  our present back- 
ground theory, (X) ( E : y ) F ( X , y ) .  But i t  i s  clear tha t  t h i s  
formula i s  t rue  on the usual construal  of the c lass  quanti- 
fiers in NB. If truth does not seem to suffice, we can 
always retreat to the metatheory for NB and prove it there. 
Now this last move may seem unsatisfactory, since it may 
seem to go beyond the spirit of reductio ad absurdurn in 
-
which the reduction is to take place. Perhaps we can cheer- 
fully say: from a theory with objects A we can see their 
superfluity. But our cheer may wane if we must draw on the 
force of its metatheory to prove the superfluity of objects 
A. Nonetheless, I think there is a redeeming feature in 
the present case. After all, we do have a proxy function, 
and a proxy function expressible in the original theory, NB. 
No danger of Pythagoreanism lurks if we adopt the above move 
for such cases. For example, while from the standpoint of 
ZFT one can prove the existence of a model in the numbers 
for all the truths of ZF, we do not thereby get a proxy func- 
tion: cardinality considerations rule out this possibility. 
Moreover, no arithmetical predicate expresses the relation 
that is the interpretation of 'G' in this numeric model of 
ZF. But there is a predicate in ZFT (shortly to be defined) 
that expresses the relation that is the interpretation of '€ '  
(of NB) among the proxies for the classes of NB. 
Let us suppose that the retreat to the metatheory 
described above is unproblematic. Can we then take the 
translation to effect an ontological reduction? 
One f i r s t  blush object ion t o  the  claim t h a t  there  i s  
a  reduction might be put t h i s  way. There i s  a  s t r i k i n g  
di f ference between the  reduction of PA + ZF t o  ZF and t h a t  
purported between NB and ZFT. PA + ZF i s  a  two sor ted  
theory i n  which there  i s  no presumed overlap between ranges 
of the two kinds of q u a n t i f i e r s .  But there  i s  an in t imate  
connection between the  two kinds of ob jec t s ,  s e t s  and c l a s ses ;  
f o r  a l l  s e t s  a r e  c l a s ses ;  moreover, a  proper c l a s s  i s  under- 
stood t o  be d i s t i n c t  from any se t - - thus ,  f o r  example, i t  i s  
a  theorem of NB t h a t  V'~X# JYIY=r3).  Hence, Wb(j#Y). 
In addi t ion,  the  members of a  proper c l a s s  run a l l  the  way up 
the cumulative hierarchy;  the  proper c l a s s  i t s e l f  appears a t  
no leve l  i n  t h a t  hierarchy.  What makes the  reduction of num- 
bers t o  s e t s  e n t i r e l y  na tu ra l  i s  j u s t  the  f a i l u r e  of overlap 
between the  laws t h a t  the  two s o r t s  of th ings ,  s e t s  and num- 
bers ,  must obey. Because we have no (or  confused) i n t u i t i o n s  
about whether o r  not  '3e5' i s  t r u e ,  we have no ser ious  mis- 
givings when the  e n t i t i e s  i d e n t i f i e d  with 3 and 5 bear o r  do 
not bear the e r e l a t i o n  t o  each o t h e r ;  l ikewise ,  we a re  not  
disturbed i f  # + 1#3= or n o t .  
It may seem t o  some t h a t  we do have i n t u i t i o n s  about 
the  t r u t h  of ' 3 6 5 ' ;  namely, we can see i t  must be  f a l s e ;  no 
number has any member. But I question whether the  i n t u i t i o n s  here 
appealed to  have qu i t e  the character  ascribed to  them. I 
suspect t h a t  i f  w e  r e c o i l  a t  the  suggestion tha t  ' 3 6  5 '  i s  
t r u e ,  i t  i s  because we do n o t  s e e  a  number a s  t h e  s o r t  of 
th ing  t h a t  could have members; t h a t  i s ,  our r e a c t i o n  t o  
t h e  c la im t h a t  3  i s  a  member of 5  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  s e n s e l e s s ,  
no t  t h a t  i t  i s  f a l s e .  But,  i f  t h i s  i s  s o ,  t hen  t h a t  very  
f a c t ,  pa radox ica l ly ,  should a l low us t o  t a k e  ' 3 6 5 '  a s  t r u e  
o r  f a l s e  i n d i f f e r e n t l y .  For on t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  g must hold  
o r  n o t  hold  between t h e  p rox ies  f o r  3  and 5 ,  and s i n c e  our  
i n t u i t i o n s  a r e  a t  base opposed t o  t h e  sense  of ' 3 6 5 ' ,  we 
oppose those  i n t u i t i o n s  e q u a l l y ,  whether we have ' 3 ( i 5 '  
come ou t  t r u e  o r  f a l s e .  
I n  any c a s e ,  we a r e  n o t  i n  a  comparable s i t u a t i o n  
wi th  s e t s  and c l a s s e s .  We do n o t  want i t  t o  be t h a t ,  some- 
how, t h e  proxy i n  ZFT f o r  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  c l a s s  of NB should 
be of lower rank i n  ZFT than  t h e  proxy f o r  HF. And y e t  
under t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  1 have cons t ruc ted  i t  seems t o  be s o .  
It i s  n o t  c l e a r ,  however, what t o  make of t h i s  objec-  
t i o n .  True,  t h e  s e t  corresponding t o  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  c l a s s  
w i l l  be  of lower rank -- i n  ZFT than t h e  s e t  corresponding t o  
HF. But t h e  s e t  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  c l a s s  w i l l  
c e r t a i n l y  n o t  be of lower rank  than  t h a t  s e t  i n  ZFT t h a t  
corresponds t o  HF of N B ,  -- on t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  - - -  of t h e  6 r e l a t i o n .  
This p o i n t  may be more persp icuous ly  pu t  t h i s  way. Suppose 
. x and y a r e  s e t s  i n  ZFT t h a t  code up c l a s ses .  Then w e  say 
t h a t  x and y  bear  t o  each o t h e r  on t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  (xb y )  iff 
On th i s  translation of the 6 re la t ion ,  i t  i s  t r i v i a l  tha t  
the en t i t i e s  of ZFT w i l l  bear to  each other when and 
ub 
only when they are  so required by NB. Thus, the proxy for  
the universal class does not bearb,, to  anything whatsoever 
in  ZFT, and i n  tha t  sense i s  not a  "set". Jus t  because the 
proxy function i s  a  proxy function, we can expect to  recover 
the new C re la t ion ,  Q to  s e t  things r igh t  among the en- 
wea 
t i t i e s  correlated to  the several classes.  
It i s  not immediately obvious how effec t ive  t h i s  reply 
to  the objection i s .  The reply seems to  e n t a i l  tha t  no -
t ranslat ion via  proxy functions can have counterintuit ive 
resu l t s  of the kind delineated in  the objection, since always 
(evidently), the various relat ions in  the reduced theory can 
be recovered as the e r e l a t i o n  was, and our in tu i t ions  with 
respect to these recovered relat ions are  of course exactly 
as they should be. 
Let us consider another problematic case of reduction 
that  follows i n  some  respect.^ the same general pattern of the 
alleged reduction of classes to s e t s ,  and see how the reply 
f i t s .  We sha l l  s t a r t  with a theory tha t  a lso has two so r t s ,  
where everything of the f i r s t  so r t  i s  also of the second. 
but there i s  something of the second sor t  not of the f i r s t .  
Construct a  theory exactly l i k e  ZF. save that  it claims p r e -  
c isely one individual ex i s t s .  This theory has two so r t s ,  
individuals and se t s  on the one hand, and individuals on the 
o t h e r .  Each s o r t  has  i t s  d i s t i n c t i v e  v a r i a b l e s ,  ranging  
over t h e  obvious domains. E x t e n s i o n a l i t y  f o r  s e t s  w i l l  n o t  
be l o s t ,  s i n c e  an axiom w i l l  be :  
v * v z ~ - > ~ ( r = q v r = s ) 3  ~ ~ ( Y & * - Y ( Z ) +  ~'2)) 
Where a  i s  t h e  v a r i a b l e  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and x ,  y ,  and z 
range over  both i n d i v i d u a l s  and s e t s .  We than  t a k e  i t  a s  
a  f u r t h e r  axiom t h a t  (a)-$g)(y€qvq=#), A proxy func t ion  
from t h e  ontology of t h i s  theory  t o  t h a t  of ZF i s  p r e t t y  
obvious.  Send t h e  unique i n d i v i d u a l  a  t o  t h e  empty s e t ;  
send t h e  empty s e t  t o  t h e  s i n g l e t o n  of  t h e  empty s e t .  Now 
suppose a l l  t h e  members of a  s e t  x  i n  t h i s  new theory  have 
been ass igned  a  s e t  i n  ZF: then  d e f i n e  t h e  proxy of x  t o  be 
t h e  unique s e t  con ta in ing  a l l  t h e  p rox ies  of i t s  members; 
t h a t  i s ,  t h e  pro:ry f u n c t i o n a l  F (x ,y )  i s :  
a M Cr+4 &a# f $0) = s&) luta j )  P F C I ) = ~ )  
We say t h a t  Xeqy (where x and y a r e  p rox ies )  i f f  y#j$f & xsy . 
Is t h i s  a  r educ t ion?  Of course ,  t h e  r e j o i n d e r  t o  t h e  
o b j e c t i o n  would imply t h a t  i t  i s ;  indeed t h e  s u i t a b l e  e , r e -  
l a t i o n  i s  e x h i b i t e d .  I f i n d  myself somewhat r e l u c t a n t  t o  say  
t h a t  i t  i s  n o t .  Now, o n e ' s  f i r s t  r e a c t i o n  may be t o  say  t h a t  
s i n c e  t h e  theory wi th  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  assumes t h e r e  i s  an 
i n d i v i d u a l  and ZIT does n o t ,  and s i n c e  i n d i v i d u a l s  d i f f e r  so 
i n  t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s  from s e t s  ( i n d i v i d u a l s  do n o t  have unions 
wi th  s e t s ,  a f t e r  a l l : ) ,  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  does not make f o r  a  
reduction. But, against this, imagine the theory of PA + 
ZF were altered in just one particular, namely, v r ' 3 ~  (gehrr) &%&I# $1 
were taken as an axiom (and therefore, of course, taken as 
well formed, unlike before). Would the addition of this 
axiom preclude the reduction of PA + ZF to ZF? Although von 
Neumann's and Zermelo's identifications of numbers with sets 
would no longer work, many straightforward identifications 
would; and I am inclined to the view that we would get a re- 
duction under these identifications. A way of construing 
these identifications is again with a mind toward reductio 
ad absurdum: Assuming numbers are distinct from sets, even 
-
as axiomatic in our to-be-reduced theory, we can show they 
need not be taken as distinct. Similarly, we might under- 
stand -&c%a)Lq#f in ZF plus the individual, and in some 
such way ~ ' V X ~ X )  in NB.
Perhaps at this point the discussion of whether there 
is an ontological reduction between NB and ZFT is becoming a 
bit too diffuse. We seem to be clutching at intuitions that 
would go one way or the other on the particular cases. Some 
reflection on more general considerations seems in order. 
When it is in mathematics that one sort of object is 
reduced to another must be a vexing question, since the notion 
of mathematical object is vexing. Our connection to any 
mathematical objects, if they indeed exist, is decidedly 
tenuous; but to determine that a particular object, say the 
universal class, can or cannot be viewed as identical to the 
ordered pair <'%=rv, s) may seem to rest too much on this 
already frail link. It is in any event quite obvious that 
our conception of a successful mathematical reduction and 
our notion of a mathematical object are so bound up that we 
must deal with them both to deal with either. We shall 
start with some thoughts about mathematical objects. 
Naively, the most appealing view on the ontological 
status of mathematical objects is, perhaps, a platonism of 
the sort Godel espoused. Godel's position is that mathemati- 
cal objects exist independently of us and constitute a well 
determined totality. As with physical objects, what mathe- 
matical objects there are is determined by the nature of the 
external world. Every sentence in the language of mathematics 
has a determinate truth value, whether we can determine it 
. -. 
or not, if we intend our sentences in the natural way, so 
that universal quantifiers range over all collections (i.e., 
all mathematical objects), and 'e' is interpreted as member- 
ship. Indeed, it may seem difficult to separate Godel's view 
that the world of mathematical objects forms a well deter- 
mined totality from thls view that we can--sp intend our 
quantifiers and our primitive predicate(s). For it may seem 
constitutive of the notion of a well determined totality that 
we are able to employ such intentions; if we cannot in 
principle find out the truth value of all the sentences we 
use, we can accomodate this by thumping hard on the distinc- 
tion between ontology and epistemology; but if we cannot in- 
tend our quantifiers to range over all objects, or our primi- 
tive predicates each to have a unique interpretation, does 
it make sense to speak of the world out there as being none- 
theless entirely well determined? In a few pages, we will 
consider this question at length. 
In any case, there will be more on this in due time. 
Now let us observe that if we can employ our quantifiers and 
primitive predicates as Godel thinks we can, then the truth 
values of - all our mathematical sentences are determined. This 
seems trivial enough to see, by induction. Suppose that Q is 
of the form y,,vcpl or . Then if it is determinate whether 
satisfies and and then whether satis- 
fies y : it is not the truth functions that make for possible 
indeterminacy of truth value (or, more precisely, satisfaction 
value). Now assume that it is determinate for any sequence 
s, whether or not it satisfies p(x). Then, inasmuch as we 
can so intend the universal quantifier that it ranges over 
all objects, the satisfaction value of * p&) must be fixed 
-
by that intention. For this, evidently, is what it would 
mean to succeed in referring to - all objects. Indeed, in the 
usual case, when philosophers say that a certain mathematical 
sentence is indeterminate, it appears to be the interpretation 
of the quantifier that they question. For example, one often 
hears the continuum hypothesis i s  indeterminate for  the 
following reason. How do we know tha t  for  any set. 'of subsets 
of , there w i l l  ex i s t  a one-one correspondence between 
tha t  s e t  and e i ther  a or the s e t  of - a l l  subsets of w ? 6 
For what, proceeds the objection, i s  to  be included under 
the 'any ' ,  the ' a l l ' ,  and the ' there  e x i s t s ' ?  In f a c t ,  
routinely when the independence of the CH or AC or  v i r tua l ly  
any other assertion i s  proved, i t  i s  accomplished a t  l e a s t  
i n  part  by changing the domain of the s t a r t ing  model, and 
therefore the interpretat ion of the quant if iers .  
Finally,  there are  the atomic predicates. It might 
seem that  the atomic predicates, surely,  are unambiguous i n  
the i r  interpretat ion.  For instance, given se t s  a and b ,  i t  
would appear perfectly determined from what we mean by '6' 
whether a b or not.  However, there are  an i n f i n i t e  number 
of relat ions involving se t s  that  are completely isomorphic 
to the 6 re la t ion ;  tha t  i s ,  there i s  a one-one map F from 
V to  V such tha t  x 8 y i f f  F (x) e* F (y) . An example of such 
a map can be obtained by the following device. Define X b*y 
thus: 
x q y  i f f  X = < ~ , ~ > & Y = ( W , \ ) + ~ ~ W .  Let F(x) = (Y,I>. 
Then, c lear ly ,  t h i s  new C* re la t ion  i s  isomorphic to  the o l d  
e re la t ion;  hence, precisely those sentences w i l l  be true i n  
th i s  model interpreting 'g' as €*as would be interpreting 
'G '  as 6 . Now a r e  our intent ions  about how we mean 'a' 
so unequivocal tha t  they pick out the "real" Q r e l a t ion  of 
V, and not the i r  r e l a t i o n  of the new in te rp re t a t ion?  It 
i s  r a the r  d i f f i c u l t  to  escape the conclusion t h a t ,  a t  l e a s t  
t o  some extent ,  our in tent ions  i n  using 'B' a re  vague, and 
tha t  i n  pa r t i cu la r  they cannot discriminate between and€+. 
One might respond to  t h i s :  But we do have the i n t u i t i o n  
tha t  we know per fec t ly  well what 'E' means, as we ord inar i ly  
use i t ;  we mean member - o f ,  and c l ea r ly  the e+ r e l a t i o n  i s  
not tha t  r e l a t ion !  But i s  t h i s  s o r t  of i n t u i t i v e  appeal any- 
thing more than a  r e t r e a t  t o  a  background theory i n  which '&' 
already understood? Naturally,  from the standpoint 
background theory i n  which we have already a t  hand a  ce r t a in  
& r e l a t i o n ,  and concomitantly a  ce r t a in  universe V ,  the d i s -  
t i nc t ion  between E and E+ i s  qu i te  straightforward.  But 
the problem i s  tha t  our use of the background theory might 
not be such tha t  the 'e' predicate i n  tha t  theory must be 
interpreted as e and not Ct 
With regard to  physical ob jec t s ,  one 's  in tent ions  seem 
to  suf fe r  l e s s  from t h i s  s o r t  of vagueness. In tha t  realm. 
the pa lpabi l i ty  of the objects, which allows such devices as  
ostension, seems to  f i x  intended in te rpre ta t ions  ra ther  more 
decis ively .  I f  we want to  r u l e  out as  unintended cer ta in  
in te rpre ta t ions  of some predicate t h a t  holds between macro- 
scopic objects,we can very of ten point t o  some objects  tha t  
would be r e l a t ed  under the unintended in t e rp re t a t ion ,  and 
then deny tha t  they a re  i n  the extension of the predicate 
as we wish to  construe i t .  Ostension of t h i s  kind i s  
evidently not avai lable  to  us fo r  mathematical ob jec ts .  A t  
bes t ,  we can employ what Quine c a l l s  deferred ostension,  
e . g . ,  pointing t o  the symbol ' 6 '  and meaning t o  r e f e r  to  4 .  
But deferred ostension i s  of l i t t l e  help here,  inasmuch as 
the  d i f f i c u l t y  then becomes to  show we have managed to  r e f e r  
t o  one mathematical object  and not another when we point t o  
' To use another example, suppose we wished t o  r u l e  out 
the €+ r e l a t ion  as inappropriate as  an in t e rp re t a t ion  of 'el, 
i n  a  manner l i k e  t h a t  described f o r  predicates of macroscopic 
objects  . We might point t o  I<*, ' and then to  '<543, I >  
and f i n a l l y  deny the two e n t i t i e s  thus re fer red  t o  by deferred 
ostension bear the C r e l a t i o n  to  each other .  But what i s  i t  
we have referred to  by pointing as  '<+, 1)' and l(I$3,1)'? 
Are they($,\) and (j#j,l) or  ra ther  and i@j? I f  the l a t t e r ,  
then we have done something we a re  concerned to  avoid: ru l ing  
out the genuine e r e l a t i o n  as a  possible intended in te rpre ta -  
t i on  of 'GI .  Now how i t  i s ,  exactly,  ostension might work well 
for  macroscopic objects ,  and not so well  fo r  mathematical ob- 
j e c t s ,  i s  a  problem of considerable sub t l e ty ;  most of ten,  such 
an account appeals to  causal connections between us and p h y s i c a l  
objects .  There a re  those,  however, who have no truck with t h i s  
or  any other way of making a  d i s t inc t ion  between how we r e f e r  
to physical objects, and how we refer to matl~ematical objects: 
perhaps Putnam, in "Realism and Reason" and in "Models and 
Reality", can be read to support this position, I am per- 
suaded that there - is an important difference between the two 
cases; what this difference is should soon become evident, 
But first we must discuss what mathematical objects might be, 
and why they are both problematic and inevitable. 
The math:matical objects picture that to Godel is flesh 
of his flesh and bone of his bone is one difficult to assimil- 
ate for others. Those of us who have said in our hearts there 
is no transcendent reality will not sit comfortably with this 
view; for the differences between mathematical and transcendent 
objects are less profound than their similarities; both trans- 
cendent and mathematical objects are not locatable in space 
and time; both are causally inert; both are eternal. And 
yet there are not in the field many credible alternatives 
to a belief in mathematical objects. Kreisel has said that 
for a philos~pher of mathematics what is at issue is not the 
existence of mathematical objects, but the existence of mathe- 
matical objectivity. Perhaps. But here we are, stuck, it 
seems, with theories that say there is a set of a11 numbers, 
there is an uncountable cardinal, and more embarrassingly 
extravagant things even than these. And it is difficult to 
make out how we are going to avoid taking these sentences to 
mean exactly what they appear to say, Indeed, the only view 
that appears to get round the mathematical objects picture 
is the one proposed by Putnam, and lately taken up by Par- 
sons, on which the notion of possibility assumes the burden 
of supporting mathematical objectivity. Insofar as we have 
serious doubts about the notion of possibility, this move 
avails us nothing, however. Intuitionism, which might seem 
to offer succor in this extremity, seems in fact no less 
otherworldly in its commitments than platonism. For intuition- 
ism is scarcely a species of finitism: the varieties of mental 
constructions that must be real for intuitionism to be plaus- 
ible already far outstrips any mental constructions we actually 
have or ever will have. On the score of remoteness from the 
everyday world, intuitionism seems no better off than platonism. 
Evidently, some think Quine has a kind of platonism 
that avoids the problems with trancendence troubling Godel's 
more "naive" view. I do not see this. Quine's view is that 
we need to posit mathematical entities in order to do physics, 
and we need to do physics in order to explain sensory stimula- 
tions. So it is only the program of accounting for such stimu- 
lations that leads us to posit mathematical entities, This 
supposed fact is purported to make empirically respectable 
the existence of mathematical objects, But it seems really 
not to bear on the issue at all. For we surely feel an obliga- 
tion to explain how it is we can know anything about the 
physical objects we posit, over -- and above observing we must 
assume then1 i n  any exp lana t ion  of sensory  e x p e r i e n c e ,  That 
i s ,  t h e  t a s k  of  exp la in ing  how we come t o  know about phys ica l  
o b j e c t s  i s  one undertaken c h i e f l y  by p h y s i o l o g i s t s ,  neurolo-  
g i s t s ,  and neuropsycho log i s t s .  The t a s k  of accounting f o r  
our  sensory  exper ience  i s  more i n  the  province  of t h e  phys i -  
c i s t ,  t h e  chemis t ,  t h e  b i o l o g i s t ,  e t c .  I n s o f a r  a s  t h e s e  two 
t a s k s  a r e  s e p a r a t e ,  we w i l l  n o t  d i scharge  our  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  
e x p l a i n  how we come t o  know about p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  by account-  
i n g  f o r  our  sensory  exper ience .  I t  may be s a i d  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  
s c i e n c e  t h a t  encompasses both  t h e s e  e n t e r p r i s e s  manages t o  
f u s e  them i n t o  one.  But c e r t a i n l y  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n s  of t h e  two 
endeavors a r e  q u i t e  d i s k i n c t :  one s t a r t s  w i t h  sensory  s t imu-  
l a t i o n s  a s  g iven ,  and proceeds t o  p o s i t  v a r i o u s  o b j e c t s  t o  
g i v e  t h e s e  s t i m u l a t i o n s  coherence and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ;  t h e  
o t h e r  s t a r t s  w i t h  t h e  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  a s  g iven ,  and a t t empts  
t o  show how they  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  our  sensory  o rgans ,  and how our  
sensory organs i n t e r a c t  w i t h  our  nervouo system t o  f u r n i s h  
us  w i t h  j u s t  those  sensory  exper iences  we have ,  And so  long 
a s  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  i n  t h i s  way, we may a s k :  
How i s  i t  we a r e  exempt from an o b l i g a t i o n  t o  show how, assum- 
i n g  mathematical  o b j e c t s  a s  g i v e n ,  we can come t o  know about 
them? This  ques t ion  Q u i n e ' s  view does n o t  a d d r e s s .  
There is  a  c e r t a i n  h i s t o r i c a l  i rony  i n  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  
nowadays pa id  t o  t h e  problem of how we can come t o  know about 
mathematical  o b j e c t s ,  For t h i s  problem i s  t h e  i n v e r s e  problem 
of one Descartes dealt with, Descartes was at great pains 
to explain how it is that we, as immaterial substances, 
could manage 20 perceive the material world. In our more 
naturalistic age, we are instead perplexed by how we, as 
material objects, can have knowledge of immaterial mathe- 
matical objects. Descartes dealt with his problem by lo- 
cating the scene of interaction between the immaterial mind 
and the material world in the pineal gland. Doubtless some 
philosopher, alert to the relevance of bygone philosophy to 
contemporary thought, will find in the pineal gland a solution 
to our problems, mutatis mutandis, 
At all events, Mark Steiner has a different way out of 
8 our present difficulty; in my estimation, no more viable. 
His idea is in brief this. To give a causal account of how 
we acquire knowledge of something, we must appeal to some 
background theory. But "the axioms of analysis, as inter- 
preted by the platonist, will indeed necessarily be used in 
whatever causal explanation can be given of our belief that 
the axioms, again as interpreted by the platonist, are true. " 
This somehow absolves us, on Steir~er's view, of providing 
further explanation. I fail to understand this. Presumably, 
any background theory that we would employ to give a causal 
account of our knowledge of physical objects would assume 
their existence, But does the presence of such an assumption 
i n  i t s e l f  q u a l i f y  t h e  t h e o r y  a s  an e x p l a n a t i o n  of  t h i s  know- 
-
l e d g e ?  No: we demand more of  t h e  t h e o r y ;  t h e  t heo ry  must 
show how - i t  i s  t h a t  p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  u s .  Our 
c u r r e n t  p u z z l e  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h i s :  What account  o f  ou r  i n t e r -  
a c t i o n  w i t h  ma thema t i ca l  o b j e c t s  can  be o b t a i n ,  o r  why should  
no such accoun t  be  sough t?  To r e q u i r e  a c a u s a l  account  o f  
o u r  " i n t e r a c t i o n "  w i t h  mathemat ica l  o b j  e c t s  seems out: of t h e  
q u e s t i o n ;  even t o  demand an accoun t  o f  o u r  " i n t e r a c t i o n "  i s  
t o  a s k  t o o  much. But what i s  l e f t ?  
We s e e ,  t h e n ,  some o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  accompanying t h e  
view t h a t  we can know about  mathemat ica l  o b j e c t s .  These d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s  i n  ep is temology  may d e r i v e  from d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  t h e  
ph i lo sophy  o f  l anguage .  L a t e l y ,  many p h i l o s o p h e r s  have grounded 
t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  knowing abou t  an  o b j e c t  r e q u i r e s  some s p e c i a l  
c a u s a l  connec t ion  t o  i t ,  i n  t h e  more b a s i c  c l a i m  t h a t  even t o  
r e f e r  t o  an  o b j e c t  r e q u i r e s  such a  c o n n e c t i o n .  The p l a u s i b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  c a u s a l  t h e o r y  o f  r e f e r e n c e  p l a c e s  a g r e a t  onus on t h e  
p l a t o n i s t .  H e  must e x p l a i n  how we can r e f e r  t o  mathemat ica l  
o b j e c t s ,  and how we can  indeed  i n t e n d  ou r  p r e d i c a t e s  s o  t h a t  
t h e y  p i c k  o u t  a p p r o p r i a t e  r e l a t i o n s .  A s  I have n o t e d ,  Godel 
had the somewhat q u a i n t  view t h a t  we can employ t h e  language 
o f  mathemat ics ,  i . e . ,  t h e  language o f  s e t  t h e o r y ,  s o  t h a t  i t  
p i c k s  o u t  a un ique  i n t e n d e d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  But Godel h imse l f  
d i d  n o t  seem t o  t a k e  t h i s  v iew w i t h  g r e a t  s e r i o u s n e s s  a t  a l l  
t i m e s .  When a r g u i n g  f o r  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t e n e s s  o f  t h e  t r u t h  v a l u e  
of CH,  Godel f e e l s  compelled t o  say we can develop i n t u i -  
t i o n s  about  axioms t h a t  would dec ide  C H ,  and LO say i t  i s  
i n  p a r t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of such i n t u i t i o n s  t h a t  g i v e s  the  
q u e s t i o n  of t h e  t r u t h  v a l u e  of CH meaning, A t  no p o i n t  does 
Godel propose an argument t o  show t h a t ,  f o r  any sentence  of 
s e t  t h e o r y ,  such i n t u i t i o n s  may be for thcoming.  I f ,  a s  Godel 
c l a ims ,  t h e  term 'el p icks  ou t  but  one r e l a t i o n ,  t h e  member- 
s h i p  r e l a t i o n ,  why do we need such i n t u i t i o n s  t o  g i v e  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  of t h e  t r u t h  va lue  of CH meaning? Tn f a c t ,  i f  'el 
p icks  ou t  j u s t  one r e l a t i o n ,  i t  seems c l e a r  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of such i n t u i t i o n s  t h a t  s e r v e s  t o  do t h i s ,  For 
suppose a l l  - t h e  sen tences  of s e t  theory  were determined by 
such i n t u i t i o n s ;  t h e r e  would y e t  be an i n f i n i t e  number of 
r e l a t i o n s  'e' could  be i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  mean, w i t h  a l l  t r u e  
sentences  coming o u t  t r u e  on each such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  I f  
we can s o  employ 'C' t h a t  i t  l a t c h e s  onto  a  unique r e l a t i o n ,  
t h a t  we can do s o  must n o t  be only  because we determine the  
t r u t h  va lues  of t h e  sentences  of s e t  t h e o r y .  Indeed, i t  
seems Godel makes a move subvers ive  t o  h i s  view when he looks 
t o  i n t u i t i v e  axioms t o  f i x  t h e  t r u t h  v a l u e  of C H ,  For he 
thereby impl ies  our  acceptance of t h e o r i e s  p lays  t h e  primary 
r o l e  i n  e f f e c t i n g  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  our  p r e d i c a t e s ,  But ,  
e v i d e n t l y ,  i f  we a r e  t o  s e c u r e  a  unique i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  f o r  
t h e  'el p r e d i c a t e ,  we must conceive t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  of i n t e r -  
p r e t i n g  language t o  be l a r g e l y  independent of what t h e o r i e s ,  
i n  d e t a i l ,  we adop t .  
I say " in  d e t a i l "  h e r e ,  because i t .  may be t h a t  t h e  
e n t e r p r i s e  of i n t e r p r e t i n g  language uniquely  cannot g e t  
moving, u n l e s s  we hold  some a p p r o p r i a t e  t h e o r y ,  Thus, i t  may 
be i f  we do n o t  hold  ZF, o r  some s i g n i f i c a n t  subse t  of ZF, 
we do n o t  have good enough a  g rasp  of 'C' t o  g i v e  i t  any 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  much l e s s  a  unique one .  But ,  c e r t a i n l y ,  i f  
we a r e  t o  o b t a i n  a  unique i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  f o r  ' C ' ,  we must 
a t  some time go beyond t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of t h e o r i e s  we do 
o r  might adop t .  
Godel has more t o  say about  t h e  de terminateness  of 
t h e  t r u t h  v a l u e  of C H .  I f  an axiom i s  f r u i t f u l ,  Godel c l a i m s ,  
we have a  prima f a c i e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  accep t  i t ;  and,  s i n c e  
such an axiom might dec ide  C H ,  t h e  t r u t h  va lue  of CH i s  ground- 
ed i n  t h i s  f a sh ion  a s  w e l l .  This  view i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  vexing .  
There i s  t h e  problem j u s t  mentioned, t h e  i m p l i c i t  assumption 
t h a t  we can f i x  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of language only v i a  t h e  
t h e o r i e s ,  i n  d e t a i l ,  we a c c e p t .  Again, f o r  Godel, t h i s  
assumption has i n t o l e r a b l e  consequences.  But a s i d e  from t h i s  
problem, t h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r .  Why should we t a k e  t h e  f r u i t f u l n e s s  
of sn axiom a s  evidence f o r  i t s  t r u t h ?  This  i s  a s e r i o u s  
d i f f i c u l t y ,  because t h e r e  might w e l l  be a  p a i r  of sen tences  
wi th  t h e  fo l lowing f e a t u r e :  one sen tence  i n  t h e  p a i r  dec ides  
( f r u i t f u l l y )  c e r t a i n  open ques t ions  i n  one d i r e c t i o n ;  t h e  
o t h e r  sentence  dec ides  ( f r u i t f u l l y )  t h e  very same ques t ions  i n  
the opposite direction; and both sentences are consistent 
with everything we believe. I can descry no reason to rule 
out such a pair. Indeed, if one is unsure of AC, AD and V=L 
will constitute such a pair; for AD requires AC to be false, 
and V=L requires AC to be true. 
Let us now draw a certain inference from our discussion 
of Godel, It is highly dubious that considerations of fruit- 
fulness (even if allowed) combined with considerations of 
intuitive evidence, could ever decide the infinite number of 
sentences of set theory. We are only finite beings, and the 
human race probably will not survive forever. And, should 
humans not as a race always be around, it seems obvious that 
only a recursive set of axioms will be intuited, or be found 
fruitful. But even if we did continue on endlessly, we would 
be little better off, at least in an endeavor to secure the 
ruth values of a11 mathematical sentences, For when one 
comes to appreciate the general applicability of diagonal 
arguments, one begins to suspect the worst: There are 
sentences of set theory that, 1) do not follow from anything 
we, as finite beings, can manage to intuit, because they are 
so complex, and, 2) will not be fruitful for any questions 
less complex than themselves. But the existence of such 
sentences would, even if we should live forever, make it 
impossible to determine the truth value of each sentence oE 
set theory at some time. 
From t h e  fo rego ing ,  we may conclude t h a t  none of t h e  
s e t  t h e o r i e s  t o  which we do, o r  even might a s s e n t  a r e  complete .  
But suppose we can p ick  o u t  a  more s e l e c t  group of i n t e r p r e t a -  
t i o n s  than  t h a t  c o n s i s t i n g  of those  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  compatible 
wi th  t h e  t h e o r i e s  we do o r  might a c c e p t .  I t  cannot be t h a t  we 
p ick  o u t  some group of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  c o n s i s t i n g  of a l l  i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n s  compatible  wi th  some complete t h e o r y ;  f o r  t h e r e  i s  
no complete theory  involved i n  our  a t t empt  t o  f i x  an i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n .  Rather ,  our a t t e m p t ,  i f  s u c c e s s f u l ,  must be a 
d i r e c t  matching ~*,p of a  p r e d i c a t e  and a  r e l a t i o n .  Once i t  
i s  g ran ted  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no way of achieving  t h i s  r e f e r e n c e  
t o  a  unique r e l a t i o n ,  we seem s t u c k  w i t h  an unappeal ing view. 
Namely, we cannot r u l e  out  a  r e l a t i o n  a s  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of 
a p r e d i c a t e  i f  such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  compatible  wi th  those  
t h e o r i e s  we might ever  a c c e p t .  
Now l e t  us  s e e  t h e  r e l evance  of t h e  foregoing  t o  t h e  
i s s u e  of o n t o l o g i c a l  r e d u c t i o n .  There i s  a t  f i r s t  b l u s h ,  
and I b e l i e v e  on l a t e r  b l u s h e s ,  a  connect ion between two 
q u e s t i o n s ,  Suppose we a r e  committed t o  a c e r t a i n  theory .  
Consider t h e  ontology of t h i s  t h e o r y .  A number of maps w i l l  
e x i s t  t h a t  go from t h i s  onto logy i n t o  o r  onto  i t s e l f .  A g r e a t  
many of t h e s e  maps (an i n f i n i t e  number i n  g e n e r a l  f o r  t h e o r i e s  
wi th  i n f i n i t e  o n t o l o g i e s )  w i l l  p r e s e r v e  t h e  t r u t h  va lues  of t h e  
sen tences  of  t h e  theory  under some t r a n s l a t i o n  of t h e  p r e d i c a t e s ;  
of t h e  maps t h a t  p rese rve  t r u t h ,  many w i l l  p rese rve  f u r t h e r  
important properties. Now one might take a select po~tion 
of these maps to show that our commitment to the ontology 
of the theory is no different whether we embrace the original 
structure, or the structure we get by the map; this despite 
the fact that the new structure may look very different from 
the original structure, from the point of view of the original 
structure. Which maps can occasion this sort of "indeterminacy" 
is the first question. Now Quine allows that any one-one map 
expressible in the theory will count as such a map. I will 
argue that this is too generous. 
In any event, the second question has to do with 
ontological reduction, When one theory is reduced to another, 
the structure of the reduced theory is mapped via some func- 
tional into the reducing theory. Typically, this functional 
can be expressed in the reducing theory. Given two theories, 
and the ontologies of these theories, there may be any number 
of maps between these two ontologies that preserve the truth 
of the sentences in the first theory, under some translation 
of the predicates. Which of these maps are to count as provid- 
ing ontological reductions? This is the second question, 
Here Quine again allows that any map expressible in 
the reducing theory will effect a reduction, Quine's consis- 
tency in his treatment of the two cases 1 admire, and is prer 
cisely to my purpose; I disagree only about the promiscuous- 
ness of his constraints in both cases. Shortly I shall pre- 
s e n t  some f u r t h e r  c o n s t r a i n t s  f o r  both  c a s e s ;  c o n s t r a i n t s  
t h a t  must come t o  p lay  p r e c i s e l y  because of such cases  a s  
t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  would-be r e d u c t i o n  of NB t o  ZFT. For now, 
l e t  us  a t t e n d  t o  t h e  u n i t y  of t h e s e  two q u e s t i o n s .  
To t ake  t h e  two ques t ions  t o  be u l t i ~ ~ ~ a t e l y  one i s  t o  
r e i n f o r c e  t h e  view of o n t o l o g i c a l  r e d u c t i o n  1 s e t  f o r t h  i n  
t h e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r .  There I urged t h a t  t o  show one ontology 
can be reduced t o  another  i s  t o  show t h a t  commitment t o  t h e  
reducing  ontology r e q u i r e s  commitment t o  t h e  reduced onto logy.  
For cons ide r  how we would j u s t i f y  s e e i n g  t h e s e  two ques t ions  
a s  one; presumably,  i t  would proceed l i k e  t h i s ,  1 )  Cases 
of o n t o l o g i c a l  r e d u c t i o n  j u s t  a r e  cases  i n  which commitment 
t o  t h e  reducing ontology r e q u i r e s  commitment t o  t h e  reduced 
onto logy.  2 )  The case  of  t h e  ontology of a  theory  being 
mapped i n t o  i t s e l f ,  i n  which commitment t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
ob ta ined  by t h e  map i s  the  same a s  commitment t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
s t r u c t u r e ,  i s  bu t  a  degenera te  case  of 1 ) ;  t h a t  i s ,  when a  
t h e o r y ' s  ontology i s  mapped i n t o  i t s e l f ,  t h e  theory i s  i t s  
own reducing t h e o r y ,  and t o  be committed t o  t h e  ontology of 
t h i s  theory  i s  t o  be committed t o  t h e  onto logy of t h e  theory 
t h a t  has  been mapped i n t o  i t s e l f ,  namely, i t s  own on to logy ,  
Perhaps an example w i l l  be of some s e r v i c e  h e r e .  Suppose w e  
show i n  Peano Ar i thmet ic  t h a t  a l l  even numbers can ,  on t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  map, and t r a n s l a t i o n ,  model PA. Then, cons ide r ing  
t h e  reducing  theory  t o  be PA, we can say t h a t  t o  be committed 
t o  i t s  ontology r e q u i r e s  commitment t o  t h e  ontology of t h e  
theory  modelled i n  i t ;  t h i s  theory  i s ,  of c o u r s e ,  PA i t s e l f .  
That i s ,  from t h e  s t andpo in t  of PA, one can s e e  t h a t  commit- 
ment t o  i t s  even numbers i s  t h e  same a s  commitment t o  a l l  i t s  
numbers; t h i s  i s  what an o n t o l o g i c a l  r e d u c t i o n  of numbers t o  
even numbers would mean. 
As an a s i d e ,  l e t  me observe t h a t ,  wi th  t h e  preceding 
i n  mind, we can o b v i a t e  a  c e r t a i n  argument of L e s l i e  Tharp. 
He w r i t e s  : 
It i s  r a t h e r  s t a r t l i n g  t o  r e f l e c t  t h a t  t h e r e  
a r e  many s e l f - r e d u c i n g  t h e o r i e s ,  and i n  f a c t  
t h e  most important  t h e o r i e s  have t h i s  prop- 
e r t y  ( t h e  p r o p e r t y  of  being a b l e  t o  model 
themselves i n  a  proper  subdomain). For 
example, t h e  s e t  of numbers l a r g e r  than 16 
can be proved i n  a r i t h m e t i c  t o  form a  do- 
main of a  model of a r i t h m e t i c .  A s i m i l a r  
s i t u a t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n  s e t  theory  i f  one l e t s  
f $ J  t a k e  t h e  r o l e  of 4 and extends t h e  
correspondence i n  t h e  obvious s a y ;  he re  t h e  
same r e l a t i o n  i s  used i n  t h e  submodel a s  i n  
t h e  s t a r t i n g  model. No one could mainta in  
t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  i n t e r e s t i n g  examples of r e -  
d u c t i o n ;  so they  a r e  i n s t r u c t i v e  i n  t h a t  they 
tend  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  what r e d u c t i o n  cannot be 
abou t .  9 
Now I do not know if I can maintain that Tharp's examples 
are generally interesting cases of reduction; I find them 
interesting; but more to the point, I find them to be cases 
of reduction. 
Now let us observe that, in 7ases of ontological re- 
duction, we seem to require something quite strong: all -
true sentences in the language of the reduced theory must 
be true on the furnished translation into the language of 
the reducing theory. This might seem to leave us in an odd 
situation, On the one hand, we have granted that there is 
a sentence of set theory such that our use of ' $ I  is indiffer- 
l ent to whether the interpretation of 6' makes that sentence 
true, or whether it makes it false; let us say that CH is 
such a sentence. On the other hand, we are presently claim- 
ing that if the ontology of ZF were to be reduced to another, 
all true sentences in the language of ZF must be true on the 
provided translation into the language of the reducing theory, 
including CH, or the negation of CH, whichever (unknown to 
us) is true. But this situation may not be as unnatural as 
it may appear. Ontological reductions hold, at the base, 
between structures, ontologies; the indeterminacy that may 
exist in the interpretation of our language arises from a 
relation between words and structures. The strictures for 
ontic reduction we night thus expect to be more severe than 
those for the fixing of interpretations of our language; 
for these two would seem to differ in much the same way as 
what there is differs from what we can know. 
I think that more than truth must be preserved in 
any map and translation that would provide an ontological re- 
duction; indeed, I think the preservation of truth derives 
from the fact that more basic, algebraic features must be 
preserved. But let us return to the cases of clearcut, and 
possible reductions we had considered earlier. One ua3,ient 
feature of the reduction of PA + ZF to ZF is the naturalness 
of the transition Erom the ontology of che one to the ontology 
of the other. The manner in which the number theory of PA + 
ZF is embedded into the structure of ZF is quite nice alge- 
braically, in the way that the & structure reflects the opera- 
tions of successor, addition, and multiplication. Paul 
Benacerraf, in "What Numbers Could Not Be", argues that if 
a progression is to model the natural numbers, that progression 
must be recursive. 10 This constraint strikes me as reasonable, 
although perhaps requiring some reformulation; I believe that 
the progression must be computable, because the structure that 
is embedded into ZF must derive its features in a direct way 
from the structure of ZF itself. Thus the progression of 
numbers is certainly recursive from the standpoint of PA; 
but then the structure that is embedded in ZF, which is to model 
FA, must derive its recursiveness straightfarwardly from 
computable relations in ZF. 
Now the notion of recursiveness is ordinarily defined 
using arithmeticalpredicates. Hence it may seem wrongheaded 
to insist that the relation between the proxies of each num- 
ber and its successor be recursive; that notion could only 
make sense, presumably, after the translation has been effect- 
ed. That is, a relation is recursive depending on whether it 
can be expressed by certain simple arithmetical predicates; 
the progression of proxies for numbers, whatever that- pro- 
gression may be, is clearly going to be one of these, under 
the translation of the arithmetical predicates, 
I think the nerve of Benacerraf's point, however, is 
unaffected by the foregoing consideration. The basic intui- 
tion lying behind Benacerraf's point is, I think, this. It 
is appropriate to identify the progression of numbers with, 
say, the progression of the ordered pairs that standardly 
code up formulas. But it is not appropriate to identify the 
progression of numbers with the subprogression of the arith- 
metical truths, since this new progression is too complex 
in its nature. Now this complexity can be adequately charac- 
terized strictly from the standpoint of set theoretic notions, 
without introducing the notion of recursiveness, For the 
basic notion of computable function can be understood from 
this standpoint; indeed, the notion of computable function is 
p excellence a notion that seems to be amenable to formula- 
tion in many ways, with recursive function being just one such 
formulation. The notion of computable function, in its 
perhaps most intuitive characterization, is cast in terms of 
finiteness, and the notion of finite can be captured in set 
theory. The characterization I have in mind is this: A 
function is computable if it takes finite objects to finite 
objects using an algorithm, which is of finite length, It 
is thus quite easy to formulate the notion of a computable 
function using strictly the language of set theory. And it 
is, of course, quite easy to show that the progression of 
arithmetic truths is not computable. So from set theory L V C  
can see that some progressions are less complex than others, 
We recognize that the relation between a number and its 
successor should be as simple as possible; hence we insisc 
that the relation be a computable one. 
Perhaps another example will help convey the point 
about how structures should be embedded to effect reductions, 
I have presented what I take to be a reduction of ZF to ZF, 
using the map x---)(x,l). Why do I consider this a reduction7 
Consider the new relation that interprets ' € '  under the trans- 
lation; that is, the relation €+ such that 
"v ~ ~ ~ ~ C A = < U , O S ~ = < V , \ ) C ~ . U ' )  
This new 6 relation must derive its important: mathematical 
properties from like properties of the relations of 2F. And 
this, of course, it does; for example, the well-Eoundednesu 
of comes about in a direct manner from the well-foundedness 
OE e . 
Contrast, now, the case of NB and ZFT. One sees how 
unnaturally the 6 structure of NB is reflected in ZF, under 
the map and translation furnished, in the artificiality of 
the definition of C,,,: there is virtually no important rela- 
tion between those things related by 6 under ZFT and those 
related by EN.. For the ehO relation involves the Sat pre- 
dicate in its definition, and indeed in any translation be- 
tween the two theories the Sat predicate or the like would 
be involved essentially. Symptomatic of the radical rearrange- 
ment of entities under €&@ is the fact that the proxy in ZFT 
for the universal class of NB is, under d in ZFT, only 
finitely high; this despite the fact that the universal class 
is as high, in the structure of NB, as is possible. Now 
perhaps if this were the only anomaly, we would still be will- 
ing to call it a reduction; but such anomalies are systematic 
and inescapable, and I am persuaded chat we are loath, for 
this reason, to think NB can be reduced to ZFT. 
In addition to the foregoing considerations, which are 
rather subtle, and clearly not yet fully developed, there are 
more obvious considerations bearing on the establishing of 
ontological reduction. Certainly, one necessary condition 
of ontological reduction would be this: The reduced structure 
and the structure that mirrors it in the reducing structure 
must have the same cardinality. Or at least this is so if we 
do not have demonstrably superfluous entities running about, 
a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of c e r t a i n  s t r u c t u r e s  t h a t  Richard Grandy 
has c o n t r i v e d .  Such cases  a r e  easy enough t o  mark o f f  from 
t h e  r e s t  t h a t  they  can s a f e l y  be cons idered  a  s e p a r a t e  s p e c i e s ,  
a s  Quine a r g u e s .  
I n  any e v e n t ,  t h e  proxy f u n c t i o n  requirement  Quine 
imposes, and which we have cons ide red ,  may be seen a s ,  i n  
p a r t ,  a  way of p rese rv ing  c a r d i n a l i t y  from t h e  reduced s t r u c -  
t u r e  t o  i t s  m i r r o r i n g  s t r u c t u r e .  But t h e r e  i s  more t h a t  can 
be s a i d  f o r  i t .  I t  f i g u r e s ,  i n  an obvious ly  c r u c i a l  f a s h i o n ,  
i n  provid ing  t h i s  m i r r o r i n g  s t r u c t u r e ,  and i n  guarantee ing  
t h a t  i t  w i l l  m i r r o r  i n  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  p o s s i b l e  manner; t h a t  
i s ,  t h a t  i t  w i l l  be isomorphic t o  t h e  reduced s t r u c t u r e .  
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